The discursive construction of discrimination: the representation of ethnic diversity in the Korean public service broadcasting news by Joo, Jaewon
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Discursive Construction of Discrimination 
 
The Representation of Ethnic Diversity  
in the Korean Public Service Broadcasting News 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jaewon Joo 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Media and Communications in 
partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
April 2012 
 
 
 
2 
 
Declaration 
 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than 
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of 
any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced 
without the prior written consent of the author. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of 
any third party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my parents, 
Myung-Hwan Joo & Gap-Yeon Lee 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 
Globalisation has intensified the international movement of labour and South Korea is 
no exception. Korea, which in the past was itself a labour-exporting country, has seen a 
reversal in human mobility since the late 1990‟s with a rapid growth in immigration and 
a transformation of a previously almost ethnically homogenous society. However, 
studies on migrant and ethnic minority groups in Korea have primarily focussed on 
such areas as industrial law and social policy. In this context, the important questions 
about the cultural and political implications associated with the construction of minority 
representations in the media have remained highly unexplored. The starting point of 
this study is an examination of the vital role of public service broadcasting (PSB) in 
Korean society, where ethnic minorities have increasingly become visible. Korean 
PSB‟s mandate, following the BBC model, emphasises the broadcaster‟s responsibility 
to represent and reflect the range of public opinion and experiences beyond class, age, 
ethnicity and ideological orientation. Despite this commitment what this study shows is 
that PSB in South Korea has failed to fairly represent the culturally diverse groups 
within Korean society. 
 
The main purpose of this study is to empirically examine the means through which PSB 
generates discourses of We-ness and Otherness at times of change in the Korean society. 
Empirically, the study focuses on primetime PSB news‟ visual and textual 
representations of migrants and ethnic minorities. With the use of critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) it demonstrates that PSB gives a concrete form to the ideological 
constructions of Otherness, sometimes transforming subtle cultural or social differences 
into fundamental and oppositional ones. Korean PSB appears to be ideologically biased 
toward nationalism, while in its visual and textual representations it constructs 
ideological systems of social and racial stratification, with Southeast Asian migrants 
constantly represented as the ultimate Others. The study shows the significant role of 
PSB in representing cultural diversity in public debates and the ways in which such 
representations and their dissemination reflect media power.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Media can be one important way in which groups who have never 
been in face-to-face contact can begin to think of themselves as 
Indonesian or Indian or Malaysian. 
(Appadurai, 1998: 8) 
 
 
1.1. Context of Research 
 
The rapidly increasing mobility of populations is a central aspect of the widespread 
social transformations occurring in the world (Castles, 1998). Although some nations 
still insist it is a temporary phenomenon, international migration is now an established 
structural feature of the East Asian region, as much as it is for other parts of the world. 
The forces responsible for this increase in movement are complicatedly associated with 
globalisation, increased levels of education, proliferation of international media, 
improved transport systems and the internationalisation of business and labour markets 
(Alford, 1999; Beck, 2000; Vertovec and Cohen, 1999). As home to approximately 
sixty per cent of the current world population, Asia, in particular, must loom large in 
any discussion of global migration (United Nations, 2010). The last decade has not only 
seen an increase in the numbers of Asians moving between nations, but the types of 
mobility have become more complex and the movement has become less selective. 
International migration is a topic of unprecedented interest in most Asian nations 
among both governments and the population; the media report on it frequently and the 
issue is constantly being placed in the public consciousness (GCIM, 2005).  
 
Among Asian countries, immigration in South Korea has been one of the most disputed 
social issues of the last decade. This is because traditionally Korea has been perceived 
as being made up of „pure-blooded‟ people; this is the dominant myth of ethnic/national 
14 
 
homogeneity. In the last decades, however, the myth has been threatened because of the 
large scale of labour immigration and intercultural marriages. The Korean Immigration 
and Foreigner Policy Office (KIFPO) of the Ministry of Justice announced on 24
th
 
August 2007 that foreign residents in Korea officially numbered at one million and two 
hundred fifty four for the first time, two per cent of the total registered population (49 
million)
1
. This figure was up by 158 per cent from 386,972 in 1997. This number is 
expected to rise to over five per cent of the origin population by 2020. It means that 
South Korea now faces the challenges of a multi-ethnic society.  
 
The influx of foreigners in Korean society and the social changes resulting from this 
can be understood through the framework of globalisation. Giddens (1990) and Castells 
(1996) have argued that globalisation is a central driving force behind the rapid social, 
political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order. 
Globalisation accelerates the movement of populations as well as capital and 
commodities (Cohen, 1997). The influx of new members in society through population 
movements came to be a serious threat to social and cultural identity of the existing 
majority in the modern nationalistic system (Robertson, 1992). During this process, the 
existing majority of society that maintains power categorises, discriminates and 
marginalises the new members of a society (Brodwin, 2001; Cottle, 1999; Held et al., 
1999; van Dijk, 1983). To state it differently, migrants, the new members of the society, 
are pushed to the periphery and end up as the strangers in the midst of globalisation (C 
Moon, 2000). Moreover, the most important role of this process of exclusion is played 
primarily by the media (Curran, 2002; van Dijk, 1988). If the media play a crucial role 
in the process of exclusion within globalisation, it is important to look at the role of the 
media in the process of marginalising sub-groups and their culture (Rantanen, 2005). 
 
The significance of media power in modern information societies is undeniable. A 
society‟s perception of minorities in most cases conforms to the stereotypes created by 
the media of that society (Cottle, 1997; Dates and Barlow, 1990; Downing and Husband, 
2005; Hall, 1997a). More specifically, the modern media have given massive and 
disproportionate attention to a series of minorities who have tended to be presented as 
                                                         
1
The Korea Times, 24
th
 August 2007, „Foreigners exceed one million‟, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2007/08/117_8926.html accessed on 21st September 
2009 
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powerful and irrational threats to society. This is because in modern societies the media 
play an important role as opinion leaders, and have the power to project a certain image 
on to a social group or a social object (Curran, 2002). If we analyse the stereotypes of 
minorities generated by the media, we will be able to understand the various situations 
that have occurred in a given society. In other words, if we seek to understand a specific 
social phenomenon, it is a requisite to make an analysis of the media‟s representation of 
the phenomenon. 
 
These concerns with socio-cultural processes associated with globalisation, migration 
and the media provide the contextual framework for this study. More specifically, this 
research project focuses on the role of the prime time news of public service 
broadcasting (PSB) in Korean society, where the presence of ethnic minorities is 
increasing rapidly. Although the World Wide Web has become one of the most 
attractive media over the last decade, Korean PSB, Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), 
still remains the most popular and influential medium. According to a survey result of 
2003 reported by Sisa Press, the leading weekly magazine in Korea, KBS has been 
ranked as the most influential medium in the last decade. This shows that in Korea, 
people still depend largely on PSB. There are, however, a few studies on social 
responsibilities that should accompany PSB, given its power and influence. Social 
responsibility is one of the key obligations of PSB, according to its charter, but very 
little discussion and research in the area has been done in Korea. This may be because 
Korean PSB is a product of national authority. Today‟s broadcasting system was formed 
in 1968 during the military rule and has not been able to free itself from the mindset of 
a „government-run media‟. In Korea, political democracy deteriorated during the 
military dictatorship from 1960 to the late 1980s. PSB became a tool of propaganda 
under the autocratic leadership. In some cases, commercial broadcasting was abolished 
or absorbed into PSB, which has dominated the broadcasting scene for a long time. 
After the second half of the 1990s, however, political and social democracy grew 
rapidly, and with the introduction of commercial broadcasts and cable television 
stations, broadcasting also came to experience democracy and diversity in 
programming. Nevertheless, today PSB is still more popular than commercial 
broadcasting – a fact that demonstrates its national media hegemony. 
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In particular, KBS News 9, the prime time news programme on KBS, has 
overwhelmingly kept the largest audience share among whole television broadcasting 
market place (KBA, 2008). Therefore, the process of analysing ethnic minorities in 
Korean society represented in Korean PSB in terms of the public media as a social 
construction is meaningful in that it provides an important key in understanding the 
cultural and political background and characteristics of society. 
 
 
1.2. Objectives of Study 
 
This study focuses on the ways in which Korean society, which believes it is a 
homogeneous nation, produces media discourses that reaffirm an ideology of national 
superiority and an ideological system of stratified racial order. This is particularly 
important as ethnic minorities are recognised as representing an element of a globalised 
economic system but they are refused cultural and citizenship recognition and rights. 
The thesis aims to understand how control of culturalist and racialised ideologies of 
social order are expressed in the construction of media discourses. To put it concretely, 
this research on the trend in the portrayal of ethnic minorities on prime time public 
television serves two major purposes. Firstly, it aims to identify the extent to which 
public service television represent Korean ethnic minorities and especially to determine 
what tendencies have been shown in the news reports of the last five years. Secondly, 
the nature of the portrayal of ethnic minorities has been conceptualised as a potential 
contributor to perpetuating racial stereotypes; examining the dominant attributes of 
news representations informs that issue. 
 
The reason that I chose PSB as my study subject arises from the basic question of „how 
“public” and “public service” can be defined in a multi-ethnic or multicultural society‟. 
Commercial broadcasting has the fundamental objective of „profit pursuit‟, whereas 
PSB is funded by viewers‟ licence fees. This means PSB has a social responsibility and 
a mandate to create an impartial and diverse broadcasting environment, which reflects 
various opinions from all levels of society, regardless of age, region or ideology 
(Christensen, 2001). As Avery (1993) states, PSB is based on the principles of 
universality of service, diversity of programming, provision for minority audiences 
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including the disadvantaged, sustaining an informed electorate, and cultural and 
educational enrichment. Campion (2005) also argues that PSB has a vital role to play in 
mediating the public sphere and in helping diverse communities to learn about each 
other. To do this effectively „it must reach as much of the population as possible and be 
trusted to portray all groups accurately and fairly, particularly those who are currently 
marginalised in society‟ (Campion, 2005: 1). Westerstahl (1983) introduced „objectivity‟ 
as a fairness examination standard. In his study, objectivity is defined as satisfying the 
criteria of factuality and impartiality. Factuality consists of turning out truthful reports 
and contents relevant to the actual incident. Impartiality consists of giving equal weight 
to opposite opinions and maintaining balanced and neutral criticism not biased toward 
any one side.  
 
So, how can the impartiality and diversity of PSB be interpreted in this era of 
globalisation? Traditionally, PSB has been expected to represent the national as 
opposed to the foreign (Raboy, 2003). However, in December 1994, a new definition of 
PSB was agreed upon by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which 
was that it should „support the values underlying the respect for human rights, culture 
and pluralism‟ (Porter, 1995: 30). Cultural diversity and impartiality in the public media 
is as much about the human right to live one‟s own cultural identity, as it is about the 
human right to have access to the wealth of cultural diversity represented by the social 
majority. Firstly this study will examine how the main values of PSB, impartiality and 
cultural diversity, are represented in the primetime news about Korean society, which is 
experiencing dramatic social changes due to the rapid influx of migrants. With regard to 
this, if specific tendencies of representation are found in this process, their meaning will 
be explored. Lastly, it will look into how news-making systems influence media 
representations and it also seeks to discuss the origin of the ideology rooted behind the 
media discourse.  
 
 
1.3. Significance and Contribution 
 
This study aims to contribute to both international and the Korean academia. First of all, 
this study can be seen as a unique attempt in such a site of research since little research 
18 
 
has been done to analyse nationalism and racial discrimination in Asian society, as the 
focus of studies on representation of minorities have been predominantly focused on 
Western societies. In fact, there have been a number of media and communication 
studies focusing on this issue, especially in the field of critical communication and 
cultural studies (Boskin, 1980; Campbell, 1995; Cottle, 1999; Downing and Husband, 
2005; Entman, 1994; Hall, 1997b; Hartmann and Husband, 1974; van Dijk, 2000). Yet, 
all these studies focus on Western societies (e.g. Turkish guest-workers in Germany, the 
Maghreb Africans in France, the Pakistanis or the Greeks in Britain, the Vietnamese or 
the Chinese in Australia, among many more). Therefore, it is noteworthy that this study 
is done by a non-Western author about a non-Western phenomenon from a non-Western 
standpoint. That is, this study raises the issue of inter-Asian racial stratifications as it 
explores the representational power exercised by Asians on other Asians in a non-
Western society. The study goes on to grasp how nationalism as a ruling and excluding 
ideology is reproduced through the media and how ethnic minorities are discriminated 
and excluded from this process. Lastly, it applies theories on public service 
broadcasting and fair representation of minorities, which surpass cultural specificity 
and address broader issues associated with democratic participation and the public 
sphere, to the particular Korean context.  
 
Another significance of the study is the critical symbolic meaning of media discourse 
studies as qualitative research in Korean media academia. A number of social problems 
occurring in modern society, such as those related to social class, gender, race and other 
social divides, can be understood by analysing social discourse. The research mainly 
based on critical discourse analysis (CDA), and primarily represented by van Dijk, 
Fairclough, Wodak and Chouliaraki, has been mostly conducted in Western Europe. 
Furthermore, since most media and communication studies scholars in Korea hold 
PhDs from American universities, Korean media research leans towards quantitative 
method-based research with critical discourse research remaining marginal in Korean 
academia. Therefore, this study has significance not only in its unique research subject, 
but also in its methodological orientation in the context of Korean academia.  
 
This thesis will be a study of the public media‟s responsibility towards minorities, and it 
builds upon the researcher‟s Masters dissertation – „A Study on “Others in Ourselves” 
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and “Ourselves in Others” Represented in the Media‟. This study, conducted in Yonsei 
University in Korea, focused on the television documentaries treating problems 
concerned with foreign migrant workers and Korean migrant workers. It is thought that 
this doctoral research would not only contribute as a stimulant for Korean media and 
communications studies, which showed little interest in research on the relationship 
between media and minorities or public media representing social minorities, but would 
also serve as a blueprint for how Korean public service broadcasting should respond 
and reflect on its responsibilities as a public service in a multicultural society. Although 
it is noticeable that interest in multiculturalism has gradually increased in the media 
field as well as other academic fields in the four years since this research project has 
been conducted, concrete and sustained research remains rather limited. Therefore, this 
current study has the ambition to lay foundations for further research on public service 
broadcasting, especially on professional ethics, professional training for reporting on 
minorities and audience research. 
 
 
1.4. The Research Questions 
 
This research project mainly seeks to understand how the public media present the 
phenomena of Korean society against the backdrop of a dramatically transforming 
multi-ethnic society. More specifically, the aim of the thesis is to analyse how the prime 
time news programme on PSB, KBS News 9, which is most influential in Korean 
society and has a critical position in everyday life, presents ethnic diversity in society. 
Therefore, the central research question that this research project seeks to answer is as 
follows:  
 
▪ How are ethnic minorities represented on the PSB news programmes?  
 
 
In order to answer this question, this study will focus on textual and visual discourses 
produced on the news. Discourses take up the most significant part in researching 
media representation as they provide critical keys in the study. In particular, the process 
of finding and analysing social and cultural ideologies of discourse produced in the 
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news, such as, for instance, seeking to discuss the origin of the ideology rooted behind 
media discourse, will provide the second part of the analysis in this study. Therefore the 
second research question can be established as follows:  
 
▪ What kinds of meaning do television text and ideology of media discourses 
express?  
 
Through the research question above, this work will discuss how discourse around 
ethnic minorities is formulated and the implications of this for related ideologies. Lastly, 
this research project will look into the ideologies present in the viewpoint of news-
makers towards ethnic minorities and multiculturalism and how this is reflected in and 
influences broadcasts. This research into news-makers has its significance in a 
complementary way as news discourse represented through television is not an 
unconditional reflection of reality, but a social construction of reality produced through 
a gate-keeping process of news-makers with a personal dimension. In addition, the 
main body of news production reflects a systematic dimension, while the social 
dimension shares the hegemonic ideology. Therefore, the last research question is as 
follows:  
 
▪ How do news makers and producers construct representations of minorities 
and how do they evaluate them?  
 
These questions will be framed by an overview of the existing literature on the topics of 
globalisation, migration and multiculturalism, followed by a discussion on ethnic 
minorities and the media. Next, the text methodology used in the study will analyse the 
representation of the prime time news programme on KBS, KBS News 9, using content 
analysis and CDA. Subsequently, the results of the interviews with ten news reporters 
and editors from KBS will be presented in order to access information about the 
decision making and the values and regulations that drive the editorial and production 
process which lead to the production of specific representations in the television news 
programmes. 
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1.5. Outline of the Thesis 
 
The project is presented in eight chapters. After Chapter One, which acts as an 
introduction and a contextualising chapter, Chapter Two discusses theories on key 
issues and concepts that relate to the research. These include complex concepts of 
globalisation, migration, ethnic minorities, nationalism and the media, especially public 
service broadcasting. Chapter Three focuses on conceptualising nationalism and ethnic 
minorities in the context of South Korea. It describes the historical and cultural 
background of nationalism and ethnic minorities in Korea. Chapter Four introduces and 
discusses the methodologies for the study, the reason behind this selection and the 
strengths and the weaknesses of the methods. This thesis employs three different 
methods in combination to analyse news texts, including content analysis, CDA and 
visual analysis. Semi-structured interviews complement and support textual analysis as 
they provide an insight into the news production system and journalistic evaluation of 
the production of media discourse. Chapter Five marks the beginning of analysis. The 
aim of this chapter is to examine how ethnic minorities are represented in KBS news 
through quantitative news content analysis. Chapter Six examines Korean public news 
media discourse on ethnic minorities and discusses the tendencies of representation. For 
this purpose, this chapter presents qualitative methods of researching news discourse, 
including narratives, specific descriptions and visual images. Chapter Seven focuses on 
trying to understand the newsmaking process when producing news related to ethnic 
minorities and foreign countries. This was done by interviewing ten reporters who are 
currently employed at KBS; the results were then used to reveal their ideas about 
multicultural society and ethnic diversity. Chapter Eight is the concluding part of the 
thesis. It argues for the responsibility of public service broadcasting as everyday media 
for representing cultural diversity. It also demonstrates the limitation of the Korean 
public service broadcasting system that produces specific stereotypes towards ethnic 
minorities and strengthens ethnic chauvinism. The conclusion also examines the 
limitations of the investigation, while noting its implications for policy and future 
research. 
 
 
 
22 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Media, Societal Change and Otherness 
 
 
It is in and through these representations, for example, that 
members of the media audience are variously incited to construct a 
sense of who „we‟ are in relation to who „we‟ are not, whether as 
„us‟ and „them‟, „insider‟ and „outsider‟, „coloniser‟ and „colonised‟, 
„citizen‟ and „foreigner‟, „normal‟ and „deviant‟, „friend‟ and „foe‟, 
„the West‟ and „the rest‟. 
(Cottle, 2000: 2) 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter includes the first element of the theoretical review, which constitutes a 
crucial element of this study. The discussion in this section focuses on the role of 
television as a medium central to the development of agendas and ideological frames 
for deliberations in the public sphere. These ideological frames become central to the 
construction of social roles and identities of Us and Others. The chapter locates this 
discussion in the context of globalisation, intense migration and the increasingly 
mediated world we all occupy. The core starting point is that „television not only 
represents social issues; it also constructs and maintains the norms and values through 
which society is ordered‟ (D‟Acci, 2004: 381). Especially in the era of globalisation, 
ethnic identities of the majority population are increasingly diverse due to human 
mobility between different regions of the globe, resulting from a multitude of factors. 
Broadcasting media, in this respect, become important not only as systems of 
representation, but also as socially relevant cultural references – in their political 
economy, their content and their symbolic relevance for particular social groups 
(Georgiou, 2006). Thus, studying television representation means examining not only 
images of people of other ethnic groups but also constructions of racial or social 
Otherness as manifested through the discourse of television. In trying to understand the 
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importance of television‟s capacity to represent society, it is necessary not only to look 
beyond particular representations to consider the pervasiveness of television as an 
everyday medium, but also to underline the fundamental asymmetry of power relations 
involved in these representations (Allen and Hill, 2004).  
 
In this chapter, I will first discuss the power of television as an everyday medium, 
which (re-)produces symbolic power in order to examine the uniqueness of the genre of 
news programming as a discourse constructor among many other television genres. 
Following this, I will go on to discuss the power relations in society, as these are shaped 
as a result of population movement associated with globalisation, and their correlation 
with the role the media play. In the last section I discuss the role and responsibility of 
public service broadcasting in multi-ethnic societies.  
 
 
2.2. Television as a Core Element of Contemporary Culture and Politics 
2.2.1. Seeing is Believing: The Power of Visual Communications 
 
Modern society is filled with visual images. Urban streets abound with colourful 
billboards and advertisements. We can easily find this when we are on the bus and there 
is a large advertisement, which may contain the smile of the main character in a 
recently released movie, or when reading the newspapers in which more than half of the 
pages are filled with pictures and visual images. Moreover, it is possible for a whole 
page to be filled with one image, and from this image the readers can infer the meaning 
of the whole story being reported. In addition to movies and television, internet media 
are also becoming image-centric. For example, a picture of a crying child left in a war-
ravaged environment can sometimes have a greater effect than an article describing the 
cruelty and inhumanity of war and indiscriminate violence. Seen like this, it is arguable 
that visual communication has increased in importance in today‟s society due to the fact 
that values, opinions and beliefs are persuasively delivered by visual culture in 
everyday life (Sturken and Cartwright, 2000). 
 
In this respect, seeing is really a great deal more than believing in the modern society 
(Mirzoeff, 1998). Berger argues that „seeing comes before words‟ (Berger, 1972: 7). 
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This is the starting point in the study of visual communication. Jenks (1995) argues that 
„looking, seeing and knowing have become perilously intertwined‟ so that „the modern 
world is very much a “seen” phenomenon‟ (Jenks, 1995: 1–2). Debord‟s (1983) thesis 
on the „society of spectacle‟ does not sound extreme anymore, while Virilio‟s (1994) 
claim about new visualising technologies creating „the vision machine‟ finds its 
empirical relevance in the current predomination of image in our highly mediated 
environments. Stafford (1991) emphasises that the construction of scientific knowledge 
about the world has become more and more based on images rather than on written 
texts. Haraway (1991) is concerned with specifying the social power relations that are 
articulated through the particular form of visuality. She argues that what this visuality 
does is to produce specific visions of social difference or hierarchies of class, race, 
gender, sexuality, and so on. That is, the particular forms of representation produced by 
specific scopic regimes are important to understand because they are intimately bound 
into social power relations (Rose, 2001). According to Hall(1997), culture is the shared 
practices of a group, community or society, through which meaning is made out of the 
visual world of representations. Therefore, the act of „seeing‟ can be further interpreted 
as one of the practices of culture, which constructs and reproduces culture through the 
process of understanding the world, exceeding the level of just perceiving an object and 
understanding it. 
 
Visual images have increasingly come to dominate our culture in recent times (Sturken 
and Cartwright, 2000). Human beings have continually sought more realistic ways of 
visual expression and their desires are found in the history of the image, as developed 
from drawing and painting, to photography and film. The development of media is 
paralleled with innumerable efforts to access „truth‟ and „reality‟. This is especially so 
for photography, which has greatly contributed to the mass production of images in the 
modern society and also has a close relationship with the development of positivist 
science. In this context, the photographic camera was taken to be a scientific tool for 
registering reality and was regarded by its early advocates as a means of representing 
the world more accurately than hand-rendered images (Sturken and Cartwright, 2000). 
With the course of time, however, the reality of photography began to lose its freshness 
and became an object of suspicion. This led to people desiring a more powerful tool to 
represent reality. Unlike photography or cinema, there is also the possibility of „instant‟ 
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transmission in television, providing the medium with that „liveness‟ which has been 
seen to be its defining characteristic, even if with the advent of production recording it 
was no longer the routine necessity it had been in the early years (Corner, 1999). The 
„liveness‟ in this sense is linked to „immediateness‟ in terms of time, and at the same 
time is related to „on-the-spot‟ in terms of space. Therefore, the liveness of television 
imagery provides viewers with viewpoints which totally differ from images produced 
by early media. Heath and Skirrow (1977) identify distinctive properties of the image 
and the viewing relations which follow:  
 
In one sense, the television image is effectively „live‟, very 
different from that of film. The image in the film is distant, 
inaccessible and fascinatingly fixed; the television image is 
close, available and interpellative (Heath and Skirrow, 1977: 53).  
 
In this sense, televisual communication produces a „mythic belief‟ which is regarded as 
a real situation happening around us right now, rather than merely representing 
information. The social significance of television as an imaginary tool has been broadly 
focused on the media and communications studies. The television images turn distant 
suffering into everyday material (Chouliaraki, 2006), deadly war into match of the day 
(Taylor, 1992), and national events into more significant events than those in private 
lives (Wodak et al., 1999). Consequently, television has become one of the most 
influential media as it frames much of the information available in the public domain, 
with consequences for the construction of identities (Hall, 1996; Silverstone, 1994). 
 
 
2.2.2. Television as an Everyday Medium: Representation of the World 
 
Although the Internet has fast become a popular and fascinating medium, television 
remains one of the most significant media in everyday life. In a recent survey 
conducted by Ofcom, the time people spend watching television remains stable 
alongside internet growth with the average person watching three hours and forty-five 
minutes of television per day. Watching television remains the activity that most adults 
would miss the most (Ofcom, 2010). According to a survey of the average time spent 
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using media in 2010, the average person in South Korea – who ranks highly for internet 
usage internationally – spends one hour and fifty-eight minutes watching terrestrial 
television and twenty-nine minutes watching cable or satellite television. This compares 
with an average of thirty-seven minutes per day spent on the Internet (Broadcasting 
Culture, 2011).  
 
Since the beginning of the 1950s when television sets became commonplace in the 
developed world, researchers have tried to assess the influence and impact of television 
on the viewing public (Ross, 1992). In particular, there has been a significant body of 
research on television as a medium and on its everyday consequences (Silverstone, 
1994; Gauntlett and Hill, 1999; Morley, 1986, 1992; Rogge and Jensen, 1988). 
Television, as Silverstone (1994) argues, still represents a central dimension of our 
everyday life and yet its meaning and its potency vary according to our individual 
circumstances. Its power will always be mediated by the social and cultural worlds we 
inhabit. Heath (1990: 268) asks: „Can anyone in our societies be outside television, 
beyond its compulsions?‟ 
 
Television lies at the heart of political, social, and cultural life in modern society. As 
people become more and more dependent on television as an everyday medium and 
become fully trusting of whatever it says, it will then have absolute power to influence 
the views of millions (Couldry, 2003). This form of power is referred to as „symbolic 
power‟ (Couldry, 2003; Silverstone, 1999, 2006; Thompson, 1995), which describes the 
ability to manipulate symbols to influence individual life. Although different forms of 
power in society commonly overlap in complex and shifting ways, the power of media 
representation is directly linked to symbolic power (Thompson, 1995). As Thompson 
writes, symbolic power „may give rise to reactions, may lead others to act or respond in 
certain ways, to pursue one course of action rather than another, to believe or disbelieve, 
to affirm their support for a state of affairs or to rise up in collective revolt‟ (Thompson, 
1995: 16–17). The central location of television in everyday life is thus associated with 
power relations within society. In the context of this study, this is particularly important 
when it comes to media representation of Others and the position these Others – 
especially as they occupy minority positions within society – might become 
marginalised and socially excluded. This is because, as Thompson (1995) argues, 
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„individuals are constantly engaged in interpreting the expressions of Others; they are 
constantly involved in communicating with one another and exchanging information 
and symbolic content‟ (Thompson, 1995: 16). Studying the role of media in 
reproducing or challenging power represents one of the fundamental objectives of 
media and communications studies. That is, as Silverstone argues, „we study the media 
because of the need to understand how powerful the media are in our everyday lives; in 
the structuring of experience; on the surface and in the depths‟ (1999: 143).  
 
One of the significant reasons for television maintaining its powerful role in everyday 
life is that people use it to promptly access and understand current issues. 
Understanding the world through television-produced visual images with simple 
commentary especially has become both simple and powerful. As Williams (1990) 
insists, in certain kinds of report, there seems to be an absolute difference between the 
written or spoken account and the visual record with commentary. Fiske (1983), who 
has written about the ideological function of television, has regarded the combination of 
pleasure and illusion in television‟s images to be the key to its efficiency in the 
programming process. Apart from visual power, television takes advantage of the 
„always thereness‟ and its increasing presence in the daily and weekly cycles of 
everyday life (Allen and Hill, 2004). Much of the experience of broadcast television, 
unlike the movie-going experience, is of programming forms comprised of multiple, 
regularly occurring episodes (Allen and Hill, 2004). Therefore, daily or weekly 
organised programmes are closely linked to the life of viewers, being based on a 
weekly or daily life-cycle. Even the daily cycle of television can seem to replicate the 
life-cycle of viewers, as, for example, when people adjust their dinner time according to 
the prime time news, or retire to bed after the prime time, late evening drama series. 
This concerns „the central role of routine in everyday life; habit, seriality, framing, and 
of course the role of television in defining and sustaining these routines‟ (Silverstone, 
1994: 8). 
 
Television playing a critical role in society in this way, as a dominant, everyday 
medium, contains the important processes of signification – „representation‟. As D‟Acci 
(2004) reminds us, any discussion of the ways in which television represents society 
might start by asking what is meant by the term „representation‟. As Sturken and 
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Cartwright (2000) argue, representation refers to the use of language and images to 
create meaning about the world around us. Discussion of representation begins with the 
relationship between the „reality‟ as it exists in the real world and the „reality‟ as 
represented by the media. To understand the concept of representation, it is important to 
find out how the media process the real world and to examine whether the media reflect 
the world as it is or grant new meanings to the existing reality from the view of the 
social constructionist (Hall, 1997). The outside world comes to have meaning and be 
seen visually through a representation system. Media representation, however, does not 
always constitute the mere reflection of the outside world. Rather it can create a „whole 
new reality‟ during the process, into which the social powers and ideologies could 
intervene.  
 
All types of representation, especially through television, intervene in the new way 
concepts are organised, gathered, arranged and categorised, and in the way complex 
relationships are established between different concepts (Hall, 1997). Therefore, the 
role of representation is more constitutive than reflective; it can also affect the lives, 
rights and statuses of people in a given society. Due to this inherent nature of 
representation, minorities in a society sometimes suffer, or find it difficult to be fairly 
represented, as a result of misinformed, negative or motivated stereotypes widely 
circulated in the society (Pietikainen and Hujanen, 2003). That is, if media 
representations are biased toward a particular common set of social, gender, class or 
racial
2
 stereotypes, it is logical to suggest that these biases play some role in the 
reinforcement of common perceptions about race, class and gender roles in our society 
(Eschholz et al., 2002). Every regime of representation is a regime of power formed, as 
Foucault (1980) reminds us, by the fatal couplet „power/knowledge‟. But this kind of 
knowledge is internal, not external. It is one thing to position a subject or set of people 
as Other in a stratified system of social order. It is quite another thing to subject them to 
that „knowledge‟, not only as a matter of imposed will and domination but also by the 
power of inner compulsion and subjective conformation to the norm. One group 
                                                         
2
 Sociologically, the term „race‟ does not refer to biological signifiers. Rather it refers to social 
relationships in which structural positions and social actions are ordered, justified and explained by 
reference to systems of symbols and beliefs which emphasise the social and cultural relevance of 
biologically rooted characteristics (Mason, 2000). An alternative way of thinking about human diversity 
is one that invokes the concept of „ethnicity‟. In this study, however, the term „race‟ often appears as this 
is associated with the socially constructed category discussed in the relevant literature. 
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exercising this kind of power or dominance over others reaffirms its hegemony 
(Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci theorised the ways in which society‟s super-structure, its 
ideology-producing institutions, are central to struggles over meaning and power 
(Gramsci, 1971). According to Hall (1985), hegemony is more than social power itself; 
it is a method for gaining and maintaining power. In this sense, media are tools that 
ruling elites use to „perpetuate their power, wealth, and status by popularising their own 
philosophy, culture and morality‟ (Boggs, 1976: 39). More specifically, media 
institutions can (re)produce the content, inflection, and tone of ideas favourable to them 
far more easily than other social groups because they manage key socialising 
institutions, thereby guaranteeing that their points of view are constantly and 
attractively cast into the public arena (Lull, 1995).  
 
In this context, we should understand television as not only a media form, but also as a 
system of production of ideological hegemony. Both of these aspects must be 
understood to appreciate the influence of television as an everyday medium. That is to 
say, when we analyse the text of television, firstly we must understand the 
characteristics and constraints of the medium, and then we must understand the social 
conditions from which a specific television programme is produced (K Kim and G 
Chun, 2003). This entails a multi-dimensional and complex exploration of intricate 
social relations – such as class, ethnicity, gender, age and religion, among others – 
rather than an over-simplistic study of the power conflict between the public and the 
state. Therefore, studying social representation on television means examining not only 
images, depictions or the presence of something that the research focuses on, but also 
rhetoric, social structures and power relations within a specific historical context. 
 
 
2.3. Television News and Social Realities 
2.3.1. Conceptualising Television News: Liveness and Pervasiveness 
 
Among many kinds of television genres, news represents the core informational system 
within the daily flow of television (Hartley, 1982). Television news can be a means of 
bridging the gap between the public and the private spheres (Gauntlett and Hill, 1999). 
This is because television news is one of the main media genres that bring something 
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new about the public to private lives. Most television channels provide their own news 
programmes for prime time viewing. Television news is one of the most popular 
sources of information for the public in modern society and therefore has an important 
part to play in helping people make sense of the world (Gunter and Winstone, 1993). 
The key concern here is, accordingly, to examine the extent to which television news 
can and should be expected to contribute to people‟s knowledge (Harrison, 2000). At 
this point, however, it is important to investigate whether the information and 
knowledge made from television news corresponds to „reality‟, as assumed and claimed 
in the news. In essence the Glasgow Media Group see television news as „a 
manufactured product based on a coherent set of professional and ideological beliefs 
and expressed in a rigid formula of presentation‟ (Harrison, 1985: 15). As Hall contends, 
the journalistic tenet of objectivity is itself a myth, „the absolute distinction between 
fact and value, the distinction which appears as a common sense “rule” in the news 
making system‟ (1973: 86). Myth is magnified by the „structure‟ of news production: 
 
The news is not only a cultural product: it is the product of a set of 
institutional definitions and meanings, which, in professional 
shorthand, is commonly referred to as news values (Hall, 1973: 87). 
 
Bird and Dardenne (1988: 70) even define television news as „myths‟ in terms of 
continuing stories with themes which are rearticulated and reinterpreted over time. 
These themes are derived from culture and feed back into it. They also explain that the 
news media is a way in which people create order out of disorder, transforming 
knowing into telling. Levi-Strauss (1967) and Barthes (1972) have analysed myths in 
semiotic terms, interpreting cultural myths as meaning-making systems that help 
explain societal attitudes, behaviours and ideologies. Similarly, Fiske and Hartley (1978) 
describe news myths as symbolic, „cultural meanings‟ that go beyond the literal, 
connotative meanings of news stories. In their analysis of a news story televised in 
England about reinforcements of British troops in Northern Ireland, they explain how a 
soldier included in the story carries with him a great deal of cultural symbolism: 
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The image in our film of a soldier clipping a magazine on to his rifle 
as he peers from his sandbagged bunker fortress in Belfast can 
activate the myth by which we currently „understand‟ the army. This 
myth … is that the army consists of ordinary men, doing a 
professional and highly technical job (Fiske and Hartley, 1978: 64). 
 
Television news offers more than fact – it offers reassurance and familiarity in shared 
community experiences; it provides credible answers to baffling questions, and ready 
explanations of complex phenomena such as unemployment and inflation. In this sense, 
television news is regarded as trustworthy and as being based on active engagement in 
the world, in events and in the relationships of everyday life (Giddens, 1990). The 
active engagement in this sense is physical; it requires bodily presence, face-to-face 
interactions, communication and language (Silverstone, 1994). Giddens (1990) defines 
that the trust of television is a kind of „faith‟. His argument is that we have learnt (as it 
were) to trust from a distance as a result of our earliest experiences of childhood 
(Giddens, 1989, cited in Silverstone, 1994). Therefore, we tend to trust information that 
we have not directly experienced, treating news produced by television as a „fact‟ 
without hesitation, such as coverage of the Gulf War, the Bosnian civil war and the 
Japanese tsunami. Giddens (1990) proposes a number of factors which influence this 
trusted attribute of television, and this study will focus on the dialectic of time and 
space, and universality among them. 
 
In comparison with print journalism, the most important characteristics of television 
news are „liveness‟ and „pervasiveness‟. As mentioned above, „liveness‟, as one of the 
characteristics of television, includes „immediateness‟ and being „on-the-spot‟ in terms 
of temporal and spatial meaning. Television news depends on its character employing 
virtual direct address to the viewer in a „here‟ and „now‟ that is composed of what are 
actually highly processed and symbolic images (Morse, 2004). To take the example of 
9/11 in 2001, when the terror attack happened, television news delivered it 
instantaneously in real time through reporters sent to the Ground Zero in New York. In 
comparison, the published media, such as the newspapers, were not able to deliver the 
news instantaneously. Especially in this era of globalisation and considering the fact 
that people are able to access stories happening on the opposite side of the globe in real 
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time through news, television has never had as great a ripple effect than it has in today‟s 
society (Cottle and Rai, 2006). Pervasiveness is related to the universality of television 
news and its role in the public sphere. Print journalism has many constraints in terms of 
information delivery only in regional areas and in nations with high rates of literacy, 
due to its reliance on text and the time required for editing and printing. In terms of 
dissemination, the press relies on labour force for transportation and has only a limited 
range of delivery. On the contrary, television news requires much fewer literacy and 
linguistic skills, as it heavily relies on visual imagery. Also, the transmission and 
reception system using electro-magnetic signals and satellites enables people to watch 
news in real time from a distance. 
 
 
2.3.2. News Discourse and Social Construction of Reality 
 
This study focuses on television news reports as a type of discourse expressed, used or 
made public in broadcast news (van Dijk, 1988). The study of television news reports is 
one of the major tasks of discourse-analytical media research (van Dijk, 1992). 
According to Foucault (1980), discourse is the substance of knowledge, which defines 
and limits possible discussion about a topic. Fiske (1987) describes discourse as a 
„system of representation that has developed socially in order to make and circulate a 
coherent set of meanings about an important topic area‟ (1987: 14). Fairclough (2003) 
defines discourse as a way of representing aspects of the world – the processes, 
relations and structures of the material world, the mental world of thoughts, feelings, 
beliefs and so on, and the social world. Discourse takes on different forms according to 
social and historical context and „authority‟ is the important factor in the floating 
concept of discourse. The authority in this concept is not a substantive presence but the 
relationship effect of interactive communication. Discourse is one of the methods 
through which authorities interact and come into being through competition and 
struggle within systems of communication. The media could be interpreted as a space 
in which discourse is constantly created and contested. The news media constantly 
create discourse by representing social phenomena and values. 
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Empirically studying a specific discourse provides accessible material, which should be 
analysed within its social function (Hartley, 1995). Fairclough (2003) emphasises that 
discourses not only represent the world as it is, they are also projective imaginaries, 
representing possible worlds, which are different from the actual world, and tied in with 
projects to change the world in particular directions. Media discourse, particularly 
journalistic discourse, is an important site in the (re)production of prejudiced and 
rejectionist argumentative strategies (van Dijk, 1999). News develops in an active and 
even creative way – it does not simply reflect its linguistic, social or historical 
determinants, it works on them. It transforms its raw materials into a recognisable 
product, which we accept as familiar (Hartley, 1995). News discourses not only 
(re)construct power relations such as racial hierarchies, gender roles, the class system 
and so forth (Berger and Luckmann, 1999), but also become socially produced and 
often institutionalised ways of making sense of a certain topic that „pre-exist their use 
in any one discursive practice, and that construct a sense, or social identity, of us as we 
speak them‟ (Fiske, 1987: 14–15). When we look at cultural and political power of 
news discourse in this context, we mean the power to typify, transmit and define social 
groups (Harrison, 1985). Hall (1982) illustrates the process of the construction of social 
reality with the observation that the reality as presented in the media is no longer a 
combination of given facts, but rather a result of the construction of them in a specific 
way. That is, the media do not simply represent reality, but play an active part in 
defining reality and conferring meaning upon it. As such, reality is something that is 
understood, rather than exists objectively, and it is the media that are indispensible in 
filtering this reality to us. In other words, media discourses are understood as reflecting 
not the events in the world „out there‟, but as the manifestation of the collective cultural 
codes of those employed to do this selective and judgemental work for society 
(Harrison, 1985). In this context, the role of media is in conveying and sustaining 
„cultural hegemony‟ or „the dominant ideology‟ by using discursive power (Harrison, 
1985).  
 
In the last couple of decades, scholars from differing perspectives have suggested that 
news and representations in the media may play a crucial role in shaping and 
reinforcing racial hierarchies, particularly in Western societies where the so-called 
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constructed category White remains the social majority (Entman, 1992, 1994; Jamieson, 
1992; Hall, 1997; van Dijk, 1988, 1991, 1992). Van Dijk provides one of the most 
elaborated theoretical frameworks for the analysis of racism and ethnic issues in the 
news media (1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993). He defines „racism as a property of ethnic 
group dominance, which is identified as the historically rooted dominance of Whites 
(Europeans) over Others‟ (van Dijk, 1993: 47). The key agents of White domination are 
„identified as the elites who indirectly control the minds of Others‟ (1993: 21), for 
example, through biased news discourse. Further, this racial dominance needs to be 
reproduced daily in the many contexts of a multi-ethnic society (van Dijk, 1993). Elite 
control of media, such as television as an everyday medium, is seen as enabling control 
over public discourses which then enact, support and legitimate majority dominance 
(van Dijk, 1993). Media representation of race and ethnicity, in this enlarged sense of 
the term, does more than present Others with images or stereotypes for us to accept or 
reject, to learn or forget, or maintain at the back or our minds (Downing and Husband, 
2005).  
 
 
2.4. Globalisation, Migration and Societal Change 
2.4.1. Migration and Cultural Conflict in the Process of Globalisation 
 
In this study, globalisation becomes the significant starting point of discussion and 
context for the study of migration and ethnic minorities. This is because contemporary 
migration is accelerated by globalisation (Cohen, 1997). Giddens defines globalisation 
as „the intensification of worldwide social relationships, which link distant places in 
such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and 
vice-versa‟ (1990: 63). For Giddens „local transformation is as much a part of 
globalisation as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space‟ 
(Giddens, 1990: 64). Tomlinson similarly claims that „globalisation is a complex 
process because it involves rapid social change that is occurring simultaneously across 
a number of dimensions – in the world economy, in politics, in communications, in the 
physical environment and in culture – and each of these transformations interact with 
the others‟ (2006: 10). 
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International migration constitutes a significant element of globalisation. Most migrants 
are forced to move towards more advanced economies and seek a place, sometimes a 
very modest place, in the global labour market; their mobility reflects the increased 
interdependence of the world‟s economies (Cohen, 1987). Migrants are also active 
agents of globalisation, establishing dense networks of connections between their 
places of origin and their places of settlement. One of the earliest theoretical 
explanations of migration is Lewis‟ model of „economic development with unlimited 
supply of labour‟, an influential model of development in dual economies in which 
migration plays a pivotal role (Lewis, 1954, cited in Arango, 2004). In Lewis‟ model, 
migration is a crucial mechanism of development for the global economy as a whole, 
exploiting the potential of growth inherent in economic disparities. Both sectors, 
traditional and modern, sending and receiving, greatly benefit from it. Migration results 
from the uneven geographical distribution of labour and capital. This model is often 
represented in the „push-pull‟ theories, because they perceive the causes of migration to 
lie in a combination of „push factors‟, impelling people to leave their origin, and „pull 
factors‟, attracting them to certain receiving countries (Castles and Miller, 2003).  
 
This „push-pull‟ theory of migration, however, cannot fully explain the complicated 
social and cultural change associated with migration. The main reality that challenges 
this analysis is that so few people move, even though there is huge difference in income 
and welfare between countries. Secondly, a connected problem with this analysis is its 
inability to explain differential migration. In itself, it fails to explain why some 
countries have relatively high emigration rates and others, structurally similar, do not. 
Borjas (1989) claims that the mere existence of economic disparities among various 
areas should be sufficient to generate migrant flows. In the long run, such flows should 
help to equalise wages and conditions in underdeveloped and developed regions, 
leading towards economic equilibrium. This may lead to negative effects for 
immigration countries, notably the decline of average skill levels (Castles and Miller, 
2003). On this score, cultural and political factors are nowadays much more influential 
than differential wages in determining mobility or immobility, and the selectivity of 
migration can be explained more in terms of legal entitlements, or of personal 
characteristics in the case of undocumented moves, than in terms of wage differentials 
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(Arango, 2004). 
 
Asia has experienced substantial demographic change as both a cause and consequence 
of the social and economic transformation of the region. At the end of 2009, the total 
population of Asia was 3,879 million, which marked approximately sixty per cent of the 
world population (United Nations, 2010). Since the 1990s, the major growth has been 
in migration within Asia, particularly from less-developed countries with massive 
labour surpluses to fast-growing newly industrialised countries (NICs), such as South 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (Castles and Miller, 2003). Moreover, the last decade has 
seen an increase not only in the numbers of Asians moving between nation states but 
the types of mobility have become more complex and the movement less selective. The 
forces responsible for this increase in movement are associated with globalisation, 
especially the increased levels of education which have enriched knowledge of the rest 
of the world and the associated individual life, the proliferation of international media, 
improved transport systems and the internationalisation of business and labour markets. 
 
According to Hugo (2005), there are broadly two systems of labour migration in Asia. 
The first and by far the largest involves mainly unskilled and semi-skilled workers who 
are employed in low paid, low status, so-called 3D (dirty, dangerous and demeaning)
3
 
jobs that are eschewed by local workers in the fast-growing labour-short nations of East 
Asia and the Middle East. These are drawn predominantly from the South Asian nations 
of Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, China, Burma and Vietnam. The second group is 
much smaller but is still significant and involves highly skilled professionals drawn 
mainly from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines who are 
attracted not only to fast-developing labour-short NICs and near NICs but also to labour 
surplus countries like Indonesia, where there is a mismatch between the products of the 
education and training systems and the skilled labour demands of a rapidly 
restructuring and growing economy (Castles and Miller, 2003). In the contemporary 
condition it is possible to classify Asian nations according to whether they have 
significant gains or losses of migrant workers. According to this classification, 
                                                         
3
 The term 3D is an American neologism derived from an Asian concept, and refers to certain kinds of 
labour often performed by unionised blue-collar workers. The term originated from the Japanese 
expression 3K: kitanai, kiken and kitsui, and has subsequently gained widespread use, particularly 
regarding labour done by migrant workers (Cornell, 1993; cited in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty,_Dangerous_and_Demeaning). 
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Philippines, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, China, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, 
Pakistan, Burma and Nepal are primarily defined as emigration countries, and South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong and Brunei remain immigration 
destinations (OECD, 2007). 
 
Changes associated with globalisation are not contained in economic life alone, but are 
also associated with cultural and social change. This derives partly from economic 
interconnectedness – most visible in migration flows and diasporisations – but not 
solely. Flows of representations and commodities also have consequences for identity 
and self making within and across nation states. Held et al. (1999) identify three broad 
responses to cultural globalisation, namely: those who forecast cultural homogenisation 
as an outcome of the impact of Western media and consumerism (hyper-globalisers); 
those who regard the impact of global culture as being relatively superficial (sceptics); 
and those who predict the emergence of new, exciting global cultural networks and 
hybrids (transformers). They also argue that contemporary cultural globalisation is 
generally seen as different from anything that superseded it in that, for the first time 
ever, it is impossible to be unaffected by it wherever one lives (Beynon and Dunkerley, 
2000). Clifford (1988, cited in Barker, 2000) argues that culture and cultural identities 
can no longer be adequately understood in terms of place, but are better conceptualised 
in terms of travel. However, the accelerated globalisation of late modernity has 
increased the relevance of the metaphor of travel because all locales are now subject to 
the influences of distant places. Such influences are accelerated through electronic 
communication. Via television representations, we can all be travellers from the 
comfort of our front rooms. Particularly in the dominant form of national identity, it is 
the product of deliberate cultural construction and maintenance via both the regulatory 
and the socialising institutions of the state; in particular, the law, the education system 
and the public media (Tomlinson, 2003). 
 
 
2.4.2. Globalisation for the Market, Not for the People: Marginalised Migrants 
 
Employing Appadurai‟s definition (2006), globalisation is the name of a new industrial 
revolution. The Industrial Revolution, which was initiated in Europe in the late 
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eighteenth century, enabled mass production due to innovative change in production 
methods, completely transforming the structure of the nation state (Giddens, 1990). 
From this perspective, globalisation represents a new phase of an industrial revolution 
that enables the global circulation not only of goods, services and capital, but also of 
ideas and people, owing to groundbreaking advances in information and 
communication technologies and this eventually has transformed the global 
organisational structure (Appadurai, 2006; World Bank, 2000). Like the Industrial 
Revolution in the past, the market mechanisms of globalisation create an abundance of 
capital. Just as there has been increased polarisation between the rich and poor, as seen 
in social fragmentation into socio-economic classes, such as the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, globalisation has also polarised and even accelerated these socio-economic 
inequalities, both within individual societies and between Western and non-Western 
societies, which can be stated crudely as between the locations where we can find high 
concentration of capitalists with vast amounts of capital and those locations with the 
highest concentration of extreme poverty (Appadurai, 2006; Castells, 2009). Notably, 
labour mobility in the process of globalisation is of prime importance due to the fact 
that it is a principal agent of change in politics, economics, culture and society and also 
represents the movement of the object, „people‟. 
 
The double-sided characteristic of the globalised market causes a negative attitude 
toward the globalised labour force and the social cacophony resulting from this. This 
antinomic phenomenon is particularly apparent in Western societies since the 9/11 
attacks in New York and the 7/7 bombings in London. For instance, while currently 
capital, commodities and raw material imported from Muslim countries are welcome, 
reservation and resistance is expressed in the case of migration of people from these 
regions. To take an example from Western Europe, on the one hand, there are many 
benefits from deregulation and there is a political lobby which seeks to attract oil 
money from the Middle East. On the other hand, there are even stricter limitations in 
issuing visas to people from these same regions who want to enter Western Europe. As 
such, it is undeniable that the vast majority of today‟s developed countries welcome the 
globalisation of markets, which they see as beneficial, but deal selectively with the 
intensifications of human mobility associated with globalisation. 
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Although the discourse of globalisation has been predominantly celebratory about mass 
production and free trade between regions, the globalisation of ethnoscapes and the free 
movement of populations has been thoroughly excluded from this discourse and 
negatively represented. In this process, migrants are marginalised in most societies. 
Brodwin (2001) insists they have a general portrait of collective marginality which 
includes exclusion and conflicts with normative claims of equality and sentiments of 
belonging (Germini, 1980), occupying the lower rungs in a stratified society, and 
exclusion from political processes, economic resources and cultural esteem. 
Marginalisation is linked to social status. Marginalised groups are often portrayed as 
outsiders living on the margins of mainstream society. Often those groups lack a voice 
in the society and are underrepresented. 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, research observed the ways in which migrants were primarily 
associated with public health scares, problems of new migrant „numbers‟ and tensions 
in „race relations‟ (Cottle, 1999). Since then, a number of scholars in this context of 
research have examined media as sites of the reproduction of hegemony (Muijsers, 
1998; Dixon and Linz, 2000; d‟Haenens and de Lange, 2001; van Dijk, 1983). Research 
suggests that the deviancy of migrants, asylum seekers and ethnic minorities is 
continually reproduced through media discourses surrounding the integrity of the nation 
state, the biologically generated notion of racial otherness, and the equation of the 
unknown with disease (Pickering, 2001). News coverage, on the other hand, is a 
reflection of the viewpoints of the majority group and its institutions such as the 
government, police and justice department (d‟Haenens and de Lange, 2001). Therefore, 
the tendency to produce particular negative and stereotypical portraits of migrants is a 
crucial factor in the marginalisation of migrants when they come to settle in a new land.  
 
 
2.5. Otherness in the Media: Differentiating Others from Us 
2.5.1. Mediated Globalisation and Migration: Learning Racial Hierarchy 
 
Although many scholars in media and communications studies have focused on the role 
of the media in the process of globalisation (Golding and Harris, 1997; Mohammadi, 
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1997; Thussu, 2000; Curran, 2002; Rantanen, 2005; Appadurai, 2006), the big question 
of how media and globalisation are connected is open to argument. Media may 
intervene in the globalisation process. Wood and King (2002) argue that media are 
involved in the globalisation process in various forms, and most significantly in the 
production of images and discourses of specific regions and cultures which function as 
crucial sources of information and an accelerator for potential migrants and global 
customers. That is, they are interconnected in that they make possible the work of the 
imagination. Images of wealth and of a free and relaxed lifestyle in Western and 
developed countries are commonplace in the developing and transforming countries of 
the world, and the constancy of these images in global media – film, television and 
advertisements – tends to reinforce their „truth‟ in the eyes of the beholders (Wood and 
King, 2002). Although Giddens (1999) argues that „Globalisation today is only partly 
Westernisation and it is becoming increasingly decentred – not under the control of any 
group of nations, still less of the large corporations‟ (cited in Curran, 2002: 171), there 
are supporting arguments that „the expansion of Western media and business 
corporations promoted capitalist and consumerist values, and eroded local cultures‟ 
(Curran, 2002: 169). The dominant strain of global media, according to Hall, still 
„remains centred in the West and it always speaks English‟ (Hall, 1997: 33). This 
mediated globalisation imposes on the developing world a threat to nationalism which 
can be understood as cultural imperialism. Curran insists that „the threat posed by 
Western cultural imperialism to “Asian values”, Chinese essentialism and Islamic 
tradition were pretexts used respectively by conservative, communist and theocratic 
regimes to justify repressive media censorship‟ (2002: 169). This tendency sustained 
nationalism as economies of these states have become globalised. 
 
The globalisation process inevitably creates imbalance in terms of economic, political 
and cultural power (Held et al., 1999). In this sense, media – in which the nation, 
racialised social order and regional particularities are of significant value – play a 
leading role in producing a negative discourse towards specific nations, ethnic groups 
and regions that are disempowered (van Dijk, 1988). As argued by a number of scholars 
(Chouliaraki, 2006; Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 1991, 1992, 1994; Wodak et al., 1999), 
media discourses have been immensely influential in constructing migrants and ethnic 
minorities as Others, and even as criminals or undesirables. Van Dijk‟s (1994) work is 
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central in this analysis as he argues that the elite dominating group supports an 
information system which legitimises their power and their dominant position, and 
which creates prejudices against members of ethnic minorities. In other words, the elite 
media reproduces power in general and can produce racism in particular, by proceeding 
actively to the construction of a negative representation of ethnic minorities and by 
spreading such a representation in the public arena (Campani, 2001). According to 
Morley (2000), media represent migrants as symbols of impurity and through these 
representations they reinforce the mainstream as consisting of cosmopolitan vis-à-vis 
segregated and inward-looking minorities, constructing themselves as superior. These 
media discourses tend to reproduce nationalism in order to exclude Others (Wodak et 
al., 1999). In this context, media become central mechanisms in sustaining and even 
increasing the relevance of nationalist ideologies within globalisation. According to 
Appadurai (2006), national identity is reinforced by globalisation, and so the 
marginalisation of migrants becomes common place. As the movement of populations 
has grown rapidly as one consequence of globalisation, the number of migrants seeking 
to enter developed countries has also dramatically increased. When analysing this 
process, it is arguable that the media act as elite discourse producers for the dominant 
class, negatively portraying the increasing numbers of migrants, particularly ethnic 
minorities, which serves to strengthen national identities (Appadurai, 2006). 
Globalisation, on the other side, tends to reinforce nationalism in developed Asian 
societies, such as South Korea and Japan. These countries and their dominant classes 
have used discourses of nationalism in order to protect their own national identities 
from Westernisation. At the same time, this discourse has been reinforced in the process 
of setting clear boundaries between the national subject and migrants, who have 
become Others, discriminated and excluded from the nation and the possibility of 
becoming national subjects by being portrayed as symbols of impurity.  
 
Another role of media representing globalisation and migration is disseminating the 
discourse of racial hierarchy and universalising and reinforcing it. This is a complex 
process associated with historical and socio-cultural particularities. In the case of many 
Asian countries, this discourse production is closely associated with the (post-) colonial 
experience against Western powers and the process of modernisation associated with 
obtaining Western technology and social-evolutionary culture. In this process, Asians 
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become exposed and „learn‟ White Westerners‟ viewpoint of racial hierarchy without 
much difficulty. This is most perceptible in the dissemination of Western cultural 
artefacts, such as the diffusion of Hollywood films post-WWII (N Park, 2002). In the 
case of South Korea, it has been greatly influenced by American media even in 
comparison to other countries due to the tens of thousands of US military personnel 
stationed in the territory as a result of intervention in the Korean War (S Yoo, 2001). S 
Yoo (2001) argues that Western missionaries and Korean intellectuals who studied 
abroad in the United States handed down these racial hierarchies as part of the 
modernisation process. It can be crudely represented as the „White – Yellow – Black‟ 
equation, images of which have been embedded in many Hollywood films since the 
1930s, and which encouraged the growth of racialised discourses in Korea (this issue 
will be discussed further in Chapter Three). These racial hierarchies still exist as a 
dominant ideology in contemporary Korea. According to T Jang‟s survey of the racial 
and ethnic preferences of Korean university students (2001), Whites predominate as a 
preferred group among participants, with Western Europeans being 6
th
 and Americans 
9
th
. However, Southeast Asians, Central and South Americans are seen rather negatively 
with being ranked from 19
th
 to 25
th
, and ranked last were people of a Black background, 
with those ranked from 26
th
 to 30
th
 being from African or other Black backgrounds. As 
shown in the previous research by scholars, media discourse is closely related to the 
maintenance and reinforcement of racial ideologies and, as demonstrated in this 
example, they can also reinforce racial and social stratification. 
 
 
2.5.2. Reinforcing Nationalism and Otherness 
 
During a time of intense globalisation in every part of the world, there has been a 
resurgence of nationalism (Boswell, 1999). Robins (1999) argues that it is because 
national fragmentation influenced by globalisation may inspire a nostalgic, introverted 
and parochial sense of national attachment and identity. To support reconstruction of 
national identity, as Hall (1996) insists, the fictitious ideas of a „pure‟, „original people‟ 
and „folk‟ are employed as a source of ethnocentrism. Along with the great upsurge of 
international migration in the era of globalisation, ethnic nationalism has been a major 
marker of social inclusion or exclusion (Munck, 2005). In terms of Western-centric 
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racial discourse, in particular, one of the characteristics that can be found in the 
globalisation process is racial discourses being combined with new or updated forms of 
nationalism. Wodak et al. (1999), for instance, investigate the tension in Austria‟s 
attempts both to maintain and to transform its nationalism in the process of the 
European Union. In their research, they prove that nationalism, as a special form of 
social identity, is produced and reproduced discursively. They argue, in this process, 
that emotional disposition, which relates to the attitudes towards other members of „in‟ 
or „out‟ groups, „would be towards solidarity with one‟s own group as well as towards 
excluding the Others from this constructed collective‟ (Wodak et al., 1999: 4). Despite 
the obvious fact that nationalism is as much about exclusion as it is about inclusion 
(Schlesinger, 1987), „it has been the most successful ideology around the world for the 
last two centuries‟ (Rantanen, 2005: 82). The collective memory and imagination of 
nationalism, as Anderson shows (1983), need the media to construct and maintain the 
sense of continuity and common destiny among fellow citizens. The role of the media 
in this sense becomes „increasingly important when nationalism goes through a period 
of transformation, as happens for example when the physical boundaries of the nation-
state change or there is a need to include or exclude new people‟ (Rantanen, 2005: 84). 
 
Ethnic minorities are mostly recognised by the dominant population through the 
representations of such groups in the media, such as the press, television and the 
Internet (Hall, 1997a; van Dijk, 1993; Georgiou, 2006; Woodward, 1997; Entman and 
Rojecki, 2000). Despite conflicting evidence in media and communications research 
about the effects of the media, we have theoretical reasons and empirical evidence to 
support the claim that media discourse plays a central role in the discursive, symbolic 
reproduction of racism (van Dijk, 1993). Media are undoubtedly a powerful force in the 
creation and/or dissemination – the distinction is as important as it is problematic – of 
public images of the „imagined community‟ that is the nation (Anderson, 1983). 
Television in particular, as a medium of multi-layered meaning structure (Fiske, 1987), 
connects viewers to „ethnic minorities‟ through the format of news. The extent to which 
migrants and their descendants are portrayed by broadcast and print media as part of – 
or apart from – the national community may significantly affect attitudes among the 
majority population towards minority groups (Hargreaves, 2001). 
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Lacan and Saussure (cited in Georgiou, 2006) discuss group identities as always relying 
on representations. As a cultural and political process, Hall (1997a) argues that 
representation exercised on the basis of power relations tends to stereotype its objects, 
and this practice divides people into bi-polar categories such as Us and Them. 
Representation means to give meaning to the surrounding world using languages or 
images (Hall, 1997a). Understanding the general ideas of the concept of representation 
is important for media analysis. First of all, media representation is not neutral: it is 
produced with a particular viewpoint. This is because representation has the power to 
define, describe, exclude and include, and to produce differences and similarities; the 
question can be raised as to who gets included or excluded in this process (Woodward, 
1997). Hall (1997a) argues that representation is an essential part of the process by 
which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture. It does 
involve the use of language, signs and images which stand for or represent things. The 
tradition in art of painting „exotic peoples‟ and the photographic representation of 
various „races‟ serve to represent codes of domination and submission, of difference 
and „alienness‟ (Sturken and Cartwright, 2000). The construction of cultural differences 
by legitimised communication system is especially open to the danger of signification 
through such stereotyping. 
 
Once prejudice and discrimination are established as norms, people become socialised 
through this predominant discourse and such negativity becomes reproduced through 
the generations (van Dijk, 1993). Socialisation is the process of reproducing the 
existing culture by new members within society through social practices. In the strict 
sense, an individual will learn prejudicial ideologies from the external social discourse 
rather than from personal experience; therefore the medium providing information to 
each individual in the process of socialisation has a vital role in constructing the social 
prejudice (K Park, 2008). In this process, educational authorities, especially parents and 
schools, have the crucial role of providing information, but it is undeniable that media 
such as television have gained a pivotal role as mechanisms of constructing prejudice 
towards racial and ethnic minority groups (Chomsky, 2002; Hall, 1997a; K Park, 2008). 
This is no surprise, as most people spend more time watching television over their 
lifetime than they spend in a classroom.  
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Media texts as elements of social events can bring about changes. Most immediately, 
texts can bring about changes in our knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, values and so forth 
(Fairclough, 2003). Medium is an active discourse producer. It has been shown in a 
great deal of research that a variety of media since the start of printed media have 
expansively reproduced racial discrimination in discourse (van Dijk, 1991, 1992, 1993, 
2000; Fairclough, 1992; Hall, 1997a; Chouliaraki, 1999; Hartmann and Husband, 1974). 
Most viewers do not stay untouched by the images and storylines they consume from 
the media. Although little evidence exists demonstrating a direct connection between 
the media and behaviour, such as violence, contemporary studies are finding that media 
messages influence viewers‟ perceptions of reality in a systematic manner (Signorieli, 
1989; Muts and Soss, 1997; Berger, 1998; Surrette, 1999; Chiricos, Padgett and Gertz, 
2001, cited in Eschholz, Bufkin and Long, 2002). The conclusions of such research 
suggest that media representations are incorporated into the knowledge base of 
audience members. If these media representations are biased toward a particular 
common set of social, gender or racial stereotypes, it is logical to suggest that these 
biases play a crucial role in the reinforcement of common stereotypes about gender 
roles, race and class in the society (Eschholz, Bufkin and Long, 2002). In particular, 
racism is to be found in the scientific theories, papers and lectures of biologists, 
historians and anthropologists, in religious doctrines and sermons, in children‟s comics 
and books, in advertising, in entertainment through jokes and caricature, and in political 
debates over the morality of colonialism and empire – all of which found expression in 
various media forms (Law, 2001). 
 
Academic definitions of the racial stereotyping process have also recognised the 
complex role stereotypes make in making sense of the world. According to Downing 
and Husband (2005), stereotypes are „generally reckoned to be particular aspects of a 
more general process by which humans categorise the world and thereby make sense of 
it for practical daily living‟ (2005: 33). As was already shown by Hartmann and 
Husband (1974), the British media, especially the popular press, represented Black as 
an invasion and Blacks‟ presence as a problem for the local population. Minority groups 
are often associated with crime, whereas crimes against them, such as racism or violent 
attacks, are underrepresented (van Dijk, 1987). 
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The Glasgow Media Group (1997) has sought to unravel White-centric hegemony 
through studies of the proportional representation of minority ethnic individuals on 
British television and in television advertising. The research showed that a large section 
of entertainment and factual programming was exclusively White, for example weather 
forecasts, documentaries, current affairs and quiz shows. The researchers emphasised 
that Black and Asian people tended to be in supporting roles and as temporary guests 
rather than hosts, and also that other minorities such as the Chinese are virtually absent 
across television. Entman and Rojecki (2000) provide a comparison of Black and White 
roles in film, appearance in television advertisements and entertainment shows, and 
representation in news stories in demonstrating the discursive construction of American 
Whiteness. As they write, „When they (media) endorse racial difference and hierarchy, 
however subtly and unconsciously, the media may reinforce tendencies toward 
prejudiced thinking apparently built into human cognition‟ (2000: 57). However, the 
researchers believe media discourse including race should be carefully scrutinised: 
 
Racial identity remains an important component of social appraisal, 
and this continues to disadvantage Blacks while benefiting Whites 
…Although race clearly remains a strong predictor of life choices, 
the public face of race is now cloaked in a chameleon-like form, an 
ever-changing camouflage that obscures its force (2000: 1). 
 
If a nation is defined as an imagined community and at the same time a mental 
construct (Anderson, 1983), an imaginary complex of ideas containing at least the 
defining elements of collective unity and equality, of boundaries and autonomy, then 
this image is real to the extent that one is convinced of it, believes in it and identifies 
with it emotionally (Wodak et al., 1999). In this sense, national identity, which the 
imagined community holds and shares commonly, is the product of discourse (Wodak 
et al., 1999). In an argument similar to this, Hall (1996) describes nations as systems of 
cultural representations and national identity partly reaffirmed in their meanings 
through everyday media consumption. As Bourdieu (1994) highlights, school and the 
educational system form „national common sense‟ and, similarly, television as an 
47 
 
„integrated into everyday life‟ representational system contributes to the construction of 
what is commonly designated as national identity through classificational systems. This 
includes the process of inclusion and exclusion towards Us and Others. In televisual 
representations „the creation of images of the Other was enabled by the use of the 
camera‟ (Sturken and Cartwright, 2000: 284) and television, in this process, functions 
as a tool which helps to easily and precisely distinguish Us from Others. These 
questions have become particularly pertinent in the case of PSB where values 
associated with the fair representation of all sections of the society represent core 
principles, at least institutionally. 
 
 
2.6. Public Service Broadcasting: Conceptual Challenges between Nationalism and 
Multiculturalism 
2.6.1. Conceptualising Public Service Broadcasting 
 
There is no easy answer to the question of „what public service broadcasting (PSB) is‟. 
Williams (1961) has identified the idea of „public service‟ as one of the great 
achievements of the Victorian middle class, and one that deeply influenced later 
generations. It was certainly a crucial component of the ideal of public service as 
grafted onto broadcasting in its formative period from the 1920s to the 1950s. The 
Victorian reforming ideal of service was animated by a sense of moral purpose and of 
social duty on behalf of the community, aimed particularly at those most in need of 
reform – the lower classes (Scannell, 1989). Küng-Shankeleman (2000: 57) argues that 
PSB has responsibility for „the cultural transmission of a nation-state‟s traditions and 
for helping to form the dominant consensus in society‟. Although Syvertsen (1999) 
analyses more than thirty different definition of PSB, she concludes that not only does 
each usage of PSB differ but also that some directly contradict others. The most 
commonly cited definitions such as „monopoly‟, „neutralisation‟, „balanced 
representation‟, „national scope‟ and „non-commercialism‟ are features of the old order 
which reflected the paternalistic and interventionist politics of 1920s and continued 
until the early 1980s in Western Europe (McQuail, 1995, cited in H Kang, 2003). The 
more recent definition of PSB equates „public service‟ with „the satisfaction of 
audience‟, implying a conception of the public as individual consumers of the media 
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(Syvertsen, 1999). In this view, PSB is regarded as a service to satisfy the interests and 
preferences of individual audiences rather than the needs of the collective (H Kang, 
2003).  
 
While some scholars (e.g. Burgelman, 1997) denounce the concept of PSB as hiding 
the reality that public service broadcasters simply do not operate differently from their 
commercial counterparts, others, such as Garnham (1986) and Murdock (1992), offer 
strong support for PSB and question the commercial media system‟s democratic 
potential. For them, public broadcasters are key institutions for extending citizenship 
rights. Curran (1991) argues that public broadcasters produce representative social, 
political and cultural diversity, including critical and controversial views, whereas the 
predominant trend within a pure market model is in favour of the production of bland 
programmes with a universal appeal to an undifferentiated, mass audience. 
 
Looking back at history, PSB‟s introduction and development has been central to 
modern nation-building and to the discourse of nationalism and ethnocentrism. 
Although there are a few exceptional cases, McQuail insists that „the usual pattern of 
state-sponsored broadcasting in Western Europe has been nowhere near as subservient 
to government‟ (1995: 147). According to Raboy (2003), PSB has been traditionally 
expected to represent the national as opposed to the foreign. The original public service 
model of broadcasting was one in which „all the citizens of a nation can talk to each 
other like a family sitting around and chatting around a domestic hearth‟ (Keane, 1991: 
164). PSB is an outcome of an agreement generated through the interactions among 
social forces under a specific historical setting, claims Syvertsen (1992). McQuail 
(1995) supports this model, saying some of the outcomes have been „determined by 
governments and politicians, some by professionals, some by various interest groups, 
and some even by the audience, which could exert indirect political pressure‟ (1995: 
151). Consequently, PSB grew out of the organic relations between interest groups 
representing some sections of the public, the state and liberal democratic politics. This 
tradition is still part of the core identity of the PSB, as seen in terms of „national unity‟, 
„cultural heritage‟ and „one country‟. 
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From the 1920s to the present, for instance, the BBC has continued the work of 
promoting national unity through its programmes. Royal occasions, religious services, 
sports coverage and police series „all reinforced the sense of belonging to “our” country, 
being involved in its celebrations, and accepting what it stands for‟ (Annan, 1977: 263). 
Annan‟s report describes the BBC as „arguably the most important single cultural 
institution in the nation‟, and recommends preserving it as „the natural interpreter of 
great national occasions to the nation as a whole‟ (Annan, 1977: 79, 114). Such 
occasions – exemplified by cases such as the wedding of Prince William and Catherine 
Middleton in May 2011 – may indeed be moments of national unity. Such national 
events have been telecasted by the BBC throughout its history over a nationwide 
network in the UK and the spectacle that is (re-) produced could arguably inspire 
nationalism in the British viewers. From this perspective, the predominant role of 
national media as systems of reinforcing nationalist ideologies is reproduced in PSB‟s 
representations. 
  
 
2.6.2. Public Service Broadcasting, Public Sphere and National Identity 
 
From a historical perspective, Anderson (1983) argues that „print capitalism‟ was 
instrumental in forging the „imagined community‟ of the nation. In his analysis the 
changed relations of time and space brought about by the Industrial Revolution, 
especially by print media and most particularly by the newspaper, led to a heightened 
awareness of the „steady, anonymous, simultaneous experience‟ of communities of 
readers (1983: 31). The earliest newspapers connected people to an idea of the nation, 
and the mass ritual and ceremony of reading the newspaper continues to contribute to 
the construction of an idea of the national community (Bausinger, 1984). The fact of 
engaging, through private consumption, in a joint public ritual with significant though 
absent others may be as important culturally as any information conveyed. If this is true 
of the newspaper, then it is yet truer of the contemporary regulation of simultaneous 
experience through broadcast media schedules (Cardiff and Scannell, 1987; Scannell, 
1989), perhaps especially as regards the evening broadcast news on television (Morley 
and Robins, 1989). 
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In fact, visual media, as much as print capitalism, have become tools for the 
reproduction of nationalism. The close relationship between visual media and modern 
nationalism has become apparent from the very beginning of the modern nation states, 
thus this relationship can be said to be fundamental. The most typical case can be seen 
in the Soviet films of the 1920s. All of the movies since the Russian Revolution in 1917 
were sponsored by the government; therefore, their contents were defined by topics 
which satisfied the revolutionary imagination. Movies as a tool of demagogy included 
persuasive styles and formalities and an element of realism. Vertov (1923), who was 
one of the typical Soviet movie directors, stresses the importance of movies in 
understanding the communist world. This function was seen in movies such as Kino-
Pravda (Cinema-Realism) as a tool for reporting the truth of the revolution. Grierson, 
one of the earliest British film directors and the inventor of documentary as a genre, 
influenced by the achievements of Vertov, persuaded the government of the UK in the 
1930s to initiate national ideology education, inspired by the nationalism of the Soviet 
movies (Borden et al., 2008). This passion towards nationalistic education through the 
media by movie directors reached its peak in some of the productions of American 
directors in the 1940s and 1950s. These films all stressed that the modern nation state 
contributes towards the public interest and common good, and this role is central in 
supporting citizens‟ dedication to the government and state. In this tradition of early 
film, negative representations of other ethnic groups, races and cultures can be found. 
One of the most vivid examples is in one of the earliest films, The Birth of a Nation 
(1915, directed by Griffith) represents the crude stereotype of sexually predatory 
African-American men as a reality using a major breakthrough for subsequent film-
making technique (Gray, 1993). In this film, Black male characters are repeatedly 
shown lusting after White women. In conclusion, the beginning of visual media was 
aimed at strengthening and reproducing the discourses of nationalism, and 
discriminating against ethnic minorities.  
 
As a national service, early PSB on occasions brought together all classes and regions 
(Reith, 1925, cited in Scannell, 1989). PSB has proved to be a powerful means of 
promoting social unity, particularly through the live relay national ceremonies and 
functions. By providing common access for all to a wide range of public events and 
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ceremonies – royal Weddings, presidential inaugurations, the Olympics and the World 
Cup, for example – broadcasting has acted as a kind of social cement binding people 
together in the shared idioms of a public, corporate and national life (Scannell, 1989). 
Most of all, the very significant genre that shows the conspicuous influence of PSB is 
that of the news. Although cable and satellite television in South Korea includes 
hundreds of channels, they account for only a small percentage of viewing – about 10 
per cent or so. The importance of public television news, at prime time particularly, is 
still enormous. This is to say that PSB functions as a crucial base and maintains its 
position in the heart of the public sphere. 
 
Although Habermas‟s account of the development of the bourgeois public sphere does 
not discuss television, his critique of public communication provides a crucial starting 
point to discuss what role PSB plays in democratic deliberation and citizenship. For 
Habermas (1989), the public sphere is a space that mediates between civil society and 
the state, and in which individuals and groups deliberate about public matters. In other 
words, the notion of the public sphere points to the requirement for democratic societies 
to sustain a space for the circulation of information, the exchange of opinion and the 
conducting of debate (Corner, 1999). The rational and critical public sphere created in 
the bourgeois coffee houses and salons has been transformed into a mass audience 
arena such as mass communication in the modern society (Harrison, 2000). Habermas 
(1987) introduces the concept of „system‟ and „life world‟ in order to explain mass 
communication as a public sphere. According to him, a system is represented by an 
economy and a bureaucracy, which correspond to money and power. The true life world 
for Habermas, however, represents the part of our everyday lives that excludes the 
influences of money and power (Harrison, 2000). To sum up, in the modern world of 
money and power, imperatives of the so-called system have infected communication in 
the life world (Harrison, 2000). For Habermas (1989), in this sense, commercial media 
production created a „pseudo-public sphere‟ within which a culture-consuming public 
exits, set in its private consumption pattern. Similarly, Garnham (1986) argues that the 
individual is prioritised as a private consumer, rather than as a public citizen via 
commercial mass media.  
 
52 
 
Some scholars within media and communications studies have debated whether PSB is 
formative of the public sphere and crucial to its existence (Curran, 1991; Garnham 
1986; Scannell, 1989). They discuss the ways in which PSB fits within the central 
Habermasian public sphere narrative (Ramsey, 2010). Curran insists that Habermas‟ 
account of the public sphere was historical flawed (1991: 42), but argues that the 
British PSB corresponds to Habermas‟ normative conception of the public sphere. He 
suggests that the normative element of Habermas‟ work mirrors that of the operation of 
British PSB (Curran, 1991). From a similar perspective, Garnham insists that 
addressing the model of PSB as an analogy to the public sphere is important, given that 
the two models share the same „strengths and weaknesses‟ (1986: 45). For Garnham the 
strength of PSB, based upon the imperatives of public sphere theory, is that „it 
presupposes and then tries to develop in its practice a set of social relations which are 
distinctly political rather than economic, and at the same time attempts to insulate itself 
from control by the state as opposed to, and this is often forgotten, political control‟ 
(ibid: 45). Scannell (1989) asserts that „PSB is crucial to the very idea of publicness‟ 
(cited in Ramsey, 2010: 3). He argues for the foundational role of public sphere theory 
in the study of modern societies and the contributory role of modern media (Scannell, 
1989). Whilst Habermas argues that „access to the public sphere is open in principle to 
all citizens‟ (1997: 105), for Scannell this was actually not the case in the period which 
Habermas describes. Rather, it is PSB that enables this inclusive condition (Ramsey, 
2010). Thus, the idea of the public sphere has been particularly related to the principles 
and practices of PSB.  
 
 
2.6.3. Public Service Broadcasting in the Multi-ethnic Society: Responsibility for 
Others 
 
In the era of globalisation marked by technological developments and faster movement 
of people across borders, the composition of audiences within national territories served 
by PSB is changing. Societies all over the world have become increasingly diverse. For 
migrant and mobile populations the public spheres of the host nation in which they 
geographically reside are far from being the only source of interpretations and 
identifications (Morley, 2000). Given that the media in most places are still, despite 
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globalising tendencies, in many respects based on nationally generated content (Morley, 
2000), the challenge remains for the public media to reflect diversity in their 
programming. 
 
The broad tradition of enquiry into the role of the public media and their potential for 
public interest leads to one of the key concerns of this research: that public television 
news should make a contribution to the welfare of a democratic society and that it 
should be accountable as a source of public information (Harrison, 2000). That is, it 
should be socially responsible. Although ethnic minority issues have been in the public 
spotlight only recently, cultural diversity in the media undoubtedly has a long history. 
PSB is, in particular, one of the most popular media which has a responsibility to 
contain cultural diversity and impartiality. This is a very important argument because 
this research adopts this normative perspective as I see PSB as central to representing 
cultural diversity, impartiality and democracy. Murdock (1994) explains that, as modern 
society evolved, PSB has undertaken a significant assignment as one of the mass media 
to provide the informational and cultural resources that would underwrite the rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship. In other words, the media have become both potent 
expressions and nurturing agents of democratic practice within a public sphere:  
 
The concept of the public sphere here refers to the arena of civic 
discourse, in which the mass media are said to play a central role 
in providing social mechanisms for public dialogue on the 
common concerns of societies (Venturelli, 1993: 491) 
 
The classic Western European model of PSB is seen as a deliberate expression for, and 
an understanding of, this role: „the tradition of Western European democratic theory 
and practice situates modes of public communication at the heart of the democratic 
process, within the very core of the notion of civil society‟ (Venturelli, 1993: 495). 
 
Pluralism and diversity refer to the extent that media supply reflects the variety in 
ideologies, communities and preference within the society. In economic terms, this 
objective can be translated as the match between the heterogeneity in supply and in 
demand. This objective is relevant for all types of content (van Dijk, Nahuis and 
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Waagmeester, 2005: 19). Cultural diversity in the public media is as much about the 
human right to live one‟s own cultural identity as it is about the human right to have 
access to the wealth of cultural diversity represented by the social majority (Raboy, 
2006). Although PSB has a duty to represent ethnic minorities impartially, public 
service broadcasters have been criticised for the „ghetto effect‟ they create by using 
government support to bracket out minorities avoided by the majority (Klimkiewicz, 
2003). According to the Broadcasting Research Unit in London (1983, cited in Tracey, 
1998), there are eight principles for PSB and among them, „provision for minorities 
especially those disadvantaged by physical or social circumstance‟, as the third 
principle, supports that PSB is charged with a particular responsibility to serve minority 
groups including those of a different culture or ethnic origin. Hoggart (1983) explains 
that there are some minorities who do not necessarily have either great purchasing 
power or much political clout. They are minorities not of taste but of the accidents of 
nature: the disabled, the blind, the deaf, the migrants, the very old and the very young, 
and the indigent. To broadcasters whose eyes are on maximising profits such people 
and groups will not seem worth the wooing. Yet manifestly their needs are at least as 
great, and the comfort they may draw from broadcasting even greater, than those of the 
hale and prosperous. PSB, therefore, should recognise them as special cases with 
particular needs (Hoggart, 1983).  
 
Pluralism was the word used by the Annan Committee in the mid-1970s to capture and 
respond to the changing nature of the times, but it is more accurately caught by the 
word „multiculturalism‟ (Scannell, 2006). Multiculturalism of PSB, however, highlights 
some difficult problems in the politics of cultural representation (Dines and Humez, 
1995). Scannell (2006) mentions that there are three major problems with British PSB 
in representing and serving ethnic minorities: i) badly distorted representation; ii) not 
getting represented at all; and iii) being lumped together with non-White people of 
entirely different cultures. British Asians and Caribbeans have often been arbitrarily 
yoked together in „ethnic minority‟ programmes in attempts to satisfy both. In fact, 
broadcasters often feel content to address very different cultural interests or tastes of 
different cultural groups, as these have all been dealt with based on their „minority 
status‟ alone (Georgiou and Joo, 2009). 
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2.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I examined television as a tool of representing social class, and its 
critical meaning in everyday life within the wider context of globalisation. The chapter 
focused on the fact that transnational human mobility has accelerated as a result of 
globalisation. For many nations, as a form of resistance to the diversification of society, 
marginalisation and discrimination of migrants became a sustained system of ensuring a 
sense of national, racially stratified order. Within this process, the chapter examined the 
role of television as a constructor of discourses which reinforces national ideologies 
and plays a de facto role as an ideological state apparatus (Althusser, 1971), which 
produces discourses classifying Us and Them through theoretical review. This 
theoretical background has great significance in theoretically supporting the primary 
premise of this study, which is to examine how representations of television media 
produce stereotypes of ethnic minority groups, which is critical for the process of 
reproducing social discrimination.  
 
The theoretical review that has unravelled throughout this chapter concerns 
universalistic theories (arguably Western-centric), which cannot be directly applied to 
the Korean socio-cultural reality. Thus, in this analysis universalistic perspectives need 
to be understood in dialogue with Korean particularism. Unlike Western societies, 
Korea itself has unique social traits associated with its history, culture and geography. 
These include a long history based on Confucian organisation of the society and 
political life, Japanese colonisation, contact with the Western military personnel 
through the Korean War and an only recent significant influx of ethnic minorities in the 
process of modernisation and industrialisation. Korean particularism and the socio-
cultural, historical and political context in which this study takes place are the focus of 
the following chapter.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Conceptualising Nationalism and Otherness  
in the Korean Context 
 
 
We are born with the historic mission to restore our nation. 
(The first sentence of The Korean Charter of Education) 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter attempts a critical historical approach to the key issues surrounding 
meanings of Korean nationalism and the position of ethnic minorities within the nation 
state of South Korea. It has been shown that the Korean tradition of ethnic homogeneity 
has been transmitted into multicultural society through press reports and governmental 
announcements.
4
 Currently, Korean society is becoming more and more multi-ethnic 
with more than ninety different nationalities having participated in intercultural 
marriages and foreign wives from twenty-one countries currently residing within the 
country. Examining the present situation, the number of foreign residents in Korea at 
31
st
 December 2010 was around 1,260,000.
5
 Non-national labourers account for 
700,000 of these and about 200,000 of them are said to be unregistered in the country. 
On top of this there is a big population of foreign residents from international marriages 
and statistics point to 11.4 per cent of all marriages in Korea in 2008 being intercultural 
marriages; even in rural areas this was as high as forty per cent (KNSO, 2010). Even if 
these figures end up being slightly high predictions, the fact is that the size of the non-
national population shows that the diversification of Korean society is here to stay.  
 
                                                         
4
 Munhwa Daily, 3
rd
 October 2007, „Foreigners in the state exceeding 1 million, Korea becoming multi-
ethnic society‟ 
Ministry of Justice, 24
th
 August 2007, „Non-national residents exceeding 1 million‟ 
 
5
 Korea Immigration Service, http://www.immigration.go.kr/HP/TIMM/imm_06/imm_2010_12.jsp, 
Accessed 1
st
 May 2011 
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Notwithstanding the rapid popularity of multicultural discourse in Korean society, 
putting this issue as a question of academic debate is merely the beginning of the 
process. It is open to doubt that the growth of multicultural discourse in Korea means 
there is an increasing number of foreigners who look different from Koreans. Strictly 
speaking it would be more accurate to say that Korea is being transformed into a multi-
national and multi-ethnic society, but not necessarily into a multicultural society. It is 
not easy to define in a succinct way what is meant by multiculturalism, but it is 
generally defined in Korean academia as a society free from the discrimination of race 
and ethnicity and where all groups of non-nationals enjoy the same level of social, 
economic, political and cultural rights as Korean citizens (K Park, 2008; G Han, 2003; 
H Lee, 2005; K Lee, 2007). This chapter will examine the historical background and 
the meaning of ethnic minorities and nationalism as formed in Korean society. It 
reveals the power struggles that, though under the surface of what appears a 
harmonious co-existence of the different ethnic groups, produce and reaffirm the 
nation‟s racial hierarchies.  
 
 
3.2. Historical and Cultural Background of Ethnic Nationalism in Korea 
 
A survey conducted in South Korea in December 1999 by the KBS and Hallym 
University found that 68.2 per cent of the respondents in South Korea consider „blood‟ 
the most important criterion of defining the Korean nation; 74.9 per cent agree that 
„Koreans are all brothers and sisters regardless of residence or ideology‟ (KBS, 1999). 
A survey by G Shin revealed similar views on nation and national identity; Ninety three 
per cent of the respondents reported, „Our nation has a single bloodline‟, and eighty 
three per cent felt that Koreans living abroad, whether they had emigrated and attained 
citizenship elsewhere or were born outside Korea and were considered legal citizens of 
a foreign country, still belong to the Korean ethnicity because of shared ancestry (G 
Shin, 2006: 2). When Koreans say, „We, Koreans are one‟, they mean that Koreans are 
one race, one ethnicity, and one nation, regardless of their current legal citizenship, 
place of residence or political beliefs.  
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Korean nationalism is maintained and strengthened by education acquired from 
individual socialisation and national institutions. Schools and media play a fundamental 
role in the process of consolidation. Schools are a vital mechanism in reproducing 
discourses of social control and act as a key element of the ideological state apparatus 
(ISA), which internalises acceptance of society and power amongst young generations 
(Althusser, 1971). To take a direct example, up until 2006 it was clearly stated in 
Korean high school history textbooks that „Korea maintains its traditions of an 
extraordinary homogenous nation‟ and furthermore, the National Ethics textbook said 
that „Korea is a homogenous nation … the community spirit as a sense of solidarity 
with other Koreans who share the same blood leads to patriotism‟.6 The vast majority 
of people who have received this kind of education accept nationalism as a fact, not an 
ideology. 
 
As the nationalism discourse within formal education is bound to be forgotten over time, 
other institutions, such as the media, play a significant role in reproducing and 
maintaining it in everyday life (Hall, 1997a). The discourses produced in this way 
function as a form of ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism suspects Others and makes a 
judgment of other groups and discourses, regarding them as alien, uncivilised, immoral 
or mentally inferior (Giddens, 2001). The nationalism of discriminative views towards 
ethnic minorities, which initially came from Western societies, was established in most 
contexts that experienced modernisation. 
 
However, in order to explain nationalism and discriminative reality in Korean society, 
we need to examine not only universalistic sociological theories, but also particular 
historical and cultural factors within a Korean context. Therefore, in this chapter I 
contextualise and discuss the history of Korean nationalism which is divided into three 
periods: pre-modernisation, era of upheaval and globalisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
6
 Joong-Ang Daily, 4
th
 April 2006, „Korea is single-blooded nation, schoolbooks make stereotypes.‟ 
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3.2.1. Pre-Modernisation (mid 1800s–1945) 
3.2.1.1. Origin of Modern Korean Nationalism 
 
Schieder (1978) suggests three types of ethnic group which are largely differentiated by 
the process of construction of modern nation states. The first is based on the nature of 
the development of production methods, such as in the UK and France. In this case, the 
bourgeoisie gained the political power by accumulating capital and gaining control of 
the state and the citizenry. The second case is seen in Germany, where the bourgeoisie 
was weak and not able to establish a unified nation state under community cohesion, 
such as in the UK or France. Therefore, in order to overcome this division, the ruling 
class constructed an idealistic and mysterious sprit of nationalism and unity to bind the 
nation. The final example is that of the Southeastern European Slavs whose nationalism 
was tinged with resistance against a ruling power from outside. The discrimination and 
persecution suffered under the ruling power inspired nationalist movements among the 
subjugated, led by the working class and intellectuals (Schieder, 1978). 
 
The Korean experience is most similar to Schieder‟s Slavic model. According to Y Shin 
(1989), modern nationalism in Korea is constituted of such thought as withstanding the 
aggression of foreign powers, upholding national sovereignty and integrity and 
following an independent and autonomous road of national development. Robinson 
(1988) also confirms that Korean nationalism was a response to an international threat 
to the traditional political and social order of the Chosun Dynasty. Looking into Korean 
history, it is not straightforward to find records of nationalistic events prior to the mid-
1800s, when imperialism led to the opening up of Korean society. Korea has sustained 
ceaseless threats and invasions from foreign powers throughout its history because the 
Korean peninsula is geographically surrounded by three of the most powerful states in 
the world – Russia, China and Japan. Its crisis became acute in the mid-nineteenth 
century when it had to wage a relentless struggle against powerful and aggressive 
Western powers and Japan in order to maintain its independent life and retain its 
national identity.  
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Although some scholars go back to the middle phase of the Chosun Dynasty era (1392–
1910) to seek the roots of modern Korean nationalism, it is commonly accepted that the 
modern nationalism of Korea began with the formation of the early „Enlightenment 
Movement (Gae-hwa Undong, 1853)‟ and „Eastern Learning Movement (Dong-hak 
Undong, 1860)‟ (Macdonald, 1990). Korea‟s early nationalism started to resist the 
influence of „hwa-yi thought‟7; however, it expanded to strive for independence and 
advancement of the nation under Western and Japanese threat (Y Shin, 1989). 
Enlightenment thought recognised the superiority of the science and technology of the 
contemporary West and advocated the application of this science and technology to the 
country‟s needs (particularly those of the factory system which used iron, coal and 
machines) so as to promote industry and trade to make the nation strong and prosperous. 
The core of Enlightenment thought was to completely reorient the country and change 
it into an independent, strong and prosperous nation and a capitalist and civil society (Y 
Shin, 1985). On the other hand, „the thought of Eastern Learning (Donghak Sasang)‟ 
argued that the strength of the big powers of the West emanated from the Western 
learning or Catholicism and was intended as a resistance against them. It began in the 
1860s as a reaction to the influence of Christianity and Western ideas in Korea 
(Robinson, 1988); it realised that its popularity as a national religion would stem the 
tide of Western challenges. Besides, Eastern Learning predominantly comprised the 
consciousness of anti-Western learning (Y Shin, 1989). It might be characterised not 
just as conservative anti-foreignism, but also as the fusion of patriotic motives with 
ethnic uniqueness (Robinson, 1988). These two forms of nationalism are the two major 
currents of thought that meet and sometimes come into conflict when applied to modern 
nationalism in Korea. 
 
According to Em (1999), the Korean nation was born out of Korea‟s integration into the 
modern world system of nations and the subsequent rise of ethno-nationalist 
historiography (minjok sahak) in the early twentieth century. He also points to the rise 
of ethno-nationalist historiography that replaced dynastic historiography as crucial to 
the birth of the Korean people as a modern nation. This for the first time narrated the 
history of Korea as the history of the Korean people, a category inclusive of every 
                                                         
7
 „Hwa-yi thought‟ regarded China as the centre of civilisation and the rest of the world as peripheral 
barbarians. 
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Korean without regard to age, gender or status distinctions (Em, 1999). In this view, the 
Korean nation was no exception to the general pattern of nation state building seen 
elsewhere: it was a fundamentally modern construction that developed in conjunction 
with the emergence of the modern world system.  
 
Although the universalistic model of modern national society that originated in 
European societies became popular throughout the world, particularistic elements also 
appeared in the construction of Korea‟s modern nationalism. In the late nineteenth 
century, some Korean leaders became familiar with modern Western ideas such as 
social Darwinism, civilisation, liberalism, individualism, nationalism, democracy and 
racism. Elements of the universalistic modernism from Western cultures were 
transplanted into the Korean context and two of the most conspicuous characteristics 
were „ethnic nationalism‟ and „the exclusion of individualism and liberalism‟ (Jager, 
2003). Above all, the concept of Korean ethnic nationalism reflects that of modern 
Germany and Japan (G Shin, 2006; Em, 1999; Schmid, 2002). In Germany and Japan, 
the nation was based on the idea of race or volk, a group with common cultural and 
racial features, and ethnic or racial consciousness was promoted as a marker of the 
modern nation. Likewise, in Korea, nation or minjok came to be strongly conflated with 
ethnicity and race. In the name of an abstract, immortal collectivity (that is, ethnic 
nation), people were asked to sacrifice their individual, civic, and political rights (G 
Shin, 2006; Em, 1999). During colonial rule ethnic nationalists such as Yi Kwangsu 
charged that Western individualism and liberalism were destroying Korea‟s „valuable‟ 
tradition of „we-ism‟ and „groupism‟, and they called for their revival (K Yi, 1922). As 
N Park (2003) points out, in the early years of the nation-building process liberalism 
was mistakenly positioned as the opposite of nationalism.  
 
 
3.2.1.2. From the Myth to History 
 
In establishing a new nation-based identity and solidarity, Korean nationalists promoted 
the value of their own history and language. In this sense, the work of Shin Chaeho, an 
editorial writer working for the Dae-Han Maeil Sinbo (The Great Korea Daily 
Newspaper, one of the earliest Korean newspapers), is very significant. In keeping with 
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the trend away from state-centred definitions of the nation, Shin adopted an ethnic 
definition of the nation, known as the minjok (Korean ethnicity). His 1908 essay Toksa 
Sillon („A New Way of Reading History‟) set forth the first and most influential 
historical narrative equating Korean history (Guksa) with the history of the Korean 
nation (minjoksa). As a history of the ethnic nation, rather than a dynastic history, Shin 
traced the origin of the Korean nation to the mythical figure Dan-gun (Em, 1999). In 
his view, history was an „indispensable instrument … in instilling nationalism and 
implanting national awareness in young people so that they can compete on equal terms 
with other nations in the struggle for survival, where only the winners are allowed to 
exist and the losers perish‟ (cited in G Shin, 2006: 36). This new historiography 
established a racial and ethnic genealogy of the Korean nation that emerged from Dan-
gun, the mythic founder of ancient Korea.  
 
Although it was not mentioned in Korea‟s oldest extant historical texts, Samgook Sagi 
(Historical Record of the Three Kingdoms), compiled in AD 1145, Samgook Yusa 
(History of Three Kingdoms), a thirteenth century document, described that the 
kingdom of Dan-gun, the ancient Korea, was established in 2333 BC. Samgook Yusa 
was written after the Mongol invasion and dominance from 1259 to 1356, and the 
inclusion of the Dan-gun legend may have been a „narrative of resistance‟ (G Shin, 
2006). Not coincidently, for a long time, the story of the birth of the nation was 
assumed to be a „mythology‟8 and was not confirmed as a supposed historical fact until 
1909, under Japanese colonisation. At that time, the independence activists who fought 
against the Japanese began to appeal to a nationalist spirit in order to raise 
consciousness among the general populace (Y Shin, 1989). Therefore, historically, the 
myth of Dan-gun can be seen to have functioned as reinforcing Korean nationalism at a 
time of national crisis, creating internal cohesiveness and strength amongst its members. 
                                                         
8
 According to the myth, Hwan-in, the heavenly king, had a son, Hwan-woong, who wished to live on 
earth. He descended to earth with three thousand followers to Baek-du Mountain under a sandalwood tree 
in today‟s North Korea and set up a kingdom there. There was a bear and a tiger in this land that wished 
to be human, and prayed to Hwan-woong for this wish. Hwan-woong gave them twenty cloves of garlic 
and a bunch of mugwort and told them to only eat this and stay out of the sun for a hundred days. The 
tiger and bear retired to a cave, but the tiger was impatient and left early (the animals probably 
represented ancient tribal totem symbols). The bear stayed and turned into a woman. This woman prayed 
to Hwan-woong for a son, who granted her wish and she gave birth to Dan-gun, who became the first 
human king on the Korean peninsula and established his capital at Wang-geom (Pyongyang, the capital 
city of North Korea now) in 2333 BC and called his kingdom Chosun, meaning „Morning Calm‟ (cited in 
http://koreanhistory.info/tangun.htm, accessed on 30
th
 March 2011). 
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The reinforcement strategy of nationalism using the myth of Dan-gun has continued up 
to the present day. Particularly after the Korean War, the divided North and South 
authorities strenuously propagated the authenticity of their own nation with an 
emphasis on the succession to the spirit of Dan-gun. The North Korean regime actually 
informed the South that they had discovered the tomb of Dan-gun in 1993 in an attempt 
to emphasise their legitimacy as inheritors of Dan-gun (Cumings, 1997). As H Song 
(2003) points out, it was an effort to strengthen national identity among North Koreans 
at a time when the country was facing a difficult situation (both internally and 
externally) and to present a North Korea-centred history of the unitary Korean nation. It 
also affirmed the homogeneity and longevity of the Korean nation. Actually, North 
Korea experienced a series of crises in the 1990s: extreme isolation from the outside 
world, the death of its leader Kim Il-sung, drought and famine, and economic hardship. 
Therefore, the myth of Dan-gun plays a central role in modern Korean nationalism and 
has significance in terms of historical support for the legitimacy of a homogeneous 
Korean national identity. 
 
According to Hall (1996), the foundational myth or myth of origin is accorded great 
significance in the invention of a national culture. He added that such myths do not just 
play a role in the officially sanctioned narrations of a nation, but also in the antithetical 
narratives which are used as instruments to found new nations. More specifically, as 
Em points out, it was a case of „reinvention – and not simply a revival – of this old and 
recurrent narrative in pre-modern Korean historiography‟ for present use (1999: 341). 
Shin Chaeho (1908), for instance, argued that the Korean people are descendants of 
Dan-gun, thus the Korean nation should be considered to be distinct from, and not a 
part of, the Chinese, Japanese or any other Asian nation in terms of a „single bloodline‟ 
(cited in Jager, 2003). As Schmid points out, it was „the bloodline, the genealogy of the 
racial nation that provided unity to Shin Chaeho‟s new narrative‟ (1997: 33).  
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3.2.1.3. Nationalism under Japanese Imperialism 
 
The Japanese colonisation which was prior to the modernisation process, played a 
critical role in the formation of Korean nationalism. The colonial experience with the 
absence of the autonomous modern state contributed to the rapid spread of the 
nationalism discourse. Nationalism contributed greatly to anti-imperialism (Cumings, 
1984). The nationalistic independence movement and the concept of nation have been 
reproduced as holy and noble values of absolute virtue through these processes (J Yim, 
1999). It is noteworthy that this discourse of nationalism displays some particularities. 
In Western society, there is no division between „people‟ and „nation‟. However, due to 
the experience under the Japanese colonisation, race was separated from the nation in 
Korea. As such there was not a state of Korea, but only the ethnic Korean people (K 
Park, 2008).  
 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt (1951) identifies race and bureaucracy as two 
major devices of colonial rule. Her observation of European colonial rule in Africa and 
India also captures the nature of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. Many have argued 
that colonialism was a primary factor in the rise of nationalism throughout the world, 
and particularly outside the West (G Shin, 2006; N Kim, 2008; Em, 1999; Cumings, 
1984, 1997). Em (1999) points out that the Japanese colonial state actually endeavoured 
to treat Koreans as subjects – subjects in the sense of having a separate (and inferior) 
subjectivity. In his view, the logic of racist colonial policy compelled the governor-
general to reconstitute Korean identities into a homogeneous Chosenjin, which means 
„the humble Korean people‟. Koreans resisted the imposition of this colonialist 
categorisation and the insistence on the unique racial origins of the Korean people and 
the promotion of the Korea-centred view of East Asia became particularly important in 
the nationalist response to Japan‟s colonial racism and assimilation policy (G Shin, 
2006).  
 
After the massive nationalist movement in March 1919, Japan instituted a new colonial 
policy known as bunka seiji (cultural rule), which allowed some limited space for 
„cultural activities‟ such as the publication of newspapers and magazines on the past of 
colonial subjects (Em, 1999). Consequently, colonial Korea witnessed the rapid growth 
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of „print capitalism‟ in the 1920s (G Shin, 2006). As in the birth of Western 
nationalisms (Anderson, 1983), the development of Korean nationalism during the 
Japanese regime was also indebted to the growth of „print capitalism‟.9 The rapid 
increase in Korea‟s own print journalism decisively contributed to the spread of Korean 
nationalistic discourse. This is because, as Wodak et al. state, „nationalism is 
constructed and conveyed in discourse, predominantly in narratives of national culture. 
National identity is thus the product of discourse‟ (1999: 22). 
 
In the 1930s, some of the key materials that explained mainstream Korean nationalism 
were published. The best-known example was Yi Kwangsu‟s Chosun minjoknon (A 
Theory of the Korean Nation). Here, he not only stressed pride in Korean heritage but 
also presented a highly racialised view of the nation. He defined the nation as „eternal 
beings‟ and Koreans have been without a doubt a unitary ethnic nation in blood and 
culture for thousands of years (K Yi, 1962). The insistence on the unique racial origins 
of the Korean people and the promotion of the Korea-centred view of East Asia became 
particularly significant in the nationalist response to Japan‟s colonial racism (G Shin, 
2006). Consequently, the initiation of Korean nationalism was promoted as a reaction 
to Japanese colonisation. In the period after the colonisation, the discourse of 
nationalism that had fostered the independence movement settled into an internal social 
discourse that was reproduced through the mass production of media. This nationalism 
became the founding principle of Korea (North and South) ever since independence 
from Japan, and it has continued up to this day. 
 
 
 3.2.2. Era of Upheaval: Independence, Korean War and Dictatorship (1945–1980s) 
3.2.2.1. Nationalism after Independence – One Nation, Two Countries 
 
With the Japanese surrender to the allied power, Korea was liberated from colonial rule 
on 15
th
 August 1945. However, the United States and Soviet Union came to occupy 
Korea and separate the peninsula: the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South, and the 
Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North. Although they looked 
                                                         
9
 In 1920 alone, the Japanese government issued 409 permits for magazines, newspapers and books, 
while in the 1910–1919 period, fewer than 40 magazine permits had been issued (Eckert et al, 1990). 
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opposite in political ideology and system, careful examination reveals a great deal of 
similarity in terms of their view of the Korean nation and their use of nationalism in 
politics (G Shin, 2006; Cumings, 1997). Ethnic nationalism became a highly effective 
organising and mobilising force in both parts of Korea. Postcolonial nationalism 
continued to function as an ideology of anti-imperialism (anti-Americanism and anti-
Japanism) for the North and anti-communism for the South (Cumings, 1997).  
 
Jowitt (1987) characterised the political ideology of North Korea as „Socialism in one 
family‟, referring to its socialist system ruled by a single powerful leader and family. 
North Korea resembles the family-state of pre-war Japan in that it regards Korean 
people as one family, or as a „socio-political organism‟, sharing the same bloodline with 
the powerful leader, with Kim Il-sung as a father figure. Indeed, Kim was not simply 
considered a political leader but was revered as oboi suryung (the fatherly or parental 
leader) among North Koreans (Cumings, 1997). He even called himself the present-day 
Dan-gun, the mythic founder of the Korean nation (G Shin, 2006). Although they 
respected Marxism-Leninism and established an important relationship with China and 
the Soviet Union, North Korea‟s primary ideology is nationalism, not socialism or 
communism. They called their own model of socialism Juche Sasang which means 
„Socialism of our style‟ based on strong nationalism (Jowitt, 1987; Cumings, 1997). 
 
While North Korea constructed nationalism based on a communist state, the first South 
Korean president, Rhee Syngman, proposed Ilmin Chuui, which means an „Ideology of 
one people‟. Ilmin Chuui was clearly an expression of ethnic nationalism similar to 
what had appeared during colonial rule. From this viewpoint, the nation was understood 
in organic and collectivistic terms, being considered a natural being or fate 
characterised by shared bloodline and ancestry (G Shin, 2006). The first president of 
South Korea stressed his view of nationalism in his article – „What is Ilmin Chuui?‟ 
(1949); he proclaimed, „As a single ethnicity of Koreans that has a long history, we are 
always one and not two. As one nation, we have to be one always‟ (S Rhee, 1949: 2). 
Ilmin Chuui was further articulated by Ahn Hosang, the first Korean minister of 
education. In the article, „Fundamentals of Ilmin Chuui’, published in 1950, Ahn 
proclaimed; „We are one people. One people has the same bloodline, the same fate, and 
the same ideology‟ (Ahn, 1950: 7).  
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In sum, in the five years between Korean independence from Japan and Korean War, 
the Korean society was in complete chaos and eventually experienced tragic division. 
Due to this process, Koreans managed to realise their own modern nation state and 
therefore the leaders of both the North and the South sought to construct their own 
ethnic nationalism and national identity in order to secure authenticity with the people. 
As such, it can be seen that ethnic nationalism arises as a crucial spirit from the national 
foundation and is an official ideology of the state continuing to the present day. 
 
 
3.2.2.2. Learning Racial Hierarchy from ‘Mighty’ White Americans 
 
Korea became independent from Japanese colonial rule when Japan surrendered 
unconditionally after the United States dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in Japan to end World War II in 1945. Despite the Korean struggle for 
independence, this was actually a result of external military intervention rather than 
internal insurrection. As such, in the view of the majority of Koreans, the American 
soldiers and other allied forces were regarded as heroes and mighty beings that had 
brought the Japanese imperial forces to capitulate and withdraw. Even the sturdy build 
and fair skin of the American soldiers made them seem like perfect human beings in the 
view of the Koreans in those days (G Cho, 2008).  
 
Although the elite Koreans likely learned of social Darwinism – White top, Asian 
middle and African bottom – from Japanese colonial scholars (Russell, 1991), this 
perception of being in between has been most forceful and popular since the 
domination of the US military after the Japanese regime (K Park, 2008). The respect 
towards White Americans and the United States was at its height in the years following 
the Korean War of 1950–1953. Abelmann and Lie (1995: 57) write that „the US 
military carried the United States to South Korea. Carrying the United States also 
meant bringing in its baggage of White superior – Black inferior racial ideologies‟. With 
little exception, Koreans conform to White America‟s hegemonic construction of itself 
as the racialised reference point (Lipsitz, 1998). This reflection of Whiteness accords 
with Koreans‟ association of a nation with its „owners‟ or „majority group‟. As well as 
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this, much of Koreans‟ interactions with Americans since the 1880s have been with 
White Americans (i.e. diplomats, missionaries). The most potent indicator of the 
persistence of this racialisation today is Koreans‟ use of miguk saram („American 
people‟) to denote „White people‟ (N Kim, 2008). Koreans also frequently use oeguk 
saram („foreigner‟) to denote a White person unless they specify otherwise, 
demonstrating that „White Westerners‟ are the reference point for anyone not Korean 
(e.g. „Asian‟ versus „not American‟, „foreigner‟ versus „Thai foreigner‟) (N Kim, 2008). 
 
In Korean culture, the importance of the colour white cannot be overstated. The country 
has valorised white as representative of its people‟s purity and desire for peace since the 
Three Kingdoms Period of 57 BC to AD 668 (K Moon, 1997). According to the public 
educational textbook on Korean history, Korea has earned the moniker the „white-clad 
nation‟ because Koreans continued to wear solely white clothing through pre-modern 
history. Although there are competing theories as to why Koreans adopted white as 
their clothing colour of choice, the three prominent accounts are Korea‟s lack of dyes, 
the worship of the sun, which they considered „white‟, and the desire to reflect their 
spiritual purity (N Kim, 2008). In addition to the specific colour preference, skin colour 
reflected social hierarchy. Through the Chosun Dynasty era (1392–1910), which was 
defined the Confucian agrarian society, Yang-ban (the nobility/elites) were light and 
white skinned and the peasants who worked outside were tanned and dark skinned. 
Simply put, in this hierarchy system, light and white skin denoted high social status, 
authority and respect, while dark skin indicated the opposite (N Kim, 2008). K Moon 
writes that „it is commonly known among Koreans that they prefer lighter skin to 
darker one even in the present age‟ (1997: 72). Although racial ideology and skin colour 
preference are not necessarily synonymous, it can be argued that the prevalence of 
particular hegemonic ideologies around skin colour reproduced throughout modern, 
Korean history relates to the ways in which Koreans think about race. 
 
More than anything else, however, the fantasy of the „Honourable Whiteness of 
Americans‟ in South Korea has been affected by the mass media. Along with US 
military prowess in South Korea, American mass media and commodities have been 
powerful markers of modernity, inspiring „American Fever‟ and subsequent emigration 
to the United States (Abelmann and Lie, 1995; K Park, 1997). Beyond exports of 
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imperialist commodity racism to Asia, the influence of both the U.S. military and mass 
media culture on Korean society converges in the form of the American Forces Korea 
Network (AFKN). Now dubbed AFN Korea (since 1997), South Korean residents have 
been exposed to the same US military propaganda and pro-American representations 
that have saturated the bases since 1957 (H Kang, 2003).  
 
As South Koreans have been inculcated with ideologies of the United States as a 
saviour and have witnessed what they consider US heroism and material abundance, 
„America‟ has become synonymous with „utopia‟ (Yuh, 2002). The United States 
literally translates to miguk (미국, 美國) in Korean (in Chinese characters), which 
means „the beautiful country‟. By implication, this word contains the great feelings 
towards America that the majority of Koreans have had for a long time. In conclusion, 
Korea‟s subordination to the White West has incited the uglier sides of nationalism, not 
only prejudices but a submission to the powerful and mistreatment of the weak – a type 
of authoritarian personality (N Kim 2008).  
 
 
3.2.2.3. Strengthening the Nationalism under Dictatorship 
 
In the aftermath of the Korean War, nationalism was combined with racism under the 
influence of the US and, at the same time, it became a complicated ideology combined 
with anti-communism (K Park, 2008). In the forty years after independence, between 
1945 and 1987, a strong form of nationalism was propagated in South Korea by the 
authoritarian regime in order for it to maintain power; however, in 1987 the opposition 
movement also began to use nationalism as a means to achieve democratisation. The 
nationalism propagated by the government was combined with a number of other 
ideologies, such as pro-Americanism, anti-communism (anti-North Korea) and 
modernisation. On the other hand, the opposition groups combined ideologies like anti-
Americanism, the agrarian movement and unionism with North Korea in terms of 
ethnic nationalism. However, hegemonic oppression from the government succeeded in 
suppressing these ideologies of opposition. As a result, the general populace has 
accepted the nationalistic discourse through textbooks and media, and it has now been 
embedded in the political, economic, and social ideologies of Korean society. 
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General Park Jung-hee, who took political power through a military coup in May 1961, 
recognised the power of nationalism in governing the country. He relied heavily on 
nationalist rhetoric to justify his illegal power-taking and established the national 
slogan „modernisation of the fatherland‟ to justify his rule (G Shin, 2006). Park 
regarded modernisation as more than improving the living standards of individual 
people or making profit for corporations. He claimed his modernisation project to be a 
clear historic mission – „to accelerate our economic growth, to modernise our 
fatherland, and to achieve peaceful unification of our country on the basis of self-
reliance, independence, and prosperity‟ (J Park, 1976: 31). Like reformers of „Meiji 
Japan‟ who sought to establish a „rich nation, strong military‟, Korean modernisation 
was taken as a matter of national survival in the sense that it was the only way to 
prevent South Korea from falling into another colonial or communist rule (G Shin, 
2006). In this sense, his nationalism included accepting superior aspects of foreign 
civilisation such as America, Europe and even Japan to achieve the developmental 
goals (J Park, 1979).  
 
Although he appropriated foreign civilisation and economic growth for the nationalist 
agenda, Park also sought to preserve and revitalise national culture and identity. This is 
because, as Gramsci (1971) observes, modern forms of domination are not only 
economic or political but also cultural and ideological. Park launched the Saemaul 
Undong (New Community Movement) in 1971 to achieve national spiritual 
development. Although this movement has been regarded as the result of Park narrowly 
defeating the opposition candidate, Kim Daejung (late-president of South Korea, 1998–
2002), in the 1971 election (53.2 to 45.3 per cent), and he felt an urgent need to secure 
popular rural support, this movement achieved huge success. In this social movement, 
Koreans were asked to preserve and develop virtues of their history, culture and 
tradition (G Shin, 2006). Park placed emphasis on an organic sense of nation based on 
the single bloodline stemming from the myth of Dan-gun, just as former ethnic 
nationalists had. After this movement combined with anti-communism and later with 
totalitarianism, it suddenly became firm as a symbolic representation of universal 
patriotism (Jager, 2003).  
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Family-centrism was an important component of the nationalism of Park‟s regime, 
along with anti-communism and economic growth (Cumings, 1997). This is linked to 
the restoration of traditional values movement. Therefore, nationalism was combined 
with patriarchal ideologies of Confucianism, which was deeply embedded in society 
due to the 500-year Chosun Dynasty. Family-centrism attaches greater worth to the 
family than to the individual and these values are reproduced in relationships 
throughout society (M Jung, 2007). Under this ideology, females are subordinate to 
males and the parent-child relationship is more important than marital relations. 
Furthermore, the family is prioritised over the individual and this was reflected in the 
monarchical structure itself, which viewed the nation as an extended family of the 
patriarchal king. With the king as father, it is anathema to select the monarch since it is 
impossible for the children to select their own father. Under this ideology, even the law 
was unable to violate the sovereignty of the monarch and patriarchal relations (Haboush, 
2001). D Lee (2001) explains the combination of family-centrism and nationalism with 
the terminology Ga-guk-che-je (家國體制, „familial nation system‟). According to his 
argument, the familial nation system is a political system modelled on the family. 
Modelling the nation means that the nation and family are not separated as a public 
sector and private sector, and the family as a private sector takes responsibility for the 
role of the public sector as the nation. Since this familial nation system emphasises 
legitimacy in regards to the blood of members of the nation, it is almost unavoidably 
intolerant to outsiders and those deemed to be Other and different from Us, which 
would include ethnic minorities and those from mixed backgrounds. 
 
To sum up, there have been massive key moments of change throughout Korean history 
in the forty years since independence from Japan, including the momentous 
achievement of the institutionalisation of democracy in the 1990s. Politically there were 
also turbulent periods, such as that under American military rule, the Rhee Syngman 
dictatorship and the subsequent thirty-year military dictatorship. During this period of 
confusion, the only ideology that has been consistently strong politically and socially 
throughout has been that of ethno-nationalism. Korean political ideologies, starting 
with Ilmin Chuui („ideology of one people‟), interlinked with the economic concept of 
„the modernisation of our fatherland‟ in the 1960s and 1970s and became distorted as 
tools to maintain the strength of the dictatorship. Furthermore, even the number of 
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democratisation groups that resisted dictatorship also appealed to a racial discourse, 
rallying around such political slogans as „One people, One nation state‟ and „By Only 
Our People‟, aiming at progressive nationalism. As a consequence, ethno-nationalism 
in Korea during the modernisation period became a powerful unifying ideology 
regardless of whether one was allied with the North or South, conservative or 
progressive, or the rulers or the ruled. From this perspective we can see that forms of 
anti-nationalism were naturally excluded from the discourse and discriminated against 
in all aspects of society, such as in political, economic and cultural ideologies, 
regardless of political bias. 
 
 
3.2.3. Era of Globalisation (1990s–present) 
3.2.3.1. Korean Transformation: From Emigration to Immigration 
 
Due to the rapid increase in foreign influence and media in the 1980s, the social 
discourse on how to adapt the exposure to foreign cultures began to diffuse throughout 
the Korean society. The rapid economic growth experienced since the 1960s eventually 
led to the export of technical professionals to Southeast Asia and the Middle East in the 
1980s. At that time, some Koreans returning from abroad actively produced 
stereotypical discourses around partial foreign cultures as they have seen and 
experienced. In the „Korean Success Story,‟ these workers starred as the heroes and 
heroines and the stereotyped discourses of inferior coloured races began to gain ground.  
 
In addition, two large international events were held in South Korea in the 1980s, these 
being the Seoul Asian Games (1986) and the Seoul Olympics (1988), which led to a 
surge in foreign labour in South Korea. Until the 1980s, Asian foreign labour was 
concentrated in Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Middle East, and Korea was not an 
immigration country for foreign labour. However, at this time a large number of 
undocumented workers from Southeast Asia began to enter Korea under waivers 
introduced to attract tourists. This system initiated a loosening of immigration controls 
(G Han, 2003). This foreign worker influx helped small businesses, which had suffered 
from a shortage of manual labour due to high rates of university entrance and wage 
increases due to stronger labour unions (K Park, 2008). Therefore, the government 
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turned a blind eye to the undocumented migrant labourers due to the fact that they 
would contribute to national economic growth (G Han, 2003). 
 
As non-White non-nationals had only been seen in the media or through others‟ stories 
of travels abroad before, their sudden appearance in everyday life led to the propagation 
of stereotypes of these new migrants. In this process, Korean nationalism reinforced 
ethnocentrism and increased discrimination and social exclusion of non-White 
foreigners. This initiated the exclusion of ethnic minorities in South Korean society. 
 
The origin of xenophobia in Korean society dates back to the mid-1800s, around the 
time when nationalistic ideologies were being formed (e.g. expulsion or execution of 
early missionaries from Western countries). The level of the mass, anti-foreign, 
patriotic sentiment continued to increase at the end of the Chosun Dynasty (Robinson, 
1988). The Donghak (Eastern Learning)
10
 religious movement had begun in the 1860s 
as a reaction to the influence of Christianity and Western ideas in Korea. The Donghak 
revolution figures prominently in most treatments of Korean nationalism. Donghak 
nationalism broadly includes conservative anti-foreignism because it celebrated the 
movement‟s Korean roots in opposition to Seohak (Western Learning). It represented a 
mass reaction to broad changes in rural life brought about by the intrusion of capitalism 
in the form of Japanese rice brokers, Chinese merchants and Western traders (Robinson, 
1988). In later years, the patriotic anti-foreign sentiment of the Donghak was revived by 
the Righteous Army movement (Uibyong Undong, 1905–1911) against Japanese 
colonialism. Due to economic needs, Korea, which had not yet even opened its doors to 
foreigners during modernisation, was eventually consumed by the inevitability of 
globalisation, and as a reaction the discourse of ethnic nationalism was strengthened. In 
this process, the reproduced and reaffirmed ethnic nationalism functioned as a 
discriminatory mechanism within institutions and caused the categorisation of 
foreigners according to their skin colour and the degree of wealth of the country from 
which they came.  
 
                                                         
10
 The legacy of the rebellion continued with the revival of the Donghak religious organisation in the 
Chundo-gyo (Korean Church of the Heavenly Way) after 1900. During the Japanese colonial period, the 
Chundo-gyo played a significant role in the nationalist movement through publishing and education 
(Robinson, 1988). 
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3.2.3.2. Between Nationalism and Globalisation 
 
Although there exist different views as to when globalisation reached South Korea, it 
became recognised and named as a major state policy and ideology during the Kim 
Young-sam government from 1993 to 1998. If modernisation was the catchphrase for 
the Park Jung-hee regime in the 1960s and 1970s, globalisation served the same 
purpose for the Kim government, which was the first civilian government in three 
decades (G Shin, 2006). Under the term segyehwa („globalisation‟), the Kim 
government attempted to reform the Korean political economy to meet the rapidly 
changing conditions of the world economy. According to Ohmae (1990), globalisation 
accelerates the formation of a borderless world with the weakening of nation state 
political regimes. However, in Korea‟s case, the state played a key role, referred to as 
„managed globalisation‟ by leading scholars (Alford, 1999; C Moon, 1995).  
 
The state‟s drive for integration in the global markets brought huge changes to the 
Korean economy and society. The launch of Korean companies into the world market 
can be seen as one of the most significant changes in economic structure in South 
Korea. Gigantic companies such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai began to stand out in 
the global market with the full support of the Korean government, through tax 
deductions, political aid, etc. Korea thus became the tenth strongest economy on the 
basis of GDP owing to the huge increase in exports. The twin affects of mass travel by 
Koreans and an influx of foreign companies into Korea again led to increased exposure 
to foreign cultures. English increasingly became the dominant mode of communication 
with foreigners and English proficiency exams became critical for employment in the 
majority of companies. There was an additional increase in migrant workers for cheaper 
labour as companies sought to make their products more and more competitive on the 
global market. 
 
Although these changes indicate that Korea was being globalised, that is, becoming 
more interconnected with the rest of the world, the Korean response to globalisation has 
been shaped by the ideology of ethno-nationalism as well as its own specific history of 
national development (G Shin, 2006). As Alford (1999) argues, Koreans view 
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globalisation as dangerous because it threatens to eliminate the foundation of Korean 
social relations and, thereby, the fundamental bases of Korean ethnic identity. He states, 
„Most of the ways in which Koreans appear to embrace globalisation are in fact 
strategies to keep globalisation at bay‟ (Alford, 1999: 12). In his view, Koreans assert 
the ideology of „Korean body, Western utensils‟, which is just another version of the 
nineteenth century nationalists‟ adage „Eastern spirit, Western technology‟.11 S Kim 
(2000) points out that „despite the rising globalisation and globalism chorus, deep down 
Korea remains mired in the cocoon of exclusive cultural nationalism‟ (2000: 263). He 
concludes, in terms of globalisation, „no fundamental learning – no paradigm shift – has 
occurred in the course of Korea‟s globalisation, only situation-specific tactical 
adaptation‟ (2000: 275).  
 
The uniqueness of the state-driven participations in the process of globalisation in 
Korea can be simply found in the address of President Kim Young-sam in 1996. He 
proclaimed; „Koreans cannot become global citizens without a good understanding of 
our own culture and tradition … Koreans should march out into the world on the 
strength of our unique culture and traditional values. Only when the national identity is 
maintained and intrinsic national spirit upheld will Koreans be able to successfully 
globalise‟ (1996: 15). In other words, „Koreanisation‟ was regarded as a precondition of 
globalisation and led to the revitalisation of Korean culture in the 1990s. As a result, the 
globalisation policies of Kim Young-Sam attempted to introduce Korean culture and 
values to the world. Furthermore, from an economic perspective the government fully 
supported native companies to make roads into the global market, which to a certain 
extent was parallel to the revitalisation of Korean values at home. According to this 
policy, a huge number of folk festivals were held and there was a rise in the sponsorship 
of Korean studies led by the government. Sinto Buri („body and the soil are the same‟) 
was created as a social movement in this period, which encouraged people to use more 
domestic products and the rise in sales of Samsung and LG products in the global 
market was on the news everyday in order to instil pride in the nation; this became the 
discourse of globalisation in Korean society (S Kim, 2000).  
                                                         
11
 By no coincidence, it is arguable that similar forms of nationalistic modernisation are present in other 
nations in East Asia. In China, the idea of „Chinese principles, Western applications‟ became the number  
one rule of reform after the Opium War (Wang, 2011). In Japan, the motto of „Eastern ethics, Western 
technology‟ played an indispensable role in their course of modernisation (Koizumi, 2002). 
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To sum up, the hegemonic public discourse in Korea in the 1990s was a part of 
government policy which focused on the reinforcement of national identity and value, 
rather than the global community, and also stressed the international competitiveness of 
Korean culture and products in a global market. Thus, it is thought that the Korean state 
has demonstrated a nationalist approach to globalisation as it did with the 
modernisation drives of earlier decades (G Shin, 2006).  
 
 
3.2.3.3. Ethnic Diversification as a Social Phenomenon in South Korea 
 
In the last decades, the myth based on Koreans‟ pure blood has been directly challenged 
by the large scale of labour migration. The accelerating pace of globalisation is giving 
rise to various forms of migration and diasporisation even in South Korea. During the 
rapid industrialisation period of the 1960s–1970s, South Korea was a typical example 
of a labour force exporter country, sending workers to Germany, Japan, and the Middle 
East, but it passed through the migration transition: by March 2008, the GDP per capita 
was US$24,500 and labour departures had fallen sharply. It was inevitable that allowing 
the migration of foreign labour would be needed to sustain economic growth. 
According to the Korean National Statistical Office (2010), in December 2010 the 
official number of non-nationals was 1,260,000, which is a 142 per cent increase from 
2000 and equates to 2.6 per cent of the 48,607,000 registered citizens in South Korea; 
the number of foreigners in Korea will top 3.6 million by 2030, Korea Immigration 
Service Commissioner Han Sang-Dae told The Korea Times.
12
 Among these non-
nationals, the largest group consists of documented migrant workers of 534,041 (46.1 
per cent), undocumented migrant workers of 187,163 (16.2 per cent) and internationally 
married women of 107,799 (9.3 per cent).
13
 Although the Chinese group among the 
immigrants in South Korea is the biggest, over a half of them (over 25 per cent of total 
immigrants in South Korea) are Chosun-Jok („Korean-Chinese‟), which means „ethnic 
Koreans holding Chinese nationalities‟.  
 
                                                         
12
 Korea Times, 26
th
 July 2007, „Foreigners to top 3.6 million by 2030‟. 
 
13
 The Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea http://moj.go.kr, accessed on 21
st
 March 2011 
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Table 3.1. Official Numbers of Non-nationals Living in South Korea (1997–2010) 
Year 1997 2003 2006 2008 2010 
Non-national residents  
in Korea 
386,972 678,687 910,149 1,158,866 1,260,000 
Source: The Ministry of Justice, Korea (2011)  
 
 
3.2.3.4. Two Main Streams of Immigration: Migrant Workers and Married Migrant 
Women  
 
Migrant Workers 
For the last twenty years, there have been multiple forms of immigration; however, 
migrant workers and married migrant women are the two most significant groups 
among them. A rapid increase of labour migration in particular has led to growing 
ethnic diversification in South Korea. Although South Korea is still at an early stage in 
the migration process, it is fast becoming a labour-import society. According to Castles 
(2007), the country no longer has to decide whether it wants to become a multicultural 
and multi-ethnic society or not. Today it faces a different challenge: what type of 
multicultural society does it want to be? Does it want to be an exclusionary society in 
which immigrants and minorities are treated as second-class citizens, discriminated 
against and socially excluded? Or does it want to be an inclusive society in which 
everybody who contributes to the economy and society enjoys equal treatment and 
equal opportunities?  
 
Although the racial hierarchy of Koreans has been affected by eighteenth century 
Western Darwinism, Japanese colonial scholars and American culture, South Korea 
began borrowing Japan‟s racialisation of the global order in the late 1980s, similarly 
blackening the migrant workers who immigrated from China, and South and Southeast 
Asia (e.g. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Philippines and Vietnam) (Lie, 1998). Koreans have 
considered these workers‟ desperation for Seoul‟s jobs of drudgery an expression of 
inferior national blood, sometimes signified by darker skin (K Park, 2008). By contrast, 
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South Korea is whiter and more middle class in the world system than the developing 
countries from which the migrant workers hail (N Kim, 2008). The majority of migrant 
workers are doubly discriminated by racial classification as well as being perceived as 
manual labourers. The perception of labourers in Korean society is different from that 
of European countries that experienced the Industrial Revolution. Under the 500-year 
influence of Confucianism prior to modernisation, the caste system of the Chosun 
Dynasty period traditionally identified „Four Classes‟ in society, which were aristocrats, 
farmers, artisans and tradesmen; the after-effects of this system are visible throughout 
society, and manual labour is still the least favoured occupation in Korean society due 
to this traditional prejudice, and it can be said that manual labourer does not simply 
represent a career but also a social class (Park, 2007). Therefore, migrant workers in 
Korean society are subject to dual exclusion, exposing them to discrimination in the 
racial hierarchy, and also in the social hierarchy as being working class.  
 
South Korea showed a large increase in immigration, as a result of the introduction of a 
work permit system for less skilled migrants. South Korea implemented significant 
changes to its migration policy during 2003 and 2004 in the form of the legislation and 
implementation of the act on employment for migrant workers, known as the 
Employment Permit System (EPS), which was designed to bring in temporary migrant 
workers who would only be allowed to stay for three years. An extension of a further 
three years was possible, but the workers had to leave for a whole year in between. 
Moreover, workers were not allowed to bring spouses or children into the country. Thus, 
under this system, most migrant workers are permitted and regarded as temporary 
residents for work, but not as those permanently settled (Castles, 2007). This is the 
structure of Korean society that symbolically reproduces Otherness. 
 
Married Migrant Women 
Another main stream of the new ethnic minorities in South Korea is migrant women 
marrying Korean men. There has been a dramatic growth in intercultural marriages in 
recent years. In August 2009, the Korean National Statistical Office (KNSO) 
announced that the number of international marriages in 2008 was 36,204, which was 
eleven per cent of all marriages in Korea that year (327,715). Most of those come from 
China (13,203) followed by Vietnam (8232), Philippines (1857), Japan (1162) and other 
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countries in Southeast Asia (3659) including Cambodia and Thailand.
14
 Much like the 
influx of migrant workers, the recent trend of „international families‟ was set off as part 
of a drive towards international division of labour (G Han, 2003). But the formation of 
such families in South Korea was driven by the need to maintain the gender division of 
labour in the countryside by making up for female emigration to the cities (triggered by 
urbanisation) with immigration of brides mainly from China, Vietnam, Philippines, 
Russia, Uzbekistan, and so on (G Han, 2003). The number of international marriages 
has been rising every year, from 12,319 in 2000 to 43,121, or 13.6 per cent of the total, 
in 2005. In particular, 35.7 per cent of men living in the countryside who got married in 
2005 married foreigners and it is expected that this will result in about fifty per cent of 
the population below the age of nineteen in rural regions to be biracial by 2020 due to 
the quickly growing number of inter-racial marriages in the farming and fishing 
community, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries announced (The 
Korea Times, 9
th
 April 2009). 
 
 
Table 3.2. The Rate of Inter-cultural Marriage 
Year 1990 1995 2000 2003 2005 2008 
Rate of inter-
cultural marriage 
1.2 % 3.4 % 3.7 % 8.4 % 13.6 % 11.0% 
Source: KNSO (2010) 
 
 
The history of married migrant women in Korea stems from the 1980s when Korean-
Chinese, the supposed first group of married migrant women, began to enter the country. 
At that time the problem of unmarried men in rural areas was seen as a social problem 
and that was the reason for the sudden influx. This movement was promoted actively 
through intervention by local governments after Korea officially established diplomatic 
relations with China in 1992. Starting in Okcheon, Chung-buk Province, in 1993 before 
expanding to Jangsu and Jyeong-eup Districts in Cheon-buk Province in 1995 and 1996, 
respectively, the local governments were either facilitating international marriages or 
                                                         
14
 Munwha Daily, 26
th
 July 2009, „1 of 10 international marriages, 46% of them are of Chinese 
nationality‟. 
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providing financial support for them (H Lee, 2005). By 2000 this had expanded to the 
national level, but mostly in rural areas throughout the country. Currently, 29.4 per cent 
of local governments and subsectors (242 out of 822) are facilitating programmes that 
encourage international marriages, which, although not simply explained, can be 
understood through the politics of population. The number of registered residents, 
including non-nationals, at the local government level is pivotal data for estimating the 
budget and human resources from central government. Therefore, the population level 
is an essential condition for maintaining a certain level of organisational capacity for 
local government and the most fundamental way to do this is for the local population to 
produce more children, which can be realised in the long run by match-making 
unmarried men in areas with a population shortage. Without regard for the supposed 
necessity of this project, it became problematic because the administratively centred 
methods of accepting migrant women, and the fact it gave little thought for local 
communities and needs, meant the women were treated as a disposable resource for 
maintaining the rural family structures (G Han, 2003).  
 
The extension of migration and diasporisation to areas of the rural periphery not only 
brought with it changes in the economic sphere, it also brought changes in the socio-
cultural sphere, with various ethnic groups forming local communities in their areas of 
residence and developing diverse cultures. As a consequence, the formation of new 
social and cultural groups raises further questions around national identity and the 
cultural and educational capital of the children of diasporic people and Koreans, about 
diasporic populations‟ communication and interaction with the locals, and the future 
shapes of specific local communities (K Lee, 2007). The phenomenon makes Koreans 
realise that the rise in international marriages is not just in numbers. It reflects how the 
nation is fast becoming a multi-ethnic society and, importantly, indicates that ethnic 
diversity has become inevitable in Korean society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
3.2.4. National Identity and the Media in the Korean Context 
3.2.4.1. Globalisation of the Korean Media 
 
Globalisation challenges the traditional ways of thinking about nationalism, which are 
based on the idea that people who live in a given geographical territory share a national 
identity and feel they belong to the same nation (Rantanen, 2005). This globalisation is 
continuously reproduced through various forms of media discourse, rather than being 
an actual phenomenon, and is expanded and disseminated throughout society. The 
period of time in which the terminology of globalisation began to be used in 
earnestness throughout South Korea corresponded with the time at which the Olympics 
were held in Seoul, in 1988. The slogan of the Olympics at that time was „The World to 
Seoul, Seoul to the World‟ and this can be said to be the beginning of the construction 
of a discourse which emphasises the „world‟ or „global‟ as a central concept in mass-
produced Korean media. However, the meaning of the word was somewhat restricted to 
referring to the „Western world‟, implying the inclusion of the more developed 
countries in terms of economic power. 
 
In the period of the first civilian government of President Kim Young-sam, initiated in 
1993, the terminology „globalisation‟ began to be frequently used. The increasing use 
of the term „globalisation‟ as a motto of national policy was a result of the changing 
Korean economic structure, which was heavily dependent on exports. Korea achieved 
remarkable economic growth due to strong economic and modernisation policies 
beginning in the 1960s; however, the rapid development had come to a standstill by the 
early 1990s. As the dramatically soaring stock market reached its limit, Korean 
companies tried to launch their businesses in overseas markets. In this situation the 
wave of globalisation that had taken off during the Seoul Olympics of 1988 became the 
perfect ideology to satisfy the needs of political and economic interests, with the former 
wanting to distract the internal opposition and the latter wanting to access new and 
broader markets. 
 
Taken together, the discourse of globalisation produced by the media has been used in a 
very limited sense in Korean society. It was claimed that in this new world the globe 
was our local neighbourhood; however, this often emphasised Western developed 
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countries, rather than Africans, Southeast Asians and other ethnic minorities. Moreover, 
globalisation in this context is limited to economic sectors, in particular, an efficient 
means of international trade and economic growth. In order to survive in this globalised 
world, international competitiveness is emphasised and globalised society is no longer 
perceived as a „society we live together with‟ but as a „society of accelerating 
competitiveness‟. This discourse utilises a selective vision of globalisation which both 
minimises its impacts and highlights the threat it poses to the homogeneity of Korean 
culture. 
 
 
3.2.4.2. Korean Public Service Broadcasting as a Factory of Fictive Nationalism 
 
While there are more differences among Asian television systems than among Western 
systems, there are also significant similarities in the ideologies and structures of 
broadcasting in Asia. Four similarities will be noted here. First, the state acting 
independently of societal interests in many Asian countries has exerted monopolistic 
power in the initial configuration of broadcasting (Tsai, 1998). With civil society being 
weak, the state compensates for an underdeveloped market or a deficient bourgeoisie 
(Gerschenkron, 1992). Second, in many Asian countries, the state-run systems have 
general arrangements for the broadcasting media. Primary reasons for the establishment 
of these systems were the extension of education, economic development, nation 
building, national security and prevention of internal insurgency (Tay, 2001). Third, 
PSB in many Asian nations is run on the noble idea of „public service‟ but their 
programmes are replete with entertainment. State broadcasting was routinely 
legitimised in the language of public service, national security and state prerogative, but 
gradually its „role as an educational medium‟ was relegated to the background. It 
became a medium for entertainment followed by information that was predominately 
political (Thomas, 1998). Fourth, the state intervention in broadcasting results not only 
from the lack of strong civil society but also from „Asian culture‟. In fact, the Western 
concept of public media is rooted in the enlightenment philosophy of individual 
freedom and rights, which cannot be directly transferred to many Asian countries where 
a Confucian philosophy of consensus and cooperation are stressed as critical social 
values (Menon, 2000). 
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These characteristics of television broadcasting systems of Asian countries are similar 
to the Korean broadcasting environment, especially those of PSB. In South Korea PSB 
is the most powerful media. This is because the Korean broadcasting system was set up 
under the strong influence of the monopolistic power of the state. The Korean state still 
has relatively strong control of PSB, at least compared to Western European countries. 
South Korean PSB retains a legacy of being supportive towards the regime. After the 
democratisation of Korean politics in the late 1980s, direct control of the media 
disappeared. There is no longer any coercion, reporting guidelines or censorship. 
However, the complex nomination system behind the scenes for designating the heads 
of public broadcasters still remains and the state still retains the right to intervene on 
particular issues (H Kang, 2003). 
 
PSB is the product of interaction and consultation with the purpose of maximising the 
benefits for social groups, such as nations, capital, or political parties (McQuail, 1995; 
Syvertsen, 1992). For this reason, PSB is bound to operate within the political ecology. 
Therefore, the governance structure of PSB is influenced by the relations between the 
broadcaster and the political system. This is particularly so in the case of the 
composition and appointment of board members in the PSB. The board members have 
distinctive political influence over broadcasters. 
 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) categorise the PSB on the basis of political influences: 
political-over-broadcasting system; autonomous systems; and politics-in-broadcasting 
system. „Autonomous systems‟ correspond to the professional model which notes that 
the broadcaster should be free from political control and operated by broadcasting 
professionals. On the other hand, the „political-over-broadcasting system‟ represents a 
model of direct control by government or the political majority. Likewise, the „politics-
in-broadcasting system‟ corresponds to the parliamentary model or the civic model 
which are controlled by a proportion of parliament seats or diverse cultural/political 
groups. 
 
None of these three models are to be fully applicable or reproduced in a clear manner in 
every society, as in all applications of the PBS there are distinct particularities. Within 
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this context, the case of Korea is closer to the government-controlled model of PSB that 
Hallin and Mancini discuss (2004). The Korean nation-state has a relatively short 
history of institutional democracy compared to most of the Western countries with PBS. 
In Korea, the authority of its president, a so-called „imperial president‟, is so powerful 
that the president has the authority of appointment of the head of KBS. Consequently it 
is evident that the political independence of KBS is not guaranteed in this structural 
environment. 
 
The history of PSB in Korea can be traced back to the Japanese colonial period. In 1926, 
the Government General of Korea (hereafter GGK), the Japanese colonial government 
in Korea, established the Kyung-Sung Broadcasting Station
15
 (the old name of KBS) 
and the old KBS started its first radio broadcast on 16
th
 February 1927 (KBS, 1997). 
The GGK enacted a wartime programming policy centred on the enhancement of 
Japanese spirit and the mobilisation of the whole Korean Peninsula for the war. Even 
the subjects of radio dramas changed for the mobilisation with themes such as 
patriotism and sacrifice for the Japanese Empire (H Kang, 2003). Just after the Japanese 
emperor announced his World War II surrender on 15
th
 August 1945, ironically, the 
Korean personnel of KBS began to broadcast „Arirang‟, Koreans‟ favourite traditional 
folk song, on the radio station that had aired Japanese military songs only a day before. 
This „opportunism‟ is the most peculiar characteristic of Korean broadcasting 
journalism (Y Choi, 1998). This seems to be a general relationship between the state 
and broadcasting in which the power of the broadcasters varies depending on that of the 
state. 
 
After liberation from the Japanese, the southern half of the Korean Peninsula was under 
the command of the US Army Military Government, while the northern half came 
under the Soviet Union. They renamed the Kyung-Sung Broadcasting Station (the old 
name of KBS) as the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) (J Song, 1991) and 
prohibited news coverage opposed to the American strategy of establishing a pro-
American government and eliminating the left in order to secure a bridgehead in East 
Asia as preparation for the Cold War with the Soviet Union (H Kang, 2003). Under this 
US regime, a reporter was dismissed from KBS after protesting that his report on UN 
                                                         
15
 „Kyung-Sung‟ was the old name of „Seoul‟ that the Japanese regime forced the Korean people to use. 
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trusteeship of Korea had disappeared in the process of censorship in 1946 (B Yoo, 1998) 
and three reporters were examined by the US police on the charge that they had quoted 
a report of a newspaper, which had positively covered a speech by a representative of 
the Soviet Union urging joint America-Soviet discussions in 1947 (KBA, 1997). The 
most ridiculous happening, moreover, was that twelve employees of KBS were arrested 
and seven were prosecuted on the charge of making a bad quality transmission during a 
right wing party‟s speech in 1947 (KBA, 1997).  
 
The American military government‟s period had two significant impacts on the Korean 
PSB system. The first is that it moulded the broadcasting environment of the future, 
where the form of state-owned broadcasting appeared for the first time. The state 
exercised its power in forming the broadcasting system and structure following the 
Japanese occupation period. The active intervention of the state in the area of 
broadcasting resulted in a broadcasting culture vulnerable to pressure from the state (H 
Kang, 2003). The second is that Korean people were influenced by American 
programmes and televisual cultural forms. Under the financial difficulties of the time of 
the Korean War, KBS broadcast programmes provided by the United States Information 
Agency (USIA) and United Nations Command (UNC) (S Chung, 1991). This provided 
an opportunity for the Korean viewers not free from the influence of KBS broadcasting, 
which produced biased programming from the viewpoint of Americans, to adhere to the 
majority American Caucasian position in terms of racial issues (J Roh, 1995).  
 
After the US military regime, KBS was still utilised as one of the most important 
institutes for the state regime (H Kang, 2003). In particular, during the eighteen-year 
dictatorship of General Park, KBS developed under the extreme power of the state. 
During the Japanese colonial period, the US military rule period and Rhee‟s 
government, broadcasting had been passively controlled by the state, while the Park 
government actively exploited broadcasting, putting its ideology of economic 
development to the fore and permitting private broadcasting. The broadcasters in Korea 
learned the strategy of supporting the regime and obtaining economic benefits in return 
for this support. Under this situation it was impossible to distinguish public service 
broadcasting from other private broadcasting (H Kang, 2003). 
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Moreover, General Chun, the very next dictator was in urgent need of controlling the 
national media and forcefully integrated a number of private broadcasters into KBS (H 
Kang, 2003). As a result, KBS possessed an unrivalled level of resources compared to 
other broadcasters and this meant its output displayed a tendency to follow the 
government line in its own interests. Another attempt to control broadcasting can be 
confirmed by the official broadcasting guidelines. Journalists used to call it „today‟s 
saying‟ until it had the official title, bodojichim („the press guidelines‟). The guidelines 
consisted of prohibitions on certain news items such as the activities of dissidents or the 
opposition party, university demonstrations and labour-management disputes. News 
stories in the everyday media were graded as „allowed‟, „not allowed‟ and „absolutely 
not allowed‟, and there was a specific format and a way each story should be written 
(Hangyore 12
th
 December 1995). What was worse, marginal groups such as the 
homeless, orphans, those in poverty and the handicapped could not appear on the 
television screen (H Kang, 2003).  
 
Since the democratisation of Korean society, after the mid-1990s, there has been a 
guarantee of the freedom of the press; however, KBS broadcasts are still closely related 
to the official government position and the service has been greatly influenced by 
changes of regime in its tones and arguments. In particular, producers and reporters 
under the military regime (1960s–1980s) now enjoy high positions of authority such as 
editorships. Therefore, there are still arguments that self-censorship of news makers 
still has an impact on news outlets such as KBS as an authority-oriented broadcaster. To 
take a direct example, President Lee Myung-bak, elected recently when the former 
ruling party was replaced in 2008, legislated for the KBS president to be removed from 
his position despite having remaining time on his term in office. The South Korean 
president was fiercely criticised as he put his favoured people, who were close to him 
and his ruling ideology, in the position instead. Additionally, there have been rumours 
that KBS has a confidential internal document which obstructs celebrities who have 
publicly voiced their opposition to the policies of the conservative party from being on 
KBS and related radio programmes. As a consequence, the political independence of 
KBS has been repeatedly questioned and remains a big issue. 
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Nationwide television in South Korea today is dominated by three public service 
broadcasters: Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), Educational Broadcasting System 
(EBS, which KBS transmits on behalf of EBS), and Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation 
(MBC). The revenue structures of the three public broadcasters differ from each other: 
KBS relies heavily on a subscription fee and advertising revenues, while EBS depends 
in part on subscription fees, in part on support from the Broadcasting Development 
Fund, and in part on advertising, and most of MBC‟s revenue comes from advertising 
(KBS, 1999). Despite its heavy dependence on advertising revenues, MBC is 
considered as a public broadcaster because 70 percent of its stock is owned by the 
Foundation for Broadcast Culture, an organisation operated entirely from funds 
provided by the national government (H Kang, 2003). Its highest decision-making body, 
the Board of Governors, is comprised of 11 members who are nominated by the Korea 
Communications Commission (KCC), and appointed by the president of South Korea. 
The Board nominates the KBS president and the chief executive officer, who are also 
appointed by the South Korean president. In this context, KBS cannot become fully free 
and independent from the government‟s control. 
 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, as examined earlier, the migrant influx as a form of the globalisation 
process in Korean society was discussed, and there was an analysis of the ways in 
which Korean nationalism intervened and was reproduced by this process. To conclude, 
Korean nationalism as an exclusionary device for ethnic minorities has been formed 
through a series of historical events over a period of time; therefore it cannot be 
described through mere rhetoric, but is a highly complex and longstanding phenomenon. 
Particularly in the last fifty to sixty years of Korean modern history, society has had 
such diverse experiences as Japanese colonisation, the Korean War, political 
intervention of the US, modernisation and globalisation. As a result of this series of 
historical events, Korean nationalism has been strengthened, reconstructed and 
transformed and it is still a process in progress.  
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Simultaneously, the Korean public media environment plays a critical role in producing 
public discourse. Due to the complicated historical background, Korean PSB tends to 
be authority-oriented rather than people-oriented, and typically represents the „national‟ 
interest, rather than impartiality. Therefore, it can be said that Korean PSB has 
produced nationalism as a national ideology, defining it as an absolute value, and it has 
tailored and evaluated all the social changes within the frame of nationalism. On the 
premise of this contextual background, the next chapters will look into what kind of 
new discourse KBS, as the Korean PSB, produces in the process of experiencing a 
radical increase in migrant numbers over the last decade and in what light they 
represent them as new members of society. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Methodology is the fundamental part of our story-telling technique, 
and as such is more than technical: it is the very language of 
research, quite simply how we go about doing things. 
(Morrison, 1998: 3) 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The starting point of this study is an examination of the role of public service 
broadcasting (PSB) in South Korea, where ethnic minorities have increasingly become 
visible in its programmes. This study is particularly crucial as it examines the role of 
the media, and especially PSB, as the main source of social discourse concerning 
discrimination and cultural exclusionism against ethnic minorities. This is valuable as 
studies of this kind are rare in South Korea. Moreover, studying media representations 
of ethnic minorities forms a significant method to understand the relationship between 
ethnic minorities and media power. This is because most people understand and define 
their world through the representational systems provided by the media. Ethnic 
minorities in modern societies are mostly recognised by the way they are represented in 
the mass media, especially the press and television. The media have the ability to give 
concrete form to abstract ideologies. Media constructs can then turn into widely 
consumed ideological discourses that have the ability to transform subtle cultural or 
social differences into fundamental differences. Therefore, in studying how ethnic 
minorities are located and recognised in social contexts, media representations 
represent one of the most significant research areas.  
 
To approach the main research questions this study employs two modes of analysis: 
textual analysis and interviews. More specifically, textual analysis is composed by 
content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA). The texts of television news 
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programmes, which this study intends to analyse, are not only composed by discourses 
such as visual images, news stories, commentary and interviews, but are also produced 
in the context of the society (Richardson, 2007). Content analysis helps to answer 
questions about „what themes occur?‟, „how often the themes and messages are 
represented?‟, „what semantic relations exist among the occurring themes?‟ and „what 
network positions are occupied by such themes or theme relations?‟ On the contrary, 
CDA as a qualitative method is adopted to explore the specific discourses in the 
representation of television news. This methodology will help to explore and explain 
the reasons why there are certain representations of ethnic minorities in the Korean 
context and discuss what forms they take. This is because not only are discourses 
historical and only understood in relation to their context but CDA can also investigate 
systematically the relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and 
power relations (Fairclough, 1989; Wodak, 1996; van Dijk, 1996). By finding and 
categorising news images, at the final stage of textual analysis, this study will recognise 
the visual images as discourses which will be examined in categories to denote what 
they mean in the specific social context.  
 
Interviews with ten news reporters, producers and editors of KBS News 9, occupying 
decision-making positions about the content of news programmes, constitute the third 
component of the research. The interviews will examine the politics and practices of the 
producers‟ perceptions in the news-making system. The interviews with news makers 
will not only aim to shed light on the decision-making process and the editorial and 
production procedures that lead to the production of specific representations in the 
television news programmes, but also find out about these representations. One of the 
reasons these interviews play a significant part in this research is the current 
insufficiency of media policies addressing the representation of ethnic minorities in 
South Korea. Thus, interviews will be the only way to record and analyse how Korean 
PSB news makers‟ perception of minorities produce and organise news contents. 
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4.2. Textual Analysis 
4.2.1. Content Analysis 
 
The starting point of any study of television must be with what is actually there on the 
screen and this is what content analysis is concerned with establishing (Fiske and 
Hartley, 1978). Since content analysis can be applied to any piece of recorded 
communication or writing, it is widely employed to evaluate different types of 
information such as documents, newspaper articles, books and so on (Y Kim, 2007). It 
provides an excellent tool to analyse various aspects of journalism and communication 
(Krippendorff, 2004). In particular, a sizable amount of research has been devoted to 
the systematic content analysis of the images of racial and ethnic minorities in the 
media (Neuendorf, 2002) and the vast majority of them have examined African 
American portrayals, and they include several important reports and volumes that 
provide an excellent first look at some of the landmark content analysis in this area 
(Dates and Barlow, 1990; MacDonald, 1983; Poindexter and Stroman, 1981). However, 
there are few studies that have examined the status of other ethnic minorities, especially 
Asians, in media content. Thus, content analysis of an Asian media‟s representation of 
another Asian people will be very meaningful research. 
 
Content analysis is primarily concerned with analysing cultural texts in accordance with 
the ideals of quantification and natural science methodology (Krippendorff, 2004). It is 
not concerned with questions of quality, of response or of interpretation, but confines 
itself to the large-scale, objective survey of manifest content (Fiske and Hartley, 1978). 
Although some critics of content analysis argue that its definition of „reliable‟ equates 
reliability with quantitative methods of analysis (Ball and Smith, 1992; Slater, 1998), 
Berelson (1952) offers a definition that has subsequently been widely adopted as the 
definitive description of quantitative content analysis: „Content analysis is a research 
technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest 
content of communication‟ (1952: 263). Krippendorff (2004) also makes clear that 
content analysis involves various qualitative procedures. He argues that „content 
analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to 
their context‟ (Krippendorff, 2004: 21). Research using content analysis does tend to 
use lots of numerical analysis. This is because, in its concern for replicability and 
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validity, content analysis offers a number of techniques for handling large numbers of 
images with some degree of consistency (Rose, 2001). 
 
The method of content analysis is based on counting the frequency of certain visual 
elements in a clearly defined sample of images, and then analysing those frequencies. 
Thus content analysis assumes that if a word is used twenty times in one newspaper and 
only twice in a different newspaper this is of significance. There are four steps to 
content analysis which are „finding data‟, „devising categories for coding‟, „coding the 
data‟ and „analysing the results‟ ; each aspect of this process has certain requirements in 
order to achieve replicable and valid results (Rose, 2001). Content analysis is a 
technique the results of which need interpreting through an understanding of how the 
codes in an image connect to the wider context within which that image makes sense. 
To do that requires not just quantitative skills but also qualitative ones and this is the 
reason why I decided to use CDA as well.  
 
As Winkler and Kozeluh argue (2005), content analysis identifies and counts the 
occurrence of particular aspects in a text. According to Weber (1988, cited in Kim, 
2007), content analysis involves codifying the units into various categories. Seggar and 
Wheeler (1973), for instance, found that an analysis of occupational roles portrayed on 
television in terms of gender and race produced some interesting results. In that study, 
57 per cent of Black males and 65 per cent of Black females worked in the five most 
frequently portrayed occupations whereas the figures for Whites were 29 per cent and 
50 per cent for males and females respectively (Fiske and Hartley, 1978). They found 
significant racial differences, but even larger sexual ones in the symbolic world of 
television.  
 
Content analysis was originally designed to analyse documents such as newspapers and 
books. Thus the approach to units of television text analysis can be largely divided into 
visual and explanatory. More specifically, „images‟ as visual narratives, „narrations‟ and 
„interviews‟ are explanations, and „narrative structure‟ is the overall flow. First of all, 
this study will analyse „newsworthiness‟ with consideration of the unique 
characteristics of television news content. This is because „television news is delivered 
to the customers in a linear arrangement, not allowing consumers to select or arrange 
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the order of viewing‟ (McQuail, 2000: 235). Therefore, prior to an analysis of the 
detailed content, an analysis of newsworthiness is essential in understanding how the 
news content is arranged and its importance. Next I will conduct a topical analysis of 
news content and a detailed categorical analysis of how participants appeared on the 
news, such as by ethnicity, country of origin, roles, gender, visual frame, and so on. I 
will go on to discuss the implications of the findings and continue with textual analysis 
using CDA. 
 
To fulfil the aims of this thesis, the texts of KBS News 9, the main news programme of 
KBS, aired between 1
st
 January 2004 and 31
st
 December 2008 (five years) dealing with 
issues related to ethnic minorities and foreigners in Korean society will be analysed. 
This period is chosen because it represents a period of peak migration, as discussed in 
Chapter Three. The Korean Ministry of Justice officially announced that the number of 
foreigners who live in South Korea went over one million in 2007. This means that 
during this period there were numerous stories around migration, diversity and foreign 
workers that dominated the news agenda. I can access all news contents through the 
VOD (Video on Demand) service on the KBS website (www.kbs.co.kr) for this period; 
there are 364 news items concerned with ethnic minorities and multicultural issues 
which I will analyse. 
 
 
4.2.2. Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Since news reports are a type of text, I will not just treat news as transparent messages 
whose contents may be analysed in a superficial, quantitative way, but will also 
examine the complex structures and strategies of news reports and their relations to the 
social context (van Dijk, 2000). The goal of analysing the discourse of broadcast news 
is to display its structure as situated communicative action under conditions of 
mediation in the specialised domain of news broadcasting. The pursuit of this goal 
resembles the long-established sociolinguistic and ethnographic concern with „who 
speaks what, to whom, when, and how‟ (Hymes, 1977, 2001; Saville-Troike, 2003, 
cited in Montgomery, 2007). In other words, the aim of analysis is to display how this is 
accomplished by attempting to answer the question of how the communicative parts 
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hold together in a meaningful and intentional fashion in a unified act of communication 
(Montgomery, 2007).  
 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is employed as a qualitative instrument to examine 
the results of the content analysis and other parts of television news text. This is 
because media discourse is currently one of the main sources of people‟s knowledge, 
attitudes and ideologies and one of the crucial tasks of CDA is concerned with studying 
and analysing texts to reveal the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality 
and bias (van Dijk, 1998). CDA identifies itself as inter-disciplinary in orientation, 
which generally means that its practitioners draw on a diverse array of methods, though 
more recently there has been a concern to theorise inter-disciplinarity more carefully in 
relation to CDA (Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; van Dijk, 
1993, 1995; Weiss and Wodak, 2003). However, there is no consensus amongst CDA 
researchers as to whether CDA is a theory, methodology or neither or both of these (Lee 
and Otsuji, 2009). Van Dijk (2008), one of the most influential scholars in the field, 
claims that CDA is neither a method nor a theory but is a movement of critical 
scholarship and should therefore allow any methodologies and theories to be employed. 
Correspondingly, Weiss and Wodak (2003) identify CDA through a multivalent and 
inclusive orientation towards theory and methodology. 
 
Influenced by the social thought of Gramsci (i.e. the concept of hegemony), Habermas 
(i.e. the concepts of colonisation of discourse), Foucault (i.e. orders of discourse) and 
others, CDA sees languages, including all forms of semiosis such as body language and 
visual images, as discourse, that is, as a form of social practice (Stamou, 2001). In other 
words, CDA is analysis of the dialectical relationships between discourse and other 
elements of social practices. Its particular concern is with the radical changes that are 
taking place in contemporary social life: with how discourse figures within processes of 
change, and with shifts in the relationship between discourse and more broad semiosis, 
and other social elements within networks of practices (Fairclough, 2003). More 
specifically, such analysis should describe and explain how power abuse is enacted, 
reproduced or legitimised by the text and talk of dominant groups or institutions (van 
Dijk, 1996). Discourse plays a particularly important role in the production and 
reproduction of prejudice and racism. It is clear from news reports in the media that 
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people are engaged daily in communication about ethnic minorities and race relations. 
It is therefore an important task of CDA to study the precise cognitive structures and 
strategies involved in these processes affecting the social cognition of groups (van Dijk, 
1996). 
 
According to Wodak (1996), CDA is concerned with social problems. She insists that 
CDA starts by identifying a social problem, „chooses the perspective of those who 
suffer most, and critically analyses those in power, those who are responsible and those 
who have the means and the opportunity to solve such problems‟ (Wodak, 2001: 1). In 
other words, it is not concerned with language, but with the linguistic character of 
social and cultural processes and structures. Society and culture are shaped by discourse, 
and at the same time constitute discourse. Discourse analysis is interpretative and 
explanatory and it implies a systematic methodology and a relationship between the 
text and its social conditions, ideologies and power relations. In essence, CDA involves 
an analysis of how discourse relates to and is implicated in the (re)production of social 
relations – particularly unequal, iniquitous and/or discriminatory power relations 
(Richardson, 2007). In response to social inequality and the abuse of power, CDA 
demands politically involved research with an emancipator requirement (Titscher et al., 
2000).  
 
It is very significant to define what the terms „critical‟ and „discourse‟ mean at this 
point. The term „critical‟ means not taking things for granted, opening up complexity, 
challenging reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies, and being self-reflective, and, 
through these processes, making opaque the ways in which structures of power 
relations and ideologies manifest themselves in specific texts. „Critical‟, thus, does not 
imply the common sense meaning of „being negative‟ but rather being sceptical (Reisigl 
and Wodak, 2001). This study will also employ Fairclough‟s definition of „discourse‟ as 
a way of representing aspects of the world – processes, relations and structures of the 
material world, the „mental world‟ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the 
social world (Fairclough, 2003). Following his argument, discourses not only represent 
the world as it is (or rather as it is seen to be). They are also projective imaginaries, 
representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world, and tied in to 
projects to change the world in particular directions (Fairclough, 2003).  
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Van Dijk (1995: 17) essentially perceives discourse analysis as ideology analysis 
because, according to him, „ideologies are typically, though not exclusively, expressed 
and reproduced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic 
messages, such as pictures, photographs and movies‟. Van Dijk‟s approach incorporates 
the two traditional approaches in media education discussed earlier: interpretive (text 
based) and social tradition (context based), into one analytical framework for analysing 
media discourse (Sheyholislami, 2005). Ideologies indirectly control the mental 
representations that form the interpretation basis and contextual embeddedness of 
discourse and its structures (Le and Le, 2009). He explains the link between ideology, 
discourse and social practice as follows:  
 
The crucial concept of ideology I proposed is defined in terms of 
the fundamental cognitive beliefs that are at the basis of the social 
representations shared by the members of a group. Thus, people 
may have ideological racist or sexist beliefs (e.g., about inequality) 
that are at the basis of racist and sexist prejudices shared by the 
members in their group, and that condition their discourse and 
other social practices. We thus at the same time are able to link 
ideologies with discourse, and hence with the ways they are 
(discursively) reproduced, as well as the ways members of a 
group represent and reproduce their social position and conditions 
in their social cognitions and discourse (van Dijk, 2004: 27).  
 
Although he admits that it is theoretically and empirically impossible to provide a 
complete and detailed „account of the ideologies involved and the structures of news 
that are controlled by them‟, he states that a polarisation between the in-group (Us, a 
positive self-image of a social group) and the out-group (Them, assessed and 
represented in a negative way) is characteristic of many such ideological structures (van 
Dijk, 2009: 199). Therefore, it can be assumed that media discourse is also permeated 
by structures, institutions and values from politics, economy and ideology (Richardson, 
2007). 
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In the last couple of decades, a significant number of CDA scholars have focused on 
media discourse (Fairclough, 1992, 1995, 2003; van Dijk, 1988, 1991, 2000, 2004; 
Wodak 1996, 1999, 2001; Chouliaraki, 2006). Fairclough (1995) argues that media 
discourse is very much under professional and institutional control, and in general it is 
those who already hold economic, political or cultural power that have control over 
media representation. He adds that media discourses „contribute to reproducing social 
relations of domination and exploitation‟ (1995: 44). Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), 
van Dijk (1998) and Chomsky (2002), following Gramsci, use the concept of 
„hegemony‟ to explain the media‟s dominant power in the real society – named 
„manufacturing consent‟. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) refer to it as follows:  
 
Hegemony is relations of domination based upon consent rather 
than coercion, involving the naturalisation of practices and their 
social relations as well as relations between practices, as matters 
of common sense – hence the concept of hegemony emphasise the 
importance of ideology in achieving and maintaining relations of 
domination (1999: 24). 
 
Hackett (1991) even defines the mainstream media as „agents of hegemony‟. 
Hegemony concerns power that is achieved through constructing alliances and 
integrating classes and groups through consent, so that the articulation and re-
articulation of orders of discourse is correspondingly one stake in hegemonic struggle 
(Fairclough, 1992). CDA is much more interested in the implicit manifestation of 
power which is not clearly marked or coded but can strongly control discourse and 
discourse (re)production, as van Dijk notes:  
 
Power is directly exercised and expressed through differential 
access to various genres, contents, and styles of discourse. This 
control may be analysed more systematically in terms of the form 
of (re)production of discourse, namely, those of material 
production, articulation, distribution, and influence (van Dijk, 
2008: 22). 
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The study of media discourse as the enactment and reproduction of ethnic and racial 
inequality has recently attracted interested in CDA research. Traditionally, such work 
focused on ethnocentric and racist representations in the mass media, literature and film 
(Dines and Humez, 1995; Wilson and Gutierrez, 1985; Hartmann and Husband, 1974; 
van Dijk, 1991). Later discourse studies have gone beyond the more traditional, content 
analytical analysis of the images of Others and probed more deeply into the linguistic, 
semiotic and other discursive properties of text and talk to and about ethnic minorities, 
migrants and other minorities (van Dijk, 1993).  
 
In this study, media discourse in television news reports about ethnic minorities, non-
nationals and multicultural issues are analysed following van Dijk‟s analytical 
framework (1995, 1998). This is because analysing and making explicit the contrasting 
dimension of Us versus Others has been central to most of van Dijk‟s research and 
writings (1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2008). What distinguishes van 
Dijk‟s framework for the analysis of news discourse is his call for a thorough analysis 
not only of the microstructures of media discourse including semantic relations between 
propositions, syntactic, lexical and other rhetorical elements but also of the 
macrostructures. His framework pertains to the thematic structure of the news stories 
and their overall schemata, which give a broader picture of the news actors under 
analysis (van Dijk, 1988, 1991, 1993; Sheyholislami, 2001). He sketches a three-
dimensional framework for conceiving of and analysing discourse: „discourse analysis, 
cognitive analysis, and social analysis (analysis of social structure)‟ (van Dijk, 1995:  
30). These elements resemble Fairclough‟s three dimensions of analytical framework: 
text (news report), discourse practice (the process of production and consumption), and 
socio-cultural practice (social and cultural structures) (Fairclough, 1995; Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough, 1999). Van Dijk‟s approach incorporates the two traditional approaches 
in media discourse, interpretive (text based) and social tradition (context based), into 
one analytical framework for analysing media discourse (Sheyholislami, 2001). For van 
Dijk, it is socio-cognition that mediates between society and discourse. He defines 
social cognition as „the system of mental representations and processes of group 
members‟ and states that „ideologies are abstract mental systems that organise socially 
shared attitudes‟ (van Dijk, 1995: 18). He concludes that „ideologies indirectly 
influence the personal cognition of other group members in their act of comprehension 
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of discourse among other actions and interactions‟ (Ibid., 19).  
 
The purpose of his analytical framework, thus, is to understand how people act, speak 
or write, or how they understand the social practices of Others (Sheyholislami, 2001). 
Van Dijk (1998: 61–63) suggests five stages to analyse media discourse on power 
related to social groups including ethnic minorities: 1) examining the context of the 
discourse, the historical, political or social background of a conflict and its main 
participants; 2) analysing groups, power relations and conflicts involved; 3) identifying 
positive and negative opinions about Us versus Them; 4) making explicit the 
presupposed and the implied; and 5) examining all formal structure, i.e. lexical choice 
and syntactic structure. 
 
Thus, at first, this study will categorise news texts and the overall analysis of objects 
will be done by topic, depending on the result of the content analysis, and from this I 
will analyse each typical news text. Secondly, based on the results drawn from the 
initial analysis, I will classify the tendency of discursive practice of KBS News 9 by 
frames and analyse them in detail. Lastly, I will look into the socio-structural meanings 
and examine the evidence for socio-ideologies, hegemonic processes and political 
structures that affect news discourses. For this purpose, the analysis adheres to the 
analytical paradigm of CDA as a qualitative method for researching news discourse 
including narratives, specific descriptions and visual images. This critical method 
incorporates „linguistic description of the language text, interpretation of the 
relationship between the discursive processes and the text, and explanation of the 
relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes‟ (Fairclough 
1995: 97). 
 
 
4.2.3. Visual Analysis as a Part of CDA 
 
As a method, discourse analysis pays careful attention to images, and to their social 
production and effect (Rose, 2001). This is because discourse can refer to many 
different types of text such as linguistic, visual, symbolic, etc. As Chouliaraki (2006: 84) 
notes in her research on Others in television news, more than anything else, the impact 
100 
 
of any news text is almost always a function of its visual referent (Peters, 1997; 
Boltanski, 1999; Barnett, 2003, cited in Chouliaraki, 2006). As Corner says, „the offer 
of “seeing” is absolutely central to the project of television journalism‟ (1995: 59, cited 
in Chouliaraki, 2006). The image that television news provides is instrumental in 
helping viewers to believe that something really happened. Moreover, in the era of 
visual communication, television and film images function as „the book of nature‟, as 
„windows on the world‟, as „observation‟, and verbal text serves to identify and 
interpret, to „load the image, burdening it with a culture, a moral, an imagination‟ 
(Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006).  
 
CDA is a method of analysis of television text that treats the linguistic and visual 
choices on the screen as subtle indicators of the power of television to mediate the 
world to the world. This is the power of television to classify the world into categories 
of Us and Others (Chouliaraki, 2006). Studies of racism and the representation of 
ethnicity over the centuries in the visual arts, literature, theatre, popular music, popular 
science, educational textbooks and religion all need to be integrated into the study of 
„racial‟ visual representation in film, photography, television and the press (Downing 
and Husband, 2006). In this sense, visual analysis is concerned with the way in which 
imagery builds social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and how 
these images maintain power through their ideological properties (Brookes, 1995). 
Visual analysis offers researchers an interdisciplinary method for understanding and 
contextualising images – crucial concerns, given the cultural centrality of vision 
(Schroeder, 2006). 
 
Like linguistic structures, visual structures point to particular interpretations of 
experience and forms of social interaction. Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) define that 
„visual grammar‟, which can be expressed linguistically to some degree, describes a 
social resource of a particular group, its explicit and implicit knowledge about this 
resource, and its uses in the practices of that group. The word „grammar‟ in this sense 
refers to a description of structure rather than the rules for correct usage of prescriptive 
grammar (Richards and Schmidt, 2002). Visual language as discussed in Kress and van 
Leeuwen (2006) is not conceived of as transparent and universally understood but as 
constituted within a culture; there may be variations in the structures of visual 
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expression from culture to culture (Koga-Browes, 2009). However, as Kress and 
Leeuwen (2006) argues, in most parts of the world, Western visual communication 
exists side by side with local forms owing to the dominance of Western visual culture 
(television, films and so on). Thus, in this research, it is confirmed that the method of 
visual analysis is broadly based on Western tradition. In some particular cases of visual 
meaning, however, it should be fully explained.  
 
In this thesis, the framework of visual analysis focuses on the original five basic aspects 
as recomposed and employed from Bignell (2004), Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) and 
Zettle (2005):  
 
- Attitude (angle) 
- Background (scenery) 
- Contact (gaze) 
- Distance (frame) 
- Effect (movement) 
 
These five aspects are named as the „visual framework of A to E‟. Although a number 
of critiques of these tools have been undertaken by former scholars, this study is the 
first application to organise and put them into one analytic framework. I will discuss the 
application of these aspects below.  
 
Attitude  
First of all, the selection of an angle, as a point of view, implies the possibility of 
expressing subjective attitudes towards represented participants. Kress and van 
Leeuwen discuss this as follows:  
 
There are, since the Renaissance, two kinds of images in Western 
cultures: subjective and objective images … In subjective images 
the viewer can see what there is to see only from a particular point 
of view. In objective images, the image reveals everything there is 
to know (or that the image produced has judged to be so) about 
the represented participants, even if, to do so, it is necessary to 
102 
 
violate the laws of naturalistic depiction or, indeed, the laws of 
nature (2006: 130). 
 
The camera angle reflects the viewpoint that the medium directly or indirectly wants to 
use. The convention of using variations in vertical camera angle to imply relationships 
of power is well established in visual expression. This research will analyse visual texts, 
using a framework of three angles. First of all, low angles, whereby the camera is 
located below a subject and is gazing upwards, giving the impression of superiority, 
exaltation and triumph. Secondly, through high angles, whereby the camera is located 
above the subject and looking downwards, giving the impression of loneliness and 
inferiority. Messaris (1998) suggests this convention may have its ultimate origins in 
the analogical relationship between child and parent; the child necessarily views adults, 
those with the authority to determine the course of many fundamental aspects of the 
child‟s life, from a low angle and, at least metaphorically, looks up to them. Thirdly, 
eye-level angles, whereby the camera shoots an actor at an equal face level, are most 
frequently used in news reporting and present stability and familiarity. Depending on 
the angle chosen, a subject can thus be seen as superior or inferior, familiar or 
unfamiliar, ordinary or extraordinary, and significant or insignificant, which in turn 
reflects the socio-cultural power embodied by the subject (Kress and Leeuwen, 2006). 
 
Background 
Background images have an influence on the authority of the subject in news footage, 
as can the behaviour displayed by the interviewee or interviewer. This can be seen as 
authority given by space. According to Merrifield (1993), space is a result of social 
interaction, while at the same time being a process. Giddens (1990) uses the 
terminology „locale‟, which is not merely a physical environment or stage but 
something actively organised by people who participate in social interaction. Space as a 
text is a place where the interests of people and society are reflected. This can be 
explained by the concept of „space-ness‟, which refers to social consciousness and 
agreement about life spaces and the process of living as a group among members of a 
specific society. For example, if a professor of a reputable university delivers a lecture 
in a market, street or factory, which is highly accessible, noisy and disorganised, then 
most people would pay little attention and would not know if that scholar is 
103 
 
academically established (i.e. spaces with authority and credibility). On the other hand, 
if the same lecture was delivered in a lecture hall, an office or church, where it is quiet 
and has more limited access, then people will tend to listen more carefully and attempt 
to understand the subject of the speech more intently. This shows how the authority of 
space is socially constructed and this authority is then bestowed upon people in the 
space as well as the discourse produced there (Harvey, 1993; Augé, 1995). Therefore, 
actors within visual images cannot help but be influenced by the socio-cultural meaning 
of the background in which they are captured. 
 
Contact 
There is a fundamental difference between images from which represented actors look 
directly at the viewer‟s eyes, and images in which this is not the case. When 
represented participants look at the viewer, vectors, formed by the participants‟ eye 
lines, connect the participants with the viewer. The actor‟s gaze (and the gesture, if 
present), Halliday (1985) argues, demands something from the viewer. It demands that 
the viewer enters into some kind of imaginary relation with him/her. In each case, 
whether the participant gazes or not, the image wants something from the viewers – 
wants them to come closer or stay at a distance or to form a pseudo-social bond of a 
particular kind with the represented participant (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006). In 
particular, someone who looks at the viewer is represented as a human being, while 
another who does not look at the viewer is portrayed as Other or a stranger. The mutual 
contact between viewer and actor as closely linked is defined by the matter of who 
takes the lead in the discourse production. Therefore, the power reproduction between 
the viewer and actor needs to be analysed so that we can understand the mechanisms of 
discourse production and how it relates to socio-cultural power. 
 
Distance 
The choice of the size of frames can suggest different relations between represented 
participants and viewers. According to Zettle (2005), in terms of distance between 
viewer and actor, the field of view is basically organised into five steps: extreme long 
shot, long shot, medium shot, close-up and extreme close-up. Grosser (cited in Hall, 
1964) especially defines that at a distance of more than four metres people are seen as 
having little connection with ourselves, and hence the painter can look at his model as 
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if he were a tree in a landscape or an apple in a still life. The distance of 1.25 to 2.5 
metres, on the other hand, is the portrait distance:  
 
The painter is near enough so that his eyes have no trouble in 
understanding the sitter‟s solid forms, yet he is far enough away 
so that the foreshortening of the forms presents no real problem. 
Here at the normal distance of social intimacy and easy 
conversation, the sitter‟s soul begins to appear … Nearer than 
90cm, within touching distance, the soul is far too much in 
evidence for any sort of disinterested observation (Hall 1964: 71).  
 
In sum, the distance used to represent participants on television is significant to define 
the relationship between actors and viewers.  
 
Effect 
Finally, camera movement is also a key tool in instituting the relations between the 
viewer and actor, particularly in terms of angles and frames. In terms of television‟s 
visual communication, camera movement means a change in the point of view for the 
viewer and the position of the actor. This change alters the meaning of the image, 
enabling dynamic and intensive meaning, as opposed to static visual text (Zettle, 
2005). For instance, when a bright image of a foreigner who looks at the viewers and 
waves his or her hands, by slowly zooming and showing this close-up he or she is 
shown to be like us, even though they are still „aliens‟. On the other hand, when a dark 
image is used where individuals avoid eye contact and are shown from the back, they 
are portrayed as „not part of our world‟, „Others‟ and „strangers‟ (Zettle, 2005; Kress 
and van Leeuwen, 2006). Therefore, the movement of the screen shot can be the object 
of interpretation as a televisual text, which also produces unique meaning. 
 
Table 4.1 summarises the main kinds of interactive meaning discussed above. 
According to Kress and van Leeuwen (2006), it should be remembered that these are 
simultaneous systems: any image must either be a demand or an offer and select a 
certain size of frame and select a certain attitude, and so on. The systems of attitude, 
background, contact, distance and effect interact to create more complex and subtle 
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relations between represented and interactive participants.  
 
 
Table 4.1. The Framework of Analysis for the Visual Texts on Television 
Framework 
Signifier 
(representation) 
Definition Signified (meaning) 
Attitude 
low angle 
high angle 
 eye-level angle 
subject looking up 
subject looking down 
subject looking collinearly 
dynamic, superiority, exaltation, triumph 
inferiority, loneliness 
stability, regularity, familiarity 
Background 
private space 
public space 
space of government 
 
office, research lab 
market, festival, street 
police station, court, governmental 
department, parliament 
professional, trust, important 
non-professional, distrust, unimportant 
authority, trust, good, protect 
 
Contact 
contact 
absence of contact 
actor gazing at the viewer 
actor not gazing at the viewer 
demand, human being 
offer, stranger, otherness 
Distance 
extreme close-up 
close-up 
medium shot 
long shot 
extreme long shot 
specific part of body 
face only 
head and waist 
whole body and background 
far from background 
anxiety, tension, defect 
friendly, important, emotion 
stability, authority 
neutrality, public relationship 
spectator, other, spectacle 
Effect 
tracking 
zoom-in 
zoom-out 
panning 
shooting in movement 
focusing on subject 
focusing away from subject 
turning camera to left or right 
sense of realism, anxiety, shock, accident 
something ours, inside 
otherness, outside 
changing viewpoint 
 
 
In this study, the visual representation among television news texts, as subjects of 
analysis, will be examined by the analytic framework presented in Table 4.1. It can be 
understood as a process, of course a part of CDA, which converts visual text into 
linguistic text for analysis. After the first analysis of this visual analysis framework, the 
research will go on to connect this with linguistic text in news script and analyse them 
in turn.  
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4.3. Analysis of the News-making System: Semi-Structured Interviews  
 
In addition to the quantitative and qualitative analysis of media representations of 
ethnic minorities and migrants, interviews with media producers and decision makers 
represent the third central and critical log of a triangulated methodology. Interviews as 
a major research method are used for analysing the news production system as 
discourse practice. This is because not only is news representation produced by 
editorial guidelines of producers, but also South Korean PSB has not established 
enough set media regulations and policies which are significant or comparable to the 
BBC‟s. The interview is different from ordinary conversation „because of the existence 
of controls in the gathering of information‟ (Keats, 2000: 1). In this sense, it is premised 
that the interviewee may know enough in some circumstances to volunteer information 
on an issue. It is usually based on expectations that a prospective source is familiar with 
a subject, or the need to dig deep because of the views and opinions of interviewees, so 
data can be fresh, raw and insightful (Creswell, 1997; Denzin, et al., 1998; Guion, 
2007). The interviews with news makers, consequently, have allowed me to explore the 
intentions and the interpretations of the representations by the people who actually 
produce them. In addition to recording the opinions and the processes of media 
production, the interviews also serve as a tool to record the regulations and the 
guidelines that drive decision making. Since that there are very few public policies on 
minority representation in the media, the interviews with the media producers become 
an entry point to the newsroom‟s political values, the guidelines and the regulations (or 
lack thereof) that drive media representations of migrants and ethnic minorities. 
 
Although there are three main interview methods that are frequently chosen in the 
social sciences, the structured interview, unstructured interview and semi-structured 
interview (Britten, 1995), many studies in media and communications studies employ 
the semi-structured interview method (Burns, 2000). The semi-structured interview is 
the most common form of academic research interviewing (Barbour et al., 2005; Berger, 
2000). In it, the interviewer develops a set of questions beforehand, but intends to be 
conversational and adapt according to the discussion, without abandoning the set 
priorities and focus. Thus, the main job is to get the interviewee to talk freely and 
openly while making sure the researcher gets the in-depth information (Rubin and 
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Rubin, 1995). For talking to media producers, this form of interviewing is considered 
the most appropriate for two reasons. Firstly, this form of interview is in general 
considered as the most appropriate for highly educated, expert participants. Secondly, 
the nature of the study includes the investigation of various processes, references (e.g. 
institutional guidelines and editorial meetings) and opinions, which requires a reflexive 
interview method that can adapt to the content of the discussion as it unfolds during its 
conduct. In this study, therefore, semi-structured interviews, which combined 
standardised questions with in-depth discussions (Berger, 2000), were chosen.  
 
In this study, the interviews were conducted during a field trip to South Korea from 
December 2009 to January 2010, after content analysis was completed and in order to 
investigate further the elements of representation that emerged through the content 
analysis. Participants were chosen from KBS reporters who had covered news stories 
related to ethnic minorities, non-nationals or multicultural issues at least twice between 
2004 and 2008. Among them, twenty reporters and producers were initially contacted 
by email. Although twelve of them agreed to take part in the interview, ten participants 
were considered as representing the range of the producer body, and its regional, gender, 
experience and decision-making, directly. The final sample included five women and 
five men; four worked in KBS Seoul and six worked in other cities; individuals‟ career 
length ranged from four to sixteen years; seven of them were reporters and three 
editorial journalists. The interviews took place between December 2009 and January 
2010. Each interview session lasted a minimum of fifty minutes and a maximum of 
seventy minutes. Most interview sessions were conducted at the interview offices in 
KBS, but a couple of interviews took place in public places such as cafes and 
restaurants. For reasons of accuracy and credibility, a digital voice recorder was used 
with their permission and all interviews were transcribed into a 138-page transcript. All 
interviewees had a chance to check their own transcript and to make sure that there was 
no problem with it.  
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4.4. Triangulation of Methods 
 
The three methods explained so far, content analysis, CDA and semi-structured 
interview, represent different approaches selected in order to answer the research 
question of this thesis. Thus, in order to maximise the meaning of this study, the 
effective connection of the analytic results gained from these three methods is required. 
Mixing methods can be useful as it sieves personal prejudices possibly inherent in a 
method (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Triangulation represents an important strategy for 
maximising the use of various methods (Adeniyi, 2008). Triangulation is broadly 
defined by Denzin as „the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon‟ (1978: 291). Triangulation of methods provides researchers with several 
important opportunities (Jick, 1979). It not only allows researchers to be more 
confident of their results but also helps to uncover any deviant or off-quadrant 
dimensions of a phenomenon (Jick, 1979). In addition, use of multiple methods can 
also lead to a synthesis or integration of theories. In this sense, „methodological 
triangulation closely parallels theoretical triangulation‟ (Denzin, 1978: 295), that is, 
efforts to bring diverse theories to bear on a common problem (Levine and Campbell, 
1972; Marris, 1975, cited in Jick, 1979: 609). Finally, triangulation may also serve as 
the critical test, by virtue of its comprehensiveness, for competing theories. The use of 
multiple methods in this research results from the multiple causes, rather than 
fragmentary phenomenon. Hence, this can be a critical factor from the perspective of 
analysing a power-related social phenomenon that needs multi-dimensional analysis.  
 
In this study, of the two major approaches to triangulation, the „between (or across) 
methods‟ type, which refers to the application of distinct methods, is employed; there is 
also the „within method‟, as a counterpart, which is about using different techniques 
within a given method (Jick, 1979). The „between methods‟ type was chosen as it 
involves the use of multiple methods to examine the same dimension of a research 
problem (Jick, 1979). For example, in this thesis, the representation of ethnic minorities 
on the television news may be studied by evaluating news contents quantitatively, by 
analysing news discourse critically, and by interviewing the news makers. The focus 
always remains that of the power-related news representation but the mode of direction 
varies. Multiple and independent measures, if they reach the related conclusions, 
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provide a more certain portrayal of the representation process. This study attempts to 
draw meaningful conclusions with a phased and gradual discussion of each set of 
results and analysis, rather than by thoroughly mixing and interpreting the results of 
research gained from the three methods. That is, as shown in Figure 4.1, firstly I will 
categorise the total subjects of analysis, 364 news articles, by theme and by frames 
depending on their frequency, through the process of content analysis. Next, according 
to the results of the content analysis, and critical discourse analysis which will 
thoroughly critique the news articles according to dominant themes, all meaningful 
discourses of news texts including verbal and visual parts will be analysed using an in-
depth critical approach. From these two processes, it will be possible to grasp the 
tendency of news representation of major discourses and answer the question „why is 
the tendency of representation occurring?‟ from the interviews with news makers.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. The Triangulation Process of Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
The mapping out and planning of a methodology is possibly one of the most significant 
processes in constructing a research framework. In order to resolve the specific research 
questions, this study adopts not only quantitative methods, but also qualitative methods. 
Consequently, this will not only restrict the possible limitations of a study that heavily 
Content 
Analysis 
C D A 
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
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depends on a single method, but will also add depth to the analysis. More specifically, 
first of all, 364 news articles have been selected as analysis subjects and I will conduct 
a quantitative analysis arranged by news order, frequency of ethnic minorities‟ 
appearance, nationality range of ethnic minorities, gender and occupation through 
content analysis. Furthermore, through this process, the results will be classified into 
specific themes. Based on this, upon completing the analysis of the most salient news 
discourses through CDA as a qualitative method, the meaning of the results will be 
discussed. Lastly, the research seeks to answer the question of what causes the results 
of the textual analysis in the news-making process from the interviews with ten news 
makers.  
 
This triangulation of methods can be seen as one of advantages of this study as the use 
of quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis simultaneously can help to overcome 
the constraints particular to a singular research method. This was achieved by 
employing content analysis, discourse and visual text analysis, and semi-structured 
interviews, allowing for triangulation of results which enables results to be cross-
checked. This methodological attempt will enrich the research results and potentially 
influence academic practice around this subject, which currently displays a tendency 
for research centred on single methodologies. This study especially has potential 
significance in initiating an alternative approach within Korean academia of media and 
communications studies, where American quantitative methods of statistic analysis are 
dominant. This mainstream approach often leads to the quantification of all social 
phenomena and an attempt to place them within one single framework. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Representation of Others: Quantitative Approach 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine how ethnic minorities are represented on KBS 
News 9 through a news content analysis. Analysed in the chapter are 364 news items 
related with „non-nationals including ethnic minorities and migrants in Korea‟ for five 
years between 1
st
 January 2004 and 31
st
 December 2008. This is a surprisingly small 
number of items for such a long period, especially as more than a million non-Koreans 
live in the country. The average number of news items on KBS News 9 is thirty-five per 
day. It is estimated that around 63,875 news items were produced during the five years 
being studied (35 items x 365 days x 5 years = 63,875 items). During that period only 
364 news items relating to non-national minorities were broadcast, which means only 
one news item per five days or an average of 0.2 per day. According to the Korea 
Ministry of Justice (2010), the non-nationals residing in Korea represent approximately 
2.8 per cent of the whole population (approximately 49 million). This equals 1.3 
million according to June 2010 estimates. In addition, around 15 per cent of all 
marriages in the country were intercultural marriages in 2008 (KNSO, 2009). The 
number of non-nationals in Korea has greatly increased in the last decade. Considering 
this sudden increase in the number of non-nationals, the fact that so little news attention 
is paid to them could be an indication of a marginalisation of these populations within 
the public national imaginary. Statistical data collected for this study confirms this lack 
of visibility of non-nationals in public service television, with only seventy news items 
dealing with relevant issues in 2008, when these groups represented 1.15 million people. 
This is even fewer than the 71 relevant news stories in the news recorded in 2004, when 
their numbers totalled 0.75 million. This chapter focuses on a quantitative analysis as 
hard data reflects a phenomenon with relevance to news representation of difference, 
but which also has wider implications for participation and visibility of diversity in 
Korean society.  
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The discussed news items have been gathered with the use of the online VOD system 
on the official website of KBS (www.kbs.co.kr). All news contents were measured by 
contents analysis and the results classified in six specific frames as follows: „non-
nationals as migrant workers‟ (84 items), „non-nationals as celebrities‟ (76 items), „non-
nationals as criminals‟ (69 items), „non-nationals as members of multicultural families‟ 
(51 items), „non-nationals as visitors‟ (57 items), „Koreans as compassionate people‟ 
(15 items) and „Other‟ (12 items).  
 
 
5.2. Newsworthiness of Non-nationals 
 
From a media and communications studies‟ point of view there are two significant 
traditions in studying news. The first is to understand news as a means of selective 
representation of reality through gatekeeping (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009; Berkowitz, 
1990; Dimmick, 1974). Another area of studies has focused on the interpretation of 
news as a social construction of reality. In both cases, the study of news values is a core 
issue. Not every event or piece of information counts as news. News has to be notable 
according to particular principles of selection, paradigms of relevance, and frames for 
including and excluding material (Montgomery, 2007). Selecting news to report is one 
of the most important practices of text production. There is a process of selecting news 
and knowing what to weed out and what to publish or broadcast. In terms of criteria for 
such selection, according to Carruthers (2000: 16) and Eaman (1987: 51), 
„newsworthiness is not an inherent characteristic of events and news items‟. Rather it is 
determined by the news production and institutional practices. Newsworthiness is 
created and not discovered through its act of publication. It follows, then, that news is 
whatever the editor or the journalist says it is (Halberstam, 1992).  
 
Television news reflects both the televisual cultures and journalistic practices. In other 
words, news reflects features of television reporting – difficulties of in-depth report due 
to time limits, reproduced scenes, news packages – but also production practices 
associated with the norms that apply across the medium and its specific incarnations in 
public broadcasting. Thus, as noted by major studies, the notion of news values in 
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television news should be considered separately from that of newspaper journalism. In 
the long tradition of news values systems it has also been emphasised that these are not 
only associated to the specific medium and professional practice but also contextualised 
politically and temporally (Harris and Johnson, 1955; Warren, 1959; Crump, 1974; 
Golding and Elliott, 1979; Itule and Anderson, 1987; Mayeux, 1993).  
 
Korean PSB has long been associated with the government and it cannot free itself 
from the accusation of being its tool. As public television broadcasting found itself 
under military dictatorship for most of the 1960s through to the 1990s, KBS news was 
government-friendly, focusing on praising the dictatorial regime (Kang, 2003). In 1980, 
the new military leader, Chun Doo-hwan, blatantly displayed his ambition to use the 
media as means of propaganda by implementing a new media policy, forcibly shutting 
down or consolidating media agencies.
16
 Many journalists were forced to resign, only 
to be replaced by pro-government personnel. As a result, the two major broadcasters 
KBS and MBC were criticised for their „Ddeng-Chun News‟, a neologism to mock the 
government-focused news, with „ddeng‟, an onomatopoeic word referring to the sound 
of the clock chiming after the music, and „Chun‟ obviously referring to the president, 
Chun Doo-hwan (Choi, 2010). The sarcasm lay on the word „ddeng-chun‟, a homonym 
with the meaning of „penny‟. This word originated in the contents of the nine o‟clock 
prime time news, as the very first news item after the chime always began with the 
words „President Chun‟. A radical example of this phenomenon was the news broadcast 
related to the Korean Airlines Flight 007 incident. The news on the flight, shot down by 
Soviet interceptors on 1
st
 September 1983, causing a death toll of 269, was broadcast 
after the news of „President Chun visiting an area of Seoul and personally cleaning it 
up‟.17 The general conception of Korean journalism scholars is that a similar back-
scratching relationship between the government and the media has continued 
                                                         
16
 In late 1980, the Chun government established more thorough control of the news media than had 
existed in South Korea since the Korean War. Independent news agencies were absorbed into a single 
state-run agency, numerous provincial newspapers were closed, central newspapers were forbidden to 
station correspondents in provincial cities, the Christian Broadcasting System (CBS) network was 
forbidden to provide news coverage, and two independent broadcasting companies were absorbed into 
the state-run Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). In addition, the Defense Security Command, then 
commanded by Roh Tae Woo, and the Ministry of Culture and Information ordered hundreds of South 
Korean journalists to be fired and banned from newspaper writing or editing. The Basic Press Act of 
December 1980 was the legal capstone of Chun‟s system of media control and provided censorship and 
control of newspapers, periodicals and broadcast media (Kang, 2003). 
 
17
 Available on http://www.sisa-news.com/read.php3?no=26223&section=44 accessed 02/05/2010 
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throughout the democratic era of the late 1990s and the 2000s (J Kang, 1996; H Lee, 
2000). KBS, although a public service broadcaster, receives public funding from the 
Korean government instead of collecting fees itself. Moreover, there have been 
occasions when the president of KBS was under pressure to resign before the end of 
term when a new government came to power, since the President of Korea has the 
power to designate the position. With the structure of the television industry remaining 
basically unchanged, news broadcasts of KBS are not free from direct or indirect 
governmental intervention.  
 
The importance of the value system behind the news can be measured in various ways. 
In television news, it is firstly evaluated based on the frequency and the order of 
broadcast. The frequency means how often a news item relating to a specific topic is 
aired; news items that have a high value appear frequently and low-valued news items 
appear less frequently. Jones (2008) reveals in his study that the news frequency is 
related to the population distribution. Major ethnic and race-related news features most 
frequently in the news, thus giving an indication of the ethnic and political relations of 
the country. Jorge (2008) compared different internet news websites under the 
assumption that the more frequently featured types of news have a higher value. The 
most common topics were money, conflict/power, leisure, celebrities, crimes and 
mystery, and he revealed that these types of news were present on all news websites; 
the only difference between them was their frequency. This means that frequency of 
appearance reflects one of the important elements in the analysis of values as it is 
directly relevant to the frequency in which audiences are exposed to a topic.  
 
The order and hierarchy of time broadcasted are also key indicators of importance in 
television news, whereas newspaper articles are measured by hierarchy of space. As 
Williams (1974) points out, because television should be interpreted as a flow, 
„television news is delivered to the consumers in a linear arrangement, not allowing 
consumers to select or arrange the order of viewing‟ (cited in McQuail, 2000: 235). 
Both news makers and audiences assume a correlation between broadcasting order and 
newsworthiness, since television news is produced, positioned and received within 
specific temporal frames. It is a fact that, due to the limited amount of news items a 
programme can broadcast within the allotted time, among the selected items those 
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considered of greater importance by the news makers are placed closer to the beginning.  
 
This study adapted the notion of „newsworthiness points‟ in order to evaluate the news 
values of items regarding non-nationals, including ethnic minorities. In an effort to 
assess the news values of international news, Lee and Son (1999) utilised the concept of 
„broadcast order‟ to calculate an average value. This method, however, does not allow 
an absolute comparison when the total number of news items is different. This means 
that, for example, in a simple analysis of order, the tenth news item within totals of both 
forty and twenty news items is erroneously perceived as having the same value. For this 
reason, this study has adapted the existing analysis method to develop a new concept of 
newsworthiness points. The proposed newsworthiness points are the result of the 
evaluation of importance according to the broadcast order of the news items. The 
formula to calculate a newsworthiness point is as follows: 
 
Newsworthiness point = (news order about non-nationals / whole numbers of news 
items) 
 
Using this analysis method, the newsworthiness point of the tenth news item from a 
total of twenty results in .500 whereas the newsworthiness point of the same tenth news 
item within forty news items is .250, meaning the news value of the latter is much 
higher than the former. Thus, a newsworthiness point closer to zero reflects that the 
news item is placed closer to the beginning of the programme, and a newsworthiness 
point near one refers to a position towards the end. In other words, a lower 
newsworthiness point, closer to zero, indicates higher value of the news, and a higher 
newsworthiness point, closer to one, indicates lower value of the news. The average 
newsworthiness point of the 364 analysed news items from KBS news was .698, which 
means that, if the total number of news items was ten, news related to minority groups 
in Korea is broadcasted seventh turn on average. This result is significant as it serves as 
an indicator to reveal on the surface how KBS approaches these subjects, why it 
considers these frames less or more important, and why these items have high or low 
news values. This will be elaborated on further in the study.  
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The news frame which is regarded as the most valued item was „non-nationals as 
migrant workers‟, with a newsworthiness point of .641, whilst „non-nationals as 
criminals‟ showed a similar value of .649, closely followed by „non-nationals in 
multicultural families‟ (.749), and „non-nationals as visitors‟ (.753). „Koreans as 
compassionate people‟ recorded the lowest newsworthiness point of .930. Looking at 
the details, the number of news items on „non-nationals as migrant workers‟ has 
decreased since its peak in 2005 with 24 items. However, its newsworthiness point 
begins to soar when the conservative government came into power in 2007, 
scoring .534 in 2008. This can be interpreted as an example of the shift of perception 
from the usual negative news values of stories related to migrant workers due to the 
new government. News items on „non-nationals as criminals‟ can also be read in a 
similar way, as this category‟s newsworthiness point increased rapidly to .520 in 2008. 
Considering the fact that crimes related to non-nationals are mostly minor offences 
such as illegal immigration, forgery of documents, light violence, drugs, phony 
marriage and fraud, it could be said that an unusually high news value was imposed 
upon this frame. On the other hand, the newsworthiness point regarding crimes 
committed by non-nationals was considerably low at 2006, a time when positive 
discourse on ethnic minorities such as non-nationals and mixed-heritage people was 
sparked by the visit of Hines Ward.
18
 However, the number of stories on „non-nationals 
in multicultural families‟, which tend to be reconstructed with a positive tint, 
dramatically increased until 2007, compared to the minimal presence of three items in 
2004. Its newsworthiness point also continued to rise until 2006, only to drop sharply in 
2007 and 2008. Considering the fact that the number of marriages with migrant women 
has exploded from 2005 onwards, and that in 2008 more than half of Korean men in the 
countryside married migrant women, the drop will be even larger than the record. 
 
These results reflect the Korean news producing system which evaluates negative news 
towards non-nationals as comparatively high value. Especially under the conservative 
                                                         
18
 Korean-American American football player and 2005–6 NFL Super-Bowl MVP, Hines Ward visited 
Korea for the first time in April 2006. His visit sparked a sudden interest in mixed-heritage people, 
leading to the Korean media dubbing the phenomenon the „Hines Ward Syndrome‟. Since his visit, many 
mixed-heritage athletes were brought to the Korean sports scene, some even managing to get into the 
national basketball team after naturalising. However, interests for mixed-heritage citizens still tend to be 
limited towards sports celebrities only. 
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government, which has repeatedly expressed its hostility towards ethnic minorities and 
migrants and stresses nationalism,
19
 the sudden increase of the newsworthiness of 
migrant workers and criminal-related news which represents people with foreign 
nationalities negatively can be seen as indicative of nationalism and of KBS news not 
being free from government power. In addition, under the conservative government 
news items relating to multicultural families also declined in their newsworthiness. It 
must be noted that nearly half of the total newly married men in rural areas in 2007 and 
2008 are in intercultural marriages. As to the underlying causes, the following can be 
suggested; i) intercultural marriages are seen as problematic within ideological frames 
of Korean nationalism which stresses ethnic origin and relations of blood as defining 
„Korean-ness‟; ii) the majority of intercultural marriages take place in rural areas and as 
such they are dealt within an ideological frame that emphasises the divides between us 
(urban middle classes) and them (rural agricultural, working class families); and iii) 
producers and audiences have lost interest in these stories because of the similarity of 
these news segments over the past years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
19
 Available on Hankyorhe, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/434455.html, accessed on 27
th
 
October 2010 
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Table 5.1. News Items about Non-nationals in Korea Year by Year and 
Newsworthiness Points 
Form of government 
Progressive 
government 
(2003–2007) 
 Conservative 
government 
(2008–present) 
 
Frames 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total N/P 
Non-nationals as migrant workers 
(N/P) 
16 
(.693) 
24 
(.655) 
16 
(.708) 
15 
(.553) 
13 
(.534) 
84 .641 
Non-nationals as criminals (N/P) 
20 
(.605) 
8 
(.716) 
10 
(.757) 
11 
(.676) 
20 
(.520) 
69 .649 
Non-nationals in multicultural families 
(N/P) 
3 
(.783) 
8 
(.678) 
14 
(.727) 
14 
(.778) 
12 
(.801) 
51 .749 
Non-nationals as visitors 
(N/P) 
16 
(.712) 
12 
(.895) 
15 
(.677) 
10 
(.798) 
4 
(.692) 
57 .753 
Non-nationals as celebrities 13 7 28
20
 13 15 76 
21
 
Koreans as compassionate people 
(N/P) 
1 
(.818) 
3 
(.976) 
6 
(.953) 
1 
(.846) 
4 
(.917) 
15 .930 
Other 
(N/P) 
1 
(.719) 
4 
(.765) 
4 
(.621) 
1 
(.920) 
2 
(.893) 
12 .741 
Total 71 66 92 65 70 364 .698 
 
 
5.3. Iconography of Others 
 
The total number of non-nationals who appeared on KBS News 9
22
 from 1
st
 January 
2004 to 31
st
 December 2008 is 511. This includes interviewees and non-interviewees 
(Table 5.1). Although the sample is relatively small, especially for a five year period, it 
                                                         
20
 15 out of 28 news items are related to Hines Ward. 
 
21
 Because celebrities are mostly sports stars who run for the team under the title of „foreign players‟, 
stories of them are usually broadcasted on sports news programmes, aired after the main news. Thus, 
regarding the difficulty of assessing this frame‟s newsworthiness point in the same way as other news 
items, this study has decided to exclude the news frame from analysis.  
 
22
 KBS News 9 is the KBS prime time news programme which is broadcasted nationally every evening at 
nine o‟clock. KBS News 9 airs on the national television channel KBS 1 and three radio channels (KBS 
Radio 1, KBS Radio 3, Korean people broadcast). On September 2010 it had an average viewer rating of 
18.7%, the highest of all television news programmes (TNmS, http://www.tnms.tv/ratings/, accessed on 
2
nd
 October 2010). 
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represents the very first substantial evidence available on the representation of 
minorities in the PSB. Besides its limitations, it systematically records the predominant 
tendencies within the representation of minorities. Of these appearances, 58.2 per cent 
were Asians, who can be divided into further categories. South and Southeast Asians – 
called „Dong-Nam-A‟ in Korean society, literally meaning „Southeast-Asia‟ – who have 
significant differences in appearance compared to Koreans, comprised 30.9 per cent of 
the total. East Asians – Chinese, Japanese and Mongolian – occupied 25 per cent of the 
total. Furthermore 70 per cent of East Asians on the news were Chinese, with 43 of 
them, which is nearly half of the total number of Chinese, being ethnic Koreans with 
Chinese nationality, which means that they are no different to Koreans except for the 
fact that their place of birth is China. Of the remaining East Asians, twelve were 
categorised as other Asians, including eight interviewees from Uzbekistan. The group 
with the next highest percentage were Whites. It should be taken into account that the 
category White in Korean society does not refer to the conventional Caucasian, but 
rather takes the meaning of White and non-White, which is a concept generally 
perceived by the Korean people as a divide between Western people (of European 
origins) and non-Western Europeans (which includes a whole range of people of 
various origins and heritages). From the 128 Whites, 55 were Americans, followed by 
Australians, Canadians and Russians, each with eight people respectively. Blacks took 
up the smallest proportion of 5.9 per cent among different ethnic minority groups, with 
half of the percentage originating from the US From the total 511, 53 people (10.4 per 
cent) were „half-Koreans‟, 23  a conventional category in the popular imagination 
referring to people with mixed-heritage. Appearance of „mixed-heritage Koreans‟ 
included 15 news items broadcasted in 2006, telling the story of Hines Ward. In 
analysing presence according to nationality, China accounts for the most appearances 
with 94 people (50 Chinese, 44 Korean-Chinese) followed by the U.S. with 70 people 
(55 Whites, 15 Blacks). Successively, 35 Vietnamese, 26 Bangladeshi, 19 Filipino, and 
16 Sri-Lankan nationals appeared in the news programme.  
 
For the purpose of analysing how non-nationals are depicted in the KBS nine o‟clock 
news, 511 non-national appearances were sorted according to professions to examine 
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 In fact, the term „half-blood‟ or „half-Korean‟ is mainly used in Korean society. In this study, however, 
the expression „mixed-heritage Korean‟ is mainly used for the objective and scientific purpose of this 
research. 
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their social and economic class. One of the earliest studies analysing television content 
focusing upon ethnic minority representation in terms of class was reported by Sydney 
Head in 1954. In terms of specific occupations, minority members were more often 
portrayed in domestic and service roles and seldom in white-collar jobs (Head, 1954). 
In 1959, Wright found that in a week of television viewing only 10 members of 
minority groups appeared, and they were in supporting roles (Wright, 1959). Seggar 
and Wheeler (1973) explored job stereotyping and the use of minority group members 
in network television programming. They found that there was a gross 
underrepresentation of females, and ethnic minorities, more than American Whites, 
were concentrated in fields of personal service and were most likely in this field to 
suffer from stereotyped images; and ethnic groups with especially small numbers 
tended to be portrayed homogeneously. Among more recent studies, Cottle (1999) 
focuses upon the British television news media‟s representation of ethnic minorities. 
According to his article, many external factors influence the representation or 
misrepresentation of ethnic minorities, such as the prejudices of journalists, outsider 
pressures and news values. The news programmes produced under these influences, 
feature stereotypes and intentional and unintentional discrimination, and the discussion 
instigated by them affects the public social and political interests. Downing and 
Husband (2006) noticed a dominance of textual research on the representation of ethnic 
minorities in the media. They emphasise that the actual term „representation‟ is most 
often used to signal either the presence or absence of people of colour in the media in a 
constructive or unconstructive way. They argue that, for a long time, television has 
produced specific – mainly negative – discourses about ethnic minorities and has thus 
discriminated against them. The discourses on ethnic minorities produced in media 
representations have extended to the cultural and political arenas and have led to a 
social bias towards them. 
 
With the case of East Asians, in this study, 35.9 per cent were portrayed as criminals, 
12.5 per cent as the afflicted or victims of crimes, and 10.9 per cent as housewives. 
With South and Southeast Asians, 45.6 per cent appeared as manual labourers, 32.3 per 
cent as housewives, and 10.7 per cent as the afflicted and victims of crime. 76.7 per 
cent of Blacks were illustrated as sports players, ten per cent as criminals, and 6.7 per 
cent as soldiers. Mixed-heritage Koreans were also mostly portrayed as sports players, 
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accounting for 45.3 per cent, with the rest being children or victims of crime, 
accounting for 39.6 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively. Notably, with the case of 
Whites, the top three groups defined on the basis of their presence in Korea consist of 
professionals (33.6 per cent), visitors or tourists (18.7 per cent) and sports players (17.2 
per cent), showing no significant difference in the presence in other categories in the 
news. The reason certain ethnic minorities are linked to certain professions does not lie 
in the characteristics of the ethnic groups, but in the stereotypes of society and the fixed 
routines of the news makers who represent stereotypes in an exaggerated way.  
 
 
Table 5.2. Top Three Roles Played by Non-nationals on KBS News 9 
 
East Asians 
(Chinese) 
South and 
Southeast 
Asians 
Other 
Asians 
Blacks 
Mixed-
heritage 
Koreans 
Whites 
1 
Criminals 
(35.9%) 
Manual 
Labourers 
(45.6%) 
Manual 
Labourers 
(66.7%) 
Sports 
Players 
(76.7%) 
Sports 
Players 
(45.3%) 
Professionals
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(33.6%) 
2 
Afflicted or 
Victims 
(12.5%) 
Housewives 
(32.3%) 
Housewives 
(25.0%) 
Criminals 
(10.0%) 
Children 
(39.6%) 
Visitors 
(18.7%) 
3 
Housewives 
(10.9%) 
Afflicted or 
Victims 
(10.7%) 
Unclear 
(8.3%) 
Soldiers 
(6.7%) 
Afflicted or 
Victims 
(7.5%) 
Sports Players 
(17.2%) 
Total 59.3% 88.6% 100.0% 93.4% 92.4% 69.5% 
 
 
Another important category studied is whether non-nationals are depicted as individuals 
or as groups in the news. It would seem to matter a great deal as to whether we are 
dealing with an image which someone holds of his/her own character as an individual 
or instead with an image which he/she maintains of his/her own ethnic group. The latter 
type would be more pervasive and it would require a greater effort to modify or 
eliminate the image (Samuels, 1973). Social majorities are capable of defining and 
framing minority group identity based on hegemonic ideological discourses of 
inferiority and their own superiority (Appadurai, 2006). In this context, the 
normalisation process is carried out through „discourse practice‟ by the media, where it 
plays a crucial role in favouring, repeating and emphasising selected norms, values and 
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 Sports managers (7.8%), lecturers (6.2%), CEOs (5.5%), academic specialists (4.7%), clergymen 
(4.7%), politicians and administrators (3.1%), journalists (0.8%), and sports referees (0.8%). 
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meanings, and transmitting certain values systems throughout the society (Hall, 1997). 
The discussion about whether the group image is positive or negative doesn‟t help 
much when it rationalises the group image. The assertion that „Blacks are musical and 
athletic‟ is in itself a positive stereotype in a society where music and sport are 
positively valued. Nonetheless, the image of the „musical, rhythmical or athletic Black‟ 
if adhered too strongly can serve to shut out other perceptions of the Black group and of 
individual Blacks from the minds of Whites. The media also tend to generalise specific 
group images presented only in particular situations, establishing them as an inherent 
characteristic of the ethnic group. More than half of East Asians and South and 
Southeast Asians were represented as members of racialised groups rather than as 
individuals, accounting for 52.3 per cent and 52.5 per cent respectively. Thus, the 
representation of the individual is projected through a generalisation of characteristics 
associated with an ethnic group, resulting in the recreation of specific stereotypes. A 
small percentage of Blacks, on the other hand, were depicted as a group (13.3 per cent), 
due to their main appearance in individual-focused celebrity-related news on sports 
players. Forming a striking contrast to the Asians, 94.5 per cent of Whites were 
represented as individuals, and a mere 5.5 per cent were depicted as groups. The 
percentage of mixed-heritage Koreans represented as a group was slightly high at 30.2 
per cent because mixed-heritage Koreans had to be discussed as a group in regards to 
the discussion about discrimination against mixed-heritage citizens. Mixed-heritage 
people were described as individuals mostly in celebrity-related news items. The ways 
of representation of specific ethnic groups as images of individuals or images of groups 
play an important role in forming positive or negative stereotypes for these specific 
ethnic groups. 
 
 
Table 5.3. Non-nationals Portrayed as Groups or Individuals 
 
East 
Asians 
(Chinese) 
South and 
Southeast 
Asians 
Other 
Asians 
Blacks 
Mixed-
heritage 
Koreans 
Whites 
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
As groups 67 (52.3) 83 (52.5) 2 (16.7) 4 (13.3) 16 (30.2) 7 (5.5) 
As individuals 61 (47.7) 75 (47.5) 10 (83.3) 26 (86.7) 37 (69.8) 121 (94.5) 
Total 128 (100.0) 158 (100.0) 12 (100.0) 30 (100.0) 53 (100.0) 128 (100.0) 
 
123 
 
 
 
5.3.1. Non-nationals as Migrant Workers 
 
For a single topic, „non-nationals as migrant workers‟ was the most broadcasted, with 
84 news items. This reflects the preoccupation of news makers with the representation 
of non-nationals as Others temporarily residing in the country for financial reasons. A 
total of 123 migrant workers and non-nationals appeared in the 84 news items. On 31
st
 
March 2006, the mid-point of the study period (from 2004 to 2008), the total number of 
registered migrant workers in Korea was 530,555 (Ministry of Justice, 2007). Chinese 
migrant workers were the largest single ethnic group, registering 321,406 workers, 
including 193,637 Korean-Chinese workers, followed by 43,320 Vietnamese, 42,325 
Filipinos, 33,972 Thais, 24,926 Mongolians, 23,751 Indonesians, 14,831 Bangladeshis 
and 13,965 Uzbek migrants. However, far from the reality revealed by the statistics, 88 
out of the 123 workers (71.5 per cent) who appeared on KBS News 9 were from 
Southeast Asia, and only 28 including 18 Chinese-Koreans were of Chinese nationality 
(Table 5.5). Major ethnic groups represented in the news were Bangladeshi and Sri 
Lankans, with 23 and 14 appearances respectively. Considering the fact that only 2.8 
per cent of the registered migrant workers are Bangladeshi and less than two per cent 
are Sri Lankans, there is a significant gap between reality and representation in the 
news. 
 
This is related to the representation of Southeast Asian migrant workers as the cause of 
certain social problems when the development of discourse about migrant workers was 
still in the early stages. As Korean nationalism based itself on an ideology of ethnic 
homogeneity, Koreans were more threatened by Southeast Asians due to their different 
appearance, whereas East Asians with similar looks to Koreans were relatively well-
received. After undergoing a process of repeated media representations of these 
negative discourse, the acquisition of „migrant workers in Korea = Southeast Asians‟ 
became a concrete statement. The establishment of this definitive form functions very 
effectively in composing a positive image of Others, in opposition to the form of Us. 
That is, it is more effective in constructing a negative discourse of migrant workers, the 
main group of which cause a social and national crisis, as it highlights the significant 
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physical dissimilarity of Others from Us (K Park, 2008). In terms of visual media, the 
external appearance of Others is different from that of Us, who are the social 
mainstream, and this packages the media discourse in a more provocative and sexual 
way (Ross, 1996). Therefore, excessive weighting of the news discourse production 
towards migrant workers from Southeast Asia can be interpreted as „emotional division 
into separate groups‟ which attempts to dichotomously simplify and classify Us and 
Others.  
 
Another interesting finding is unequal distribution of gender representation. 67 per cent 
of the migrant workers represented in the news were men, whereas female workers only 
accounted for 21.1 per cent. The gendered bias of the news is interesting as actually 
women have a much more significant presence in the society than that recorded in the 
news. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Justice (2009), the official number 
of female migrants on March 2009 was 502,665, 43 per cent of total migrants. Around a 
fifth of these women had immigrated through marriage and the rest of the 400,000 
migrant women had migrated to Korea in order to seek employment. It must be noted 
that, according to the NGOs, including illegal migrant workers the gender distribution 
is almost fifty-fifty. Men are more often represented when talking about migrant 
workers, which can lead to stereotypes about migrant workers. Especially when 
considering the social mood, which favours female non-nationals over male ones, the 
overrepresentation of men can cause negative perceptions towards migrant workers. 
Also Korean patriarchal culture is one of the reasons why female migrant workers are 
ignored by the media. Compared to the multicultural family news, which I will discuss 
later, most married migrant women are represented as common housewives; this 
representation limits the women‟s role in society and has led to a twofold segregation 
between women and men in this discussion.  
 
In addition, most non-nationals represented as migrant workers were regarded as 
unskilled/manual labourers, as the definition of „migrant workers‟ for Koreans refers 
almost directly to men from poor Southeast Asian countries with no skills who engage 
in manual labour. And also, because the meaning of the word „labour‟ itself is mostly 
understood within the limits of manual work, these social perceptions were reflected in 
the news representations. There were a couple of cases of representations where 
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migrant workers are described as victims. However, the report focuses on his or her 
identity as a victim of ill treatment, rather than the social function of the subject as a 
migrant worker. As to visual frames, the most popular choice was a bust-shot, the 
typical preference for interviews, accounting for 42.3 per cent of the total frames. 
However, negative representations using techniques such as crowd-shots (17.9 per cent), 
mosaics (14.6 per cent), extreme close-ups (14.6 per cent), back-side views (5.7 per 
cent), long-shots (3.2 per cent), and scenes showing the subject lowering his/her head 
(1.6 per cent) accounted for 57.6 per cent of the total, showing that the occurrence of 
negative visual frames were higher than positive. Regarding the matter of 
representation of migrant workers as part of a group or as individuals, 56.1 per cent 
were portrayed in a group or as a member of a group, while 43.9 per cent were 
interviewed as individuals (Table 5.6).  
 
On the other side, a total of 51 Koreans appeared in the news, consisting of 42 men 
(82.4 per cent) and 8 women (15.6 per cent), displaying a severe imbalance of gender, 
with an average of 0.5 men and 0.1 women appearing per news item, calculated out of 
84 total analysed news items. Korean men were mainly represented as government 
authorities (31.4 per cent), NGO officers (25.5 per cent), religious leaders (11.8 per cent) 
and professionals (7.8 per cent), a stark contrast to the representation of migrant 
workers. However, with much difference as to the professionalism displayed by Korean 
men, four Korean women were interviewed as ordinary citizens and one woman as a 
co-worker of a migrant. The stereotyping by gender partly comes from social reality, as 
there are far fewer females in high-ranking positions and more significantly males are 
consistently represented as the majority of Us, instilling strong trust in an authoritative 
and professional context. With regards to this, a detailed discussion will be undertaken 
in the discourse analysis chapter. In terms of visual framing, the bust-shot was the 
major technique used to interview the Koreans, accounting for 90.1 per cent. The rest 
consisted of negative visual frames, with 5.9 per cent being back-view shots, 2.0 per 
cent extreme close-up shots, and 2.0 per cent showing heads covered with clothes, 
where the Korean interviewees were factory owners who did not clear overdue wages 
or those who abused the migrant workers (Table 5.7). However, we should pay 
attention to arguments based on the data analysis, as this, remains relatively small in 
size. This attention has to be counter-posed to the fact that this is all the data available 
126 
 
on the actual representations of minorities in the main Korean PSB news broadcasts.  
 
 
5.3.2. Non-nationals as Criminals 
 
Following the stories on migrant workers and celebrities, the third most frequent 
representation of non-nationals was as criminals. Considering the positive after-effects 
of the Hines Ward Syndrome of 2006 and the consequent increase in news about non-
national celebrities, when compared by yearly statistics, news about non-nationals as 
criminals surprisingly accounted for the highest proportion in 2004 and 2008; 21 
instances were recorded in 2004 followed by a steep decline in 2005, 2006 and 2007, 
with eight, nine and eleven broadcasts respectively, only to jump back up to 20 cases in 
2008. This tendency has no relevance to the steady growth of the non-national 
population since 2003 or the subsequent increase in non-national crimes. Rather, the 
decline seems to be the result of the politicisation of issues related to mixed-heritage or 
non-national residents in 2005 and 2006,
25
 stimulated by the visit of Hines Ward. 
 
The increase in news broadcasts on foreign criminals consequently encourages negative 
discourse on non-nationals, such as opinions that the growth in the non-national 
population will most definitely cause more social problems. In the news texts, non-
nationals, non-Whites in particular, are frequently considered as potential criminals in 
Korean society. Whites are also increasingly being associated with crimes involving 
drugs and sexual harassment. A key aspect of the representation of non-nationals as 
criminals associates them with an increased crime rate among non-nationals, said to be 
due in part to the increasing influx of foreigners, which is regarded as a social 
phenomenon threatening Korean society. The most critical premise here is whether 
there is an actual increase in the crime rate among non-nationals, and consequently 
whether non-national residents in Korea are actually committing more crimes 
proportionately than native Koreans. In 2007, when the number of non-nationals living 
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 The very first news on Hines Ward was broadcast on 31
st
 October 2000, a short item about how a 
Korean-American football player contributed to the success of his team. Later, on 16
th
 January 2004, the 
news about the second generation Korean-American playing at the All-Star game was broadcast, 
followed by a story of his brilliant performance on 4
th
 January 2005. It was after his team won the NFL 
championship and he became the MVP of the season in January 2006 that he began to attract media 
attention. 
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in Korea passed one million for the first time, according to the Korean Ministry of 
Justice, crimes committed by non-national residents amounted to 23,351 cases, 
accounting for 1.18 per cent of the total number of crimes in Korean society. 
Recognising the fact that in 2007 the total number of recorded non-national residents 
was 1,066,291, making up 2.03 per cent of the total population in Korea, the relative 
crime rate for foreign residents is actually half of the rate for native Koreans. It is also 
important to point out that, out of the total 74 on the news, 22 non-nationals, accounting 
for roughly 30 per cent, were guilty of illegal immigration or forgery of documents, an 
issue that may not be broadcast in a prime time news programme if the criminal was 
not a non-national. Thus, a certain tendency to overplay crimes related to non-nationals 
compared to incidents involving Koreans could be found in news broadcasts.  
 
A total of 74 non-nationals made an appearance on the news related to crimes, 
consisting of 60 non-Whites and 14 Whites, accounting for 81.1 per cent and 18.9 per 
cent respectively. According to national background, 46 were Chinese (including 16 
Korean-Chinese), accounting for 62.2 per cent of the total, showing Chinese migrants 
to be the major offenders. Chinese migrants were involved in various crimes, including 
11 respective cases of „illegal migration or forgery of documents‟ and „violence‟, and 5 
respective cases of „murder‟ and „phony marriage‟. White criminals were mostly 
English teachers who were involved in criminal acts such as forgery of documents, 
drugs and child abuse (Table 5.8).  
 
Among the non-nationals represented as criminals, 62.2 per cent were men and 20.3 per 
cent were groups including both men and women. The news stories on crime delivered 
negative images of non-nationals, with 24.3 per cent of the scenes showing non-
nationals with lowered heads or faces covered with clothes, and 18.4 per cent showing 
random individuals gathered in groups. Showing pictures of criminals with their faces 
covered is a common representation of suspects in news, which continues to be 
practised although it contains elements of violation of human rights.
26
 Other visual 
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 By the time reporters arrive for the news of convicted criminals, they are already locked up, waiting to 
be dispatched to the prosecutor, thus not allowing the reporters to record images of the criminal. 
However, the news industry came up with the idea of asking the police to cover the criminal‟s face and 
recreate a police interrogation scene, to be filmed and broadcasted. This is one of routines in the news-
making process of Korea. 
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frames displayed similar occurrences, with 14.8 per cent being mosaic scenes, 12.2 per 
cent close-up shots, 12.2 per cent CCTV materials and 12.2 per cent back-view shots, 
totalling negative presentations of 97.3 per cent. In addition, 62.2 per cent of the non-
nationals were presented as a group image, which may mislead the viewers into 
believing an individual misdeed was a group crime (Table 5.9). 
 
On the other side, among the 69 Koreans who appear in news on crime committed by 
non-nationals, only three were women, and the remaining 95.7 per cent were men. In 
contrast to the results of K Kim‟s study (2003) on the relationship between coverage 
routines of gender reproduction and gender differences in the Korean national 
television networks, where 80.7 per cent of interviewees filmed for the evening news 
programme were men and 19.3 per cent women, the proportion of men in news related 
to crime by non-nationals is considerably higher. This reveals the mechanism of 
symbolic annihilation of females in which women are underrepresented and their 
images are biased by the journalistic routines like source use and information channel 
selection. Furthermore, 80 per cent of the visual frames used on interviewees are bust-
shots, emphasising stability and authority, whereas only victims and accomplices to the 
crime were pictured using frames such as extreme close-up shots (8.6 per cent) and 
mosaics (7.2 per cent), to suggest an impression of instability. Another significant 
difference in the Korean interviewees from the non-nationals is that every single one of 
them was portrayed as an individual. In particular, the majority of Koreans appear as 
policemen or prosecutors (32.0 per cent), followed by figures of authority such as 
religious leaders and professors (26.7 per cent), and government officials (13.0 per 
cent), encouraging the viewers to believe in the veracity of the interview. As for women, 
one person appeared as a victim, and the other two as ordinary citizens, which is a 
meaningful difference compared to the status of authority represented by male 
interviewees (Table 5.10).  
 
The most common crime
27
 committed by non-nationals in the KBS news report is 
„illegal migration or forgery of documents‟; 16 out of 22 non-national suspects were 
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 The term „crime‟ in this sentence is certainly debatable. This is because it is supposed that illegal 
migrants are not necessarily criminals. Nevertheless, in this thesis, illegal migrants and undocumented 
migrants are included in a wide range of crimes in order to show how Korean media and society 
understand illegal migrants. 
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Asians and the remaining 6 were Whites, who were mostly caught in an attempt to enter 
or work in Korea through an illegal channel. In the case of Asians, stories about those 
who forged their entry visa to engage in manual labour in Korea, who changed their 
visa status (entering by travel visa and illegally prolonging their stay to work), and 
incidents of Chinese or Korean-Chinese people illegally arriving by boat were mostly 
considered in the news. On the other hand, except in a case of a Bulgarian who worked 
as a fashion model with a travel visa, other Whites were mainly prosecuted for 
fabricating academic degrees or visa forgery with the purpose of working as an English 
teacher (Table 5.11).  
 
Crimes of violence reported were mostly associated with Chinese people, accounting 
for 9 out of 13 news items, and Korean-Chinese for 2 items. The remaining 2 news 
stories on violent crimes were about US armed forces. In news items on drug related 
crimes, 4 Asians, 4 Whites, and 2 Black interviewees made appearances, of which 3 
Korean-Chinese and 2 Blacks were represented as drug providers, while 1 Korean-
American and 4 Whites were described as drug users, displaying a stark contrast in 
roles. Felonies such as murders and frauds were all represented by Asian criminals, 
including marriage scams, which started to surface due to increased cases of 
international marriages between Korean men and foreign women. Crimes such as pick-
pocketing, robbery and smuggling were all shown as committed by Asians, and stories 
related to child abuse were all done by Whites. 
 
A certain difference could be found between news representations and the reality of 
proportional involvement of ethnic groups in crime. The crime rate among non-
nationals has been on the increase since the remarkable increase of migration at the 
beginning of the twenty first century. Chinese and Americans continued to be the major 
ethnic groups with the most recorded crime from 2000 into 2007. A certain correlation 
was to be found between the increase in the total non-national population and the 
increase in Chinese (including Korean-Chinese) related crimes, as they account for 
nearly half of the total number of non-nationals. Since 2005, however, crimes 
committed by Chinese migrants started to increase, being recorded as comprising more 
than half of the total number of non-national related crimes, a significant increase 
compared to other ethnic groups. The reason behind the increase seems to be due to the 
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strengthened visa policy to stop the invasion of migrant workers; incidents of 
undocumented immigration and illegal stays have increased, subsequently causing 
illegal money transfers.
28
 Another reason is that, because of the increase in the Chinese 
population, Chinese criminal organisations have also expanded their influence to 
Korea.
29
 
 
Crimes caused by Americans had the highest proportion among other ethnic groups 
until 1998, accounting for 33–65 per cent of the total crimes committed by non-
nationals during the period of 1990 through 1998 (KNSO, 2009). Americans stepped 
down from first place in 1999, the time when the explosion in Chinese migration started. 
Crimes are mostly committed by members of the US army. These are investigated and 
prosecuted by the US military police rather than by Korean law, as a result of SOFA 
(Status of Forces Agreement). Thus, as the Korean law enforcement forces are only 
involved in serious crimes such as murder or sexual assault, minor crimes committed 
by the US army are seldom broadcast in news programmes. The number of Americans 
who reside in Korea for positions as English teachers is also significant, and continues 
to show a tendency to increase.   
 
 
5.3.3. Non-nationals as Members of Multicultural Families 
 
Issues about „non-nationals as members of multicultural families‟ have become some of 
the major news topics on non-nationals over the years, increasing from 8 broadcasts in 
2005 to 14 in 2006. Although 14 stories a year still seems to be a small number, this is 
due to the surge of intercultural marriages between Korean men and migrant brides at 
the start of the twenty first century, regarded as a common social phenomenon by the 
time of mid-2000s. This rapid increase of intercultural marriages subsequently raised 
issues regarding mixed-heritage children (with different features to native Koreans), 
leading to more stories being broadcasted on PSB news. It is a fact that the number of 
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 Segye Daily, 18
th
 October 2004, „China prosecutes 53 cases of illegal money transfers‟;  
Hankyorhe,2
nd
 February 2005, „Money changer arrested for illegally transferring 37.1 billion to China‟ 
 
29
 Kyunghyang Daily, 23
rd
 November 2005, „Chinese criminal organisations specialising in illegal entry 
by faux marriages, exposed‟;  
Seoul Daily, 25
th
 November 2005, „Chinese criminal organizations diversifies business in Korea‟ 
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married migrant women brought to Korea was approximately 7,000 in 2000, which 
more than doubled to nearly 19,000 in 2003 (KNSO, 2007). This trend continued, as 
statistics reveal that, in 2004, marriages to non-national women accounted for 27.4 per 
cent of all marriages in rural areas, which rose to 30.6 per cent in 2005, 41.2 per cent in 
2006 and, in 2007, 43.8 per cent of total marriages were to foreign women (KOSIS, 
2008).  
 
A total of 55 news items were broadcasted regarding non-nationals as members of 
multicultural families, featuring 77 interviewees. Southeast Asians accounted for 59.7 
per cent of the total, followed by 16.9 per cent East Asians and mixed-heritage Koreans 
respectively. Sorted by ethnic groups, 17 Filipinos, 15 Vietnamese, and 6 Cambodians 
made appearances on the news (Table 5.12). This order of appearance, however, is an 
inaccurate representation of the actual statistics of migrant women in Korea. 
Throughout the period of research, 2004 to 2008, women with Chinese nationalities 
were the dominant group, taking up 74.6 per cent in 2004, 66.2 per cent in 2005, 48.4 
per cent in 2006, 49.8 per cent in 2007 and 46.9 per cent of the total intercultural 
marriages in 2008. Yet, Filipinas who most frequently appeared on television news only 
accounted for 3.2–6.6 per cent over the period from 2001 to 2008. Vietnamese women 
were the second largest group in the statistics occupying 18.7 per cent of the total in 
2005, 33.5 per cent in 2006, 22.7 per cent in 2007, and 29.4 per cent in 2008 (KOSIS, 
2009). As mentioned in the earlier section, this tendency can be interpreted as being 
interlinked with the news representation, which stresses visible physical differences, 
such as skin colour, in setting up Others who are different from Us. 
 
Among the 77 interviewees in the news about non-nationals in multicultural families, 
62 were women and only 5 were men, demonstrating how the term „multicultural 
family‟ is understood in mainstream Korean society (Table 5.13). In other words, from 
the point of view of a typical Korean, „multicultural family‟ consists of a Korean 
husband and a Southeast Asian wife. Interestingly enough, married migrant women 
were only portrayed within limited roles, either as non-national brides (37.7 per cent) or 
as daughters-in-law (29.9 per cent). The fact that only two major roles are imposed on 
these women on the PSB programme reveals that the common Korean perception based 
on patriarchal cultures and Confucian traditions looks at the married migrant women 
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from the position of husbands or parents-in-law. Married migrant women in this context 
are expected to provide a service to the Korean husbands and parents-in-law, and to 
give birth to boys, who would then continue the family legacies.  
 
As most married migrant women reside in Korea as legal migrants, 66.2 per cent of the 
visual frames used for interviews were stable bust-shots. However, non-national women 
who divorced their Korean husbands and some of the mixed-heritage children and 
adults were framed through negative angles such as extreme close-up shots and mosaics, 
including 28 per cent back-view shots. Mixed-heritage children (11.7 per cent) were 
mostly described in a negative manner, as the related topics were mostly of bad side-
effects of intercultural marriages, such as problems of basic education or children‟s 
psychological disorders.  
 
Unlike other news frames, Koreans who appeared in this news category show a 
relatively even gender ratio: 52.8 per cent for males and 44.3 per cent for females (2.9 
per cent of children excluded). Characteristic of this representation is the fact that a 
relatively greater number of female scholars majored in women‟s studies as experts, 
who suggested professional opinions about social problems, and NGO officers, who 
helped married migrant women to appear in the interviews, along with mothers-in-law 
as educators and assessors of daughters-in-law. Native Korean men who appeared in the 
news were mostly those who married migrant women, government officials or 
professionals. Korean women were represented as NGO officers who helped married 
migrant women or mothers-in-law. Most of the Koreans are described as individuals 
aiding or analysing multicultural families and the related issues, filmed in stable visual 
frames. While Korean men occupy most of the other news frames, news items 
regarding multicultural families tend to include a relatively high proportion of 
interviews with female Korean human rights activists or NGO officers. Korean male 
government authorities or those married to migrant women were interviewed for 
negative issues such as mixed-heritage children or overabundance of marriage migrants, 
whereas interviews with parents-in-law or NGO workers delivered positive testimonies 
in regards of married migrant women. The discourse of the interviews will be further 
analysed with the use of CDA in the next chapter. 
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5.3.4. Non-nationals as Visitors 
 
News featuring non-nationals as visitors accounted for 16 cases in 2004, 12 in 2005 and 
15 in 2006, but dropped to 4 cases in 2008. The concept of „visitor‟ in this study refers 
to foreign tourists, those who are invited to various events, international students 
staying for a limited period of time, and members of foreign embassies and their 
families. A total of 57 news items were broadcast, in which 97 non-nationals appear as 
interviewees in this category. The most remarkable factor in this news frame is that the 
proportion of Whites was considerably higher (67.4 per cent) than in other frames. This 
is quite different from the reality, as 38 per cent of the total visitors were from Japan, 
17.3 per cent from China and 14.6 per cent from Taiwan, according to the travel 
statistics of 2007. Japanese, Chinese and Taiwanese tourists occupy approximately 70 
per cent of the total foreign tourists arriving in Korea (KOSIS, 2008), while tourists 
from the U.S. who mostly fall in to the Whites category only account for 9 per cent of 
the total. Moreover, the fact that approximately 90 per cent of the international students 
come from Asian countries, with 20,080 Chinese students accounting for 61.7 per cent 
of the total, proves the distance between news representation and the reality (Table 
5.15).   
 
A total of 59 per cent of the non-national interviewees who are categorised as visitors 
were male, occupying a slightly higher percentage than female interviewees, who 
accounted for 41.3 per cent. Details reveal that White males accounted for 42 per cent 
of the total foreign visitors and 72.5 per cent of the total male interviewees. White 
females occupied 25.4 per cent of the total foreign visitors which is a higher figure that 
the percentage of non-White males within the total number of foreign visitors, who 
accounted for 16.7 per cent. Except for one instance of news regarding an international 
student, all interviewees were filmed using a bust-shot, with most of them carrying out 
the interview in English. Furthermore, 90.2 per cent were represented as individuals, 
while only 9.8 per cent were introduced as groups or members of certain groups. The 
major role of the non-national visitors was as tourists, making up 38 per cent of the 
total, followed by 18.5 per cent international students, 18.5 per cent professionals 
including 7.6 per cent CEOs, and 6.5 per cent religious figures (Table 5.16). Notably, 
134 
 
most of the non-national visitors, excluding students and tourists, were upper-class 
professionals. Although the tendency of the representation of these non-national 
professionals will be discussed further in the discourse analysis chapter, in presenting 
White visitors, the distribution by socio-economic class is significantly different from 
the non-White group which was examined earlier. This difference is rooted not only in 
racial differences between White and non-White but also the social meaning of tourists. 
Bauman (1998) categorises mobility into two major types in the era of globalisation: 
„tourists‟ and „vagabonds‟. He defines tourists as members of elite groups, those who 
travel by choice, taking advantage of all forms of mobility available. As opposed to this, 
vagabonds are defined as groups that are not welcomed in mainstream society, as those 
who travel in order to escape from their unbearably inhospitable homelands. This 
contrasting characteristic is interpreted as one of the causes of the stark difference in 
representation between migrant workers or married migrant women and visitors in this 
section.  
 
On the other side, more than half of the Koreans who appear in the frame of „non-
nationals as visitors‟ were men, scoring 64.8 per cent, a much higher percentage than 
the appearance of women, only occupying 35.2 per cent of the total. A notable 
difference in role according to gender was noticed, as 15 out of the 19 Korean women 
were mostly pictured as non-professionals, while 27 out of 35 men were professionals, 
government officials, religious figures and CEOs. Of the Koreans, 83.3 per cent were 
represented with a bust-shot, whereas 13 per cent were negatively portrayed by extreme 
close-ups, as they were government workers, travel guides and street vendors who 
received negative evaluations from the non-national visitors. Continuing the trend of 
other news frames, 96.3 per cent of the Koreans appeared as individuals and only 3.7 
per cent as groups (Table 5.17). Another aspect in the representation of Koreans in this 
section is that 13 per cent of Koreans were negatively described. In the news related to 
ethnic minorities, such as migrant workers or married migrant women, Koreans had 
absolute authority as assessors. However, in the section with a high rate of White 
appearances, although they were not the majority representation, Whites often evaluate 
Koreans as reviewers. With regard to this, it can be a critical starting point in discussing 
racial hierarchies which are prevalent in Korean society. 
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5.3.5. Non-nationals as Celebrities 
 
The second most frequently broadcast news frame was items regarding non-national 
celebrities. A total of 78 non-national figures appeared in 76 news items where, 
excluding five Americans (two governors, two educators, and one chancellor of a 
university), 73 of them were sport personalities, managers and referees. A Brazilian 
football player named Jose is recorded as the first non-national player in South Korea, 
when the import system for foreign football players was first established in 1983. Non-
national players were then introduced in stages within the professional basketball, 
baseball and volleyball fields, and currently limited numbers of import players are 
accepted in all professional sports leagues.  
 
The number of registered non-national players in the major four professional sports 
leagues (football, baseball, basketball and volleyball) for the 2007–2008 season was 76, 
with 18 White players (23.7 per cent) and 58 non-White players (76.3 per cent), 
revealing higher proportions of non-Whites participating in the sports leagues. However, 
KBS news featured 34 White players, who account for 46.3 per cent of the total, 
followed by 24 mixed-heritage Koreans (30.7 per cent) and 18 Black players (23.1 per 
cent). Although it is true that the proportion of Whites within managers was higher than 
for other ethnic groups, compared to the actual percentage, a higher number of White 
appearances in the news are certainly a contradiction to reality (Table 5.18). Moreover, 
most of the celebrity-related news includes interviews with the players, which were 
conducted in English except nine mixed-heritage Koreans, one Serbian and one 
Spaniard, with eight Brazilian players occasionally speaking in Portuguese. This is in 
contrast to the attitude towards ethnic minorities represented by migrant workers and 
married migrant women, who were interviewed mostly in Korean.  
 
Because the import player system in Korea is generally limited to men‟s professional 
leagues, 85.9 per cent of the news appearances were males, and only 14.1 per cent were 
female players. Foreign women players are currently accepted only in volleyball and 
basketball leagues, with further limitations caused by only one import player being 
allowed per team. The fact that, throughout the world, men‟s leagues are much more 
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popular than women‟s seems to be another contribution to the gender gap. A positive 
eye-level angle and bust-shot were used to represent 90 per cent of the interviewees, 
while 6.4 per cent were shot using a low-angle, a technique seldom used in other news 
frames. This is the counterpart of the high-angle technique, which makes the character 
look more powerful and mighty. This can make the audience feel vulnerable and small 
by looking up at the character (Chun, 1994). This technique has an effect of 
representing stability, but also evokes awe and respect of the viewers. The foreign 
celebrities are all represented as individuals, a method to emphasise the players‟ 
uniqueness and independence. Almost 80 per cent of the celebrities were sports players 
and 12.8 per cent were sports managers, meaning that around 93 per cent of the total 
celebrities were sports-related. This suggests that the roles of foreign celebrities in 
Korea are limited to specific fields, carrying the implication that one of the limited 
ways of mixed-heritage Koreans or non-Whites gaining fame in Korea is being a sports 
player (Table 5.19). The celebrity culture in Korea will be discussed more in the 
discourse analysis chapter. 
 
Koreans who appeared in non-national celebrity related news were also mostly men, 
taking up 83.3 per cent of the total, whereas women only occupied 14.8 per cent. 
Because Korean interviewees related to foreign players or managers had to be team 
mates or fellow managers, Korean males naturally occupied most of the appearances. 
Korean interviewees, 51.8 per cent of them being sports managers and 11.1 per cent 
sports players, played the role of providing positive comments (negative comments 
were rarely presented). Citizens, who accounted for 13 per cent of the total, were 
interviewed on topics regarding positive after-effects of the visit of Hines Ward, or on 
negative effects of the influx of foreign sports players, such as sports violence and 
deprivation of opportunities for Korean players. Interviews of mixed-heritage Korean 
sports players and their Korean mothers, who mainly tell the proud success story of 
overcoming discrimination and becoming a sports star, accounted for 9.2 per cent of the 
total appearance of Koreans (Table 5.20).  
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5.3.6. Koreans as Compassionate People 
 
Lastly, the news frame „Koreans as compassionate people‟ deals with stories of Koreans 
helping non-nationals who face difficulties or are in imminent danger. Of the non-
nationals appearing in these 15 news items, all 20 were Asians. In this frame of news, 
all of the interviewees were people who were given some help from Koreans and all 
were from South or Southeast Asian countries (Table 5.21). It is an apparently arbitrary 
situation that particular migrants from specific Asian countries – among hundreds of 
non-national ethnic groups from around 170 countries in Korean society – receive help 
from Koreans. Apparently it can be interpreted that the economical poverty of their 
country of origin is linked to individual treatment. Moreover, as examined earlier, this 
shows that migrants are represented as „visible Others‟ due to significantly distinctive 
physical appearances, such as darker skin compared to Koreans. 
 
Among the 20 non-nationals, 65 per cent were men, 25 per cent were women, and 10 
per cent were children. Bust-shots, occupying 55 per cent of the total visual frames 
used, were mostly chosen in scenes where the non-nationals thank the Koreans for help. 
In 20 per cent of the scenes, close-up shots were used to maximise the effects of scenes 
where non-nationals are moved to tears or where they are suffering from a difficult 
situation. Another 20 per cent presents scenes of non-nationals receiving medical 
treatment, to emphasise the reality and vividness of the news. More than half of the 
non-nationals were described as individuals (55 per cent) and almost half were 
introduced as part of a group (45 per cent), with the percentage of group representation 
relatively higher than in other frames. Furthermore, 85 per cent of the non-nationals 
were migrant workers and 10 per cent were international students (Table 5.22).  
 
The number of Korean helpers who appeared in the news was 20, 75 per cent of these 
were men and 25 per cent women. Half of the appearances were interviews filmed as 
bust-shots, followed by 30 per cent visual frames featuring Koreans giving medical 
treatment and 15 per cent scenes of Koreans having conversations with non-nationals. 
Considering previous representation trends demonstrated in other news frames, where 
Koreans were mostly filmed using bust-shots, different visual frames were used here to 
emphasise the role of Koreans as counsellors and caregivers. As for the professions of 
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the Koreans, 45 per cent were doctors giving free treatments, and 20 per cent were 
religious figures such as pastors or priests. The lopsided role of Koreans not only 
reflects the limited number of organisations providing assistance to non-nationals, but 
also indicates the level of influence of the news-making routines of the media, looking 
at specific groups to find representations of compassionate people in Korea (Table 5.23).  
 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
Although this chapter requires the circumspection due to limitations of small-scale 
sample, the content analysis of news items on non-nationals residing in Korea can lead 
to a number of conclusions. First of all, clear differences were found in the number of 
broadcasted items and newsworthiness points of the six news frames, which is the 
result of influences of complex social and political issues. For instance, in 2006, when 
public opinions regarding ethnic minorities started to change, leading to a social 
phenomenon named the „Hines Ward Syndrome‟, the number of negative and crime-
related stories of migrant workers being broadcast on television news decreased, while 
these frames‟ newsworthiness points saw a slight rise. However, when the conservative 
government came to power in 2008, the newsworthiness points of frames, such as „non-
nationals as migrant workers‟ and „non-nationals as criminals‟, increased, with crime-
related news doubling its numbers. After the change of government, the 
newsworthiness point of news regarding multicultural families continued to drop, and 
was gradually considered as having less importance. This case shows the political 
relationship of the conservative government with ethnic minorities, migrant workers 
and multiculturalism, and its involvement with the KBS News 9 productions. On the 
whole, news frames about „non-nationals as migrant workers‟ recorded the highest 
number of items and had the highest average newsworthiness point (.641), followed by 
stories of „non-nationals as criminals‟ (.649), reflecting that these two frames are 
regarded as the most common issues in news items related to non-nationals. 
 
Secondly, specific trends in hierarchical representations of non-nationals were found 
according to ethnicity, nationality and gender. Southeast Asian men were mainly 
portrayed as manual labourers due to their difference in appearance from Koreans and 
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other East Asians. Southeast Asian women were also mostly represented as marriage 
migrants. Among East Asians, who share similar facial features with Koreans, Chinese 
were often described as criminals, whereas most Korean-Chinese appeared as the 
afflicted, victims of crime or housewives. Black and mixed-heritage Korean 
interviewees were mostly sports players, with some of the mixed-heritage children also 
being interviewed. Whites were mostly represented as visitors, professionals or sports 
players. These differences were also found in visual representations, where more than 
half of East Asians and Southeast Asians being represented as a group, while 94.5 per 
cent of Whites were treated as individuals, focusing on their unique characteristics. 
These fixed representation routines recreate stereotypes against certain ethnicities, 
misleading the viewers into thinking the social discrimination originates from the innate 
differences in racial backgrounds.  
 
Thirdly, certain tendencies were found in methods of representation when specific 
ethnicities or nationalities were spotlighted according to related news topics. In the case 
of migrant workers, 71.5 per cent were represented by Southeast Asians, with 60 per 
cent of the visual frames containing negative intentions. Moreover, 62.2 per cent of the 
non-nationals who appeared in crime-related news were Chinese, where they were 
pictured in a negative way, such as mosaics, crowd-shots, and head dropping scenes in 
97.3 per cent of the frames. In addition, 62.2 per cent were portrayed as part of a group, 
which as a result strengthens the negative image of certain ethnic groups. As for 
married migrant women, Chinese women only accounted for 16.9 per cent of the total 
news appearances while taking up more than half of the actual population of marriage 
migrants. It was the Southeast Asian women who dominated the news regarding 
intermarriages, occupying an approximate 60 per cent of the total.  
 
Fourthly, Koreans who appeared as counterparts of the non-nationals in the news were 
mostly represented as individuals and males, with their professional status also being in 
contrast to the non-nationals. Koreans who appear in news items regarding migrant 
workers were generally government authority figures and NGO workers, and Koreans 
in foreign criminal-related news were mostly policemen, government officials or 
victims of crime. In the news about marriage migrant women, Koreans were portrayed 
as NGO workers who help the afflicted women, government officials, husbands or 
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parents-in-law. Looking at broadcast trends of the above news frames more closely, it 
becomes clear that a typical opposition in the social roles of Koreans and the non-
nationals exists. In other words, it can be said that there are different positions and roles 
for Koreans and non-nationals in the social hierarchy, represented in the news by non-
nationals as non-professional manual labourers and Koreans as professional and 
authoritative, non-nationals as being in need of help and Koreans as being able to 
provide that very necessity, non-nationals as criminals and Koreans as the law 
enforcement forces, and married migrant women as service providers and Korean 
husbands and parents-in-law as giving evaluative statements on the interviews. On the 
other hand, non-nationals as visitors were free from the binary opposition of the other 
news frames, as foreign visitors were mostly White men, who were in Korea as tourists, 
students, professionals, CEOs and religious figures. The foreign visitors were mostly in 
a position of assessing Koreans and the Korean system, sitting in a higher place than 
ordinary Korean citizens, street vendors and government officials who caused 
bureaucratic problems. Korean professionals add authority to the assessment, appearing 
on the news to agree with or support the comments of the White non-nationals.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Mediated Discourses of Discrimination:  
A Critical Discourse Approach 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter content analysis was used to outline the main themes and 
ideological frames in which KBS news features about ethnic minorities are constructed. 
It shows that non-nationals in the KBS news are mostly marginalised, homogenised and 
stereotyped against, in opposition to the complex context of migration in Korea. 
Following these findings, the aim of this chapter is to analyse Korean public news 
media discourse on non-nationals and to critically discuss the trends in representation. 
Traditional approaches to the role of media representation in the reproduction of racism 
and stereotyping of minorities have largely been analytical in content (Hartmann and 
Husband, 1974; Keever et al., 1997, cited in van Dijk, 2000). For the last couple of 
decades, however, especially in Europe, there has been an increased interest in the 
linguistic, semiotic, cultural, or ideological analysis of media texts on minority groups 
(van Dijk, 1988, 1991, 1993; Fairclough, 1995; Wodak and Reisigl, 1999; Chouliaraki, 
2006).  
 
Many scholars in Europe and North America, where Caucasians form the social 
majorities, have already focused on the representations of racialised minorities in the 
mass media. Most often, findings show that ethnic minorities are underrepresented and 
that the majority of these representations are stereotypical and discourse plays a 
prominent role in the reproduction of racism (Fowler, 1991; van Dijk, 1991, 1993; 
Fairclough, 1995; Wilson and Gutierrez, 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Wet, 
2001). Discourse expresses, persuasively conveys and legitimates ethnic or racial 
stereotypes and prejudices among White group members, and may thus form or confirm 
the social cognitions of Others (van Dijk, 1992). Van Dijk (1991, 1992, 1993) defined 
this as an „elite discourse‟. That is, media discourse that is produced to disguise social 
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class as invisible and having a social majority and minority taking specific but rigid 
positions in these social systems. Based on these findings it is possible to set up a 
hypothesis: Korean society and Korean PSB, which forms the most influential medium 
in that society, stress the single race national ideology and the pure blood myth and, as 
a consequence, reproduces an elite discourse that consolidates the ruling power and 
social, racialised hierarchies. 
 
Throughout this chapter we will deal with broadcast news as a specific type of 
discourse. In order to investigate the research hypothesis, this chapter will employ two 
analytical methods combined as introduced in Chapter Four: CDA and visual analysis. 
Although visual analysis can be considered one part of it, CDA will focus on the 
linguistic and narrative structure of the television news discourse in particular. 
Following this, visual images of television news will be examined by visual analysis 
drawing from analytical categories and methods as developed by Rose (2001), Kress 
and van Leeuwen (2006) and Zettle (2005).  
 
 
6.2. A Three-dimensional Framework for Analysis  
 
The news that projects socially negative effects associated with ethnic minorities can be 
categorised into three frames: „dehumanisation‟, „pathologisation‟ and „victimisation‟. 
These are the three dimensions of framework that emerged as central in my analysis 
and which I discuss below. 
 
 
6.2.1. Dehumanisation 
 
Dehumanisation is one of the oldest ways by which the majority media exclude Others, 
including ethnic minorities, and distort their representations (Singh, 2009). 
Dehumanisation, according to Baron and Richardson (1994), occurs when an individual 
views another person in negative ways, which leads to the belief that they are 
undeserving of the respect and kindness usually afforded to another person. It is as if 
that individual is compared to non-humans (Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, and 
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Suitner, 2008). In comparing groups under the same situation, Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, 
and Mihic (2008) state that, for example, if group B is seen as failing to uphold values 
belonging to group A, then group B must be immoral and less than human. This results 
in group B being less deserving of humane treatment. The fate of the members of group 
B is less relevant to group A, and their interests may be ignored. The implication is then 
that dehumanisation of a target increases aggressive behaviour because dehumanised 
group members have no moral standards applied to them (Castano and Giner-Sorolla, 
2006).  
 
Bandura (2002) adds that strangers can be more easily depersonalised because of the 
lack of moral obligation to try and comprehend them. There are three different ways in 
which people are dehumanised. Haslam et al. (2008) point out that people can be 
compared to animals, in which uniquely human attributes are denied and the person is 
described as being coarse, uncultured, amoral, irrational and childlike. Bandura (2002) 
adds that attributing demonic or bestial qualities to a person also makes them less than 
human. A second way in which people are dehumanised is by comparing a person to a 
machine (i.e. „mechanistic dehumanisation‟), in which human attributes are removed, 
and the person is perceived to be unfeeling, cold, passive, rigid and lacking 
individuality (Haslam et al., 2008). By doing this, the person is denied of emotionality 
and desires (Haslam et al., 2008). Controlling or manipulative interpersonal 
relationships have been identified as one antecedent of mechanistic dehumanisation 
(Moller and Deci, 2010). The third way that a person can be dehumanised is by 
perceiving the other person as being the enemy. Esses et al. (2008) state that the enemy 
is constructed to exemplify manipulation and is described as being opportunistic, evil, 
immoral and motivated by greed. The enemy is shown to take advantage of the weak, 
which in turn justifies any action taken against the enemy. Esses et al. (2008) go on to 
describe the barbarian image, which includes the perceptions of a ruthless, crude and 
unsophisticated individual that is willing to cheat to reach glory. 
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6.2.2. Pathologisation 
 
According to D‟Souza (1995), media strategy is the combined implementation of the 
positive presentation of the in-group and the negative presentation of the out-group. In 
this sense, the principal rhetorical means are those of hyperbole and metaphor, that is, 
the exaggerated representation of social problems in terms of illness („pathologies‟, 
„virus‟), and the emphasis of the contrast between the „civilised‟ and the „barbarians‟ 
(van Dijk, 1998). To put it concretely, in terms of „the New Racism‟ (Barker, 1981; van 
Dijk, 2000), minorities are not biologically inferior, but different. They have a different 
culture, although in many respects there are deficiencies, such as single-parent families, 
drug abuse, lacking achievement values and dependence on welfare and affirmative 
action – „pathologies‟ that need to be corrected of course (van Dijk, 2000). The concept 
of difference in this sense is needed to distinguish the healer from the patient as well as 
the „healthy‟ from the „sick‟. Order and control are the antithesis of „pathology‟. 
„Pathology‟ is disorder and the loss of control, the giving over of the self to the forces 
that lie beyond the self. It is because these forces actually lie within and are projected 
outside the self that the different is so readily defined as the pathological (Gilman, 
1985). Since almost all ideas of nation and people-hood rely on some idea of ethnic 
purity or singularity and the suppression of the memories of plurality, ethnic minorities 
are regarded as an impurity, as Jews were seen as a „cancer‟ or „pest‟ for the purity of 
German-Aryan blood in Nazi propaganda (Appadurai, 2006).  
 
 
6.2.3. Victimisation 
 
Racist victimisation, as opposed to „conventional‟ victimisation, involves that 
interaction of the offender and the victim, who are not being victimised in their capacity 
as individuals but in their capacity as representatives of the community to which they 
belong (Witte, 1996 cited in Winterdyk and Antonopoulos, 2008). In racist 
victimisation, whole communities are the „collective victims‟ (Karydis, 1994). Romer et 
al. (1998) investigated victimisation using a power relationship perspective. They 
contended that television news tends to overrepresent Whites as victims because of an 
ethnic-blame discourse in which people of colour are blamed for the problems of 
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Whites (van Dijk, 1993). This discourse affects news makers such that they produce 
crime stories that emphasise the harm that people of colour cause to Whites. As a result 
of such a discourse, people of colour are relegated to roles of perpetration, whereas 
Whites are portrayed as victims. The majority of the media research about racial 
victimisation mainly focuses on news reporting crime cases; therefore, the terminology 
of „victim‟ can be understood as a victim of crime. In this study, however, the concept 
of victim is not limited to crime, but includes a diversity of meanings of what it is to be 
a victim, as victimisation is produced through a variety of structures, such as social 
power relations, economic conditions and living environments. Moreover, this study 
will look into media representations of the victimisation of non-nationals, and also 
focus and look intently at the representations of victimised non-nationals. This is 
because Korean news reporting, compared to other studies of victimisation, does not 
openly victimise ethnic minorities, but instead undermines them in a more subtle way, 
leading to victimisation. However, looking closely into produced discourses, a 
discourse of duplicity can be found as it shifts responsibility on to them. Specific 
examples of this will be described in this chapter. 
 
This chapter will develop a critical discourse analysis on the themes and frameworks 
that were introduced in the previous chapters.  
 
 
6.3. Dehumanisation of Others 
6.3.1. Migrant Workers as Ornaments for Korean National Holidays 
 
Any society experiences, whether positive or negative, changes when migration and 
settlement of new populations takes place (Legrain, 2006; Castles and Davidson, 2000; 
Castles and Miller, 2003). However, in most cases, the positive effects of labour 
migration go unnoticed because they are often not considered to be newsworthy. On the 
other hand, studying coverage of labour migration can have consequence on issues such 
as social inclusion and participation in the public sphere. That is because the many side-
effects and conflicts associated with labour migration news coverage reflects and 
records social ideologies and the restriction or potentials of inter-cultural 
communication (Hartmann and Husband, 1974; van Dijk, 1988; Downing and Husband, 
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2005; Montgomery, 2007).  
 
Approximately twenty per cent of news related to migrant workers in Korea is 
produced during the Korean traditional holiday period. Therefore, cultural diversity is 
one of the most common topics of news representation at this time. It is interesting to 
note that it is during the Korean traditional holiday season that minorities are most 
conspicuous and news items of this type are most prevalent. Minorities are socially 
most conspicuous during the holiday season through the media and they are 
restrictively humanised during that period. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) argue 
that media have a tendency to drive people to feel sympathy towards socially 
vulnerable groups, such as the homeless, the poor and orphans during holiday seasons 
like Christmas. It is important to note here that holiday seasons become almost unique 
periods for ethnic minorities to be represented as „humanised Others‟ in the news. 
Chouliaraki (2006) argues:  
 
Humanisation is a process of identity construction that endows 
sufferers with the power to say or do something about their 
condition, even if this power is simply the power to evoke and 
receive the beneficiary action of Others and the humanisation of 
subalterns occurs either via the verbal mode or the image (2006: 
88–89). 
 
In terms of her argument, narration of news presenters, storytelling by reporters, the 
existence of sufferers‟ voices and camera angles are requisites of humanisation of 
Others. Therefore, it is very important to analyse discourses and images of Others in 
the news during such periods. They can provide significant occasion for studying how 
media manipulate and humanise Others.  
 
Traditional holidays have a special meaning in Korean society. Koreans are very proud 
of their holidays. Their pride is the result of the fact that they see holidays as key 
occasions for national uniqueness and reaffirmation of the significance of tradition. 
There are two main national holidays in South Korea, the biggest one is Seol which is 
the lunar New Year‟s Day and the other one is Ch’usŏk, the Korean Thanksgiving Day. 
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Most Koreans visit their hometown in order to pay respect to their ancestors and spend 
time with their extended family. It is interesting that ethnic minorities appear more than 
usual in the media during these periods. It is important to note that the headlines of 
these sorts of news stories can be categorised into two different groups. Firstly, there is 
news about migrant workers who are learning the Korean traditional and cultural 
activities. Secondly, there are the stories about miserable migrant workers whose 
hardships are in stark contrast with the pleasant holidays that everyone else is enjoying. 
The latter concerns the victimisation of migrant workers and I will describe it later in 
more detail. At this point I will focus on the former news discourse. 
 
KBS news not only emphasises Korean traditional holidays as a special time for 
migrant workers, but also reinforces ideologies of cultural superiority based on the 
Korean holidays‟ special value. Migrant workers are portrayed in these news categories 
as passive, receiving and enjoying Korean food, games and overall cultural benefits. A 
sub-text of the stories is that the minorities are „uncivilised‟ and „unemployed 
wanderers‟ and „bystanders‟ and „lonely aliens‟ until they learn Korean traditional 
culture. They are shown at the point of participation in the national ritual. Migrants 
come onto the screen through interviews, where they often demonstrate awkwardness 
with the Korean culture, which can be interpreted as cultural inferiority.  
 
The voice of Others has an important role in indicating the relationship between 
minority groups and the majority. According to Spivak (1988), speech does not refer 
strictly to talk, but more generally to the capacity of suffering Others to call attention to 
their unfortunate condition and engage their addressees with their condition. 
Chouliaraki (2006) adds that interviews in broadcast news provide a real opportunity 
for Others to be humanised as individuals. The interviews mentioned here, however, are 
extremely standardised and migrants only use their voices to reaffirm viewpoints of the 
majority. These are little removed from the level of discourse of saying „This Korean 
food is delicious‟, „Those Korean traditional games are fun‟ or „I love Korean holidays‟. 
These kinds of interview with the minorities contribute news content that represents the 
migrant workers as „pity‟, using words such as  „unemployed‟, „wanderers‟ and 
„lonely aliens‟, while the interviews depict Koreans as „thankful beings who held the 
festival for poor migrant workers‟. Some of the news stories emphasise directly – 
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through the interviews – how migrant workers feel thankful to Koreans. Although this 
topic will be discussed more specifically in the next chapter focusing on the news-
making process, We who have hegemony intentionally adopt or reject the discourse 
produced during interviews depending on whether it reproduces hegemonic superiority 
or not. To sum up, even though the voice of Others is quantitatively presented in news 
reports, that does not produce representation of them, but a representation of Us as 
superiors. In this way, the question, „Who are they?‟ reflects the answer „Who are we?‟ 
(Pack, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Portrayals of Migrant Workers as Interviewees 
  
 
 
In a similar context, the superiority of Korean culture is demonstrated in stories about 
migrants learning traditional games. Korean traditional games such as Yut-nori
30
 and 
Jegi
31
 superficially play a big role in aiding migrant workers by making them forget 
about their everyday troubles and worries in these news stories. However, these appear 
as culturally complex experiences that migrants can only grasp with difficulty. The 
reason for these attitudes can be found in Fanon‟s (1986) analysis of minority ethnic 
psychology. He used as an example the fact that Caucasians pride themselves on having 
the best cultural values whilst Africans try to prove that their culture is just as valuable 
as the Western one and even better in some cases (Fanon, 1986). Korean public media 
contain both the attitudes of Caucasians and Africans, as recorded by Fanon. That is, it 
                                                         
30
 Yut-nori is a traditional board game played in Korea, especially during Korean New Year. 
31
 Playing with a Jegi, which involves kicking a shuttlecock-like object with the inside of the foot, is an 
interesting traditional Korean game (Jo and Kim, 2001). 
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appears that their attitude to prove the superiority of Korean culture stems from the fact 
that a Korean majority is anxious about the potential comparative inferiority of its 
culture. They argue that their culture internalises better values than most migrant 
workers‟ cultures. However, Koreans seem insecure about the value of their culture 
compared to Western cultures. These cultural attitudes have also been present in the 
Korean government‟s slogan since the 1990s, which projects a national superiority as 
globally relevant: „The most Korean thing is the most Global thing.‟ In this campaign 
the government also tries to prove the superiority of Korean culture by stating the 
achievements of gigantic Korean companies such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai in the 
global market. In the process of discursive construction, as Hall (1996) and Laclau 
(1990) argue, Korean traditions of pre-modern cultural forms were given civilised and 
globalised superiority, whereas ethnic minorities in modernised society are 
characterised as uncivilised inferiorities. By setting up the visual scenes that show their 
mistakes and difficulties playing Korean traditional games, they are characterised as 
Others, not like Us. This portrayal often stems from the narcissistic reasoning that 
Korean culture contains unique elements, which are difficult for foreigners to grasp. 
 
 
6.3.2. Voiceless and Faceless Illegals 
 
Representing the migrant workers as „illegal‟ could be included in the discourse of 
dehumanisation. This is the way of the „new racism‟, as van Dijk (2000) mentions, 
which tries to avoid explicitly racist terms, yet uses negative words to describe the 
properties or actions of migrants or minorities. The news discourse describes them as 
passive and dangerous beings that should be managed and controlled. Especially in the 
news reports related to the domestic labour market, they are categorised not as human 
beings but as social ills or threats in need of control by the government. The fire 
accident at the Yeo-su Immigration Detention Centre on 11
th
 February 2007 was a 
tragic disaster where, of the migrant workers, who had been arrested because they 
lacked the necessary documents and were waiting for deportation, nine died and 
eighteen and more were severely injured because of the fire that broke out. The news 
reports about this disaster described the people who either got injured or died in the fire 
as „illegal residents‟: 
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Twenty-seven people died or were injured at an immigration 
detention centre in Yeo-su, Jun-Nam. These people were all foreign 
illegal residents ... Fire officials stressed the possibility of arson by 
these illegal residents who were committed there ... Yeo-su 
Immigrant Detention Centre accommodates a total of fifty-five 
illegal residents („Nine people dead, eighteen people injured‟, 11th 
February 2007). 
 
As can be seen from the report above, the term which consistently defined the migrant 
workers who died or were injured by fire was „illegal residents‟. This can give the 
impression that their sanctity of life and values are lower than those of nationals. That 
is, the migrant workers shown on this news report are dehumanised as illegal residents 
and the worth of their lives is treated as less than that of Koreans‟ lives. News coverage 
of this tragedy was very limited. Although it was an extraordinary disaster, KBS news 
broadcast items about it only for two days, the day of the accident itself (11
th
 February 
2007) and the next day. The total amount of news stories was just nine. It can be argued 
that its news value was lower than that of a similar incident resulting in the death of 
Korean citizens. The Ye-Ji Hakwon fire accident (16
th
 May 2001, ten dead and twenty-
three injured) was reported 28 times during six days whilst the Icheon warehouse fire 
accident (5
th
 December 2008, seven dead) was reported 18 times during five days. The 
case reflects the dominant view of the inferiority of migrant workers in the Korean 
mainstream media and is again part of the dehumanisation of migrant workers. 
Chouliaraki (2006) interprets the distorted perspective shown by the media as a concept 
of hierarchies of human life. She takes the example of natural disasters in Bangladesh 
and Indonesia, which took the lives of thousands of the inhabitants, yet the coverage 
given to the deaths of two or three Americans suggests their life-worth is of a greater 
value. It is hardly ever the case that the former lives are valued more than the latter 
(Chouliaraki, 2006).  
 
There is another striking example of a similar news discourse. The news report „When 
receiving wages for labour during the cultivating season…‟, aired on 30th April 2007, 
dealt with issues related to three Thai migrant workers who had lost their lives during a 
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fire in their accommodation whilst working in the countryside. In the introduction of 
KBS News 9, the item was presented as below: 
 
 
Three illegal immigrants who sought employment in the 
countryside lost their lives due to a blaze. Recently the amount of 
foreigners who work in the countryside has increased. However, 
hardly anything has been done to manage these illegal aliens 
(„When receiving wages for labour during the cultivating 
season…‟, 30th April 2007). 
 
It is clear that the presenter focuses on how we should manage the increase in illegal 
aliens in the countryside, and not on the accident, the tragic deaths and the cause of the 
fire. Clearly using the words „illegal immigrants‟, instead of migrant workers or just 
people who experience a tragedy when referring to the dead, frames the discourse 
strongly in a specific way, that of the victims‟ Otherness. In other words, the news 
discourse was only focusing on how the migrant workers can be effectively managed, 
with a view of the accident as a result of the mismanagement of illegal aliens, rather 
than the miserable deaths of worthy individuals. The power structure originated here is 
eventually divided into Us as „subject‟, „humanised‟ and „manager‟, and Others as 
„object‟, „dehumanised‟ and „managed‟.  
 
Over-lexicalisation can be another pragmatic strategy of encoding ideologies in news 
discourse, as shown. According to Fowler et al. (1979), over-lexicalisation results when 
a surfeit of repetitious, quasi-synonymous terms is woven into the fabric of news 
discourse, giving rise to a sense of „over-completeness‟ in the way participants in the 
news discourse are described. It is characteristic, according to Fowler et al. (1979), that 
powerless people are over-lexicalised. Seen in this light, over-lexicalisation often has a 
pejorative effect as it signals a kind of deviation from social convention or expectation 
and reflects perceptions and judgements from the essentially biased standpoint of such 
cultural norms or social expectations (Teo, 2000). The lexical cohesion, such as „illegal 
resident‟ or „illegal alien‟, frequently appearing in the news relating to migrant workers 
suggests that the very existence of migrant workers in Korea is in itself an illegality and 
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an anomaly. The frequent expression of „the foreign labourer‟ also consolidates the 
stereotype of migrant workers as foreigners and manual labourers. This stereotypical 
generalisation forms an opposition structure of „foreigner‟ versus „domestic‟ and 
„labourers‟ versus „employer‟, strengthening the binary opposition relationship of 
Others as foreigners and labourers, and Us as domestic and employers. On one level, 
this kind of stereotypical generalisation offers reporters or news makers a convenient 
means to ascribe certain key qualities to the main participants of the news discourse 
without encumbering the reader with tedious details; on another, the selection and 
repetition of a particular generalising attribute also hints at an underlying ideology that 
might have motivated the choice in the first place (Teo, 2000). Van Dijk (1987) explains 
this stereotypical generalisation as a concept of homogenisation. The homogenisation 
of the migrant workers as „illegal residents‟ or „foreign labourer‟ parallels the kind of 
categorical generalisation that is often symptomatic of stereotyping or cognitive 
prejudice (van Dijk, 1987): the larger the category, the more sweeping the 
generalisation and hence the more „severe‟ the stereotyping. 
 
The news discourse which dehumanises migrant workers as illegal residents is also 
revealed in visual representations. As can be seen in Figure 6.2, the migrant workers 
portrayed as illegal residents are all faceless. The first image on the top-left shows the 
image of migrant workers as illegal immigrants being „educated‟ in a small, confined 
space with prison-like steel bars. In fact, they are waiting to be deported after being 
accommodated at the immigration detention centre. They probably have not committed 
any crime. However, the image of them being „educated‟ behind barred windows by a 
Korean manager creates an image of them being deviants and criminals. The formation 
of superiority and inferiority on the value of human life can be part of the 
dehumanisation process, which devalues migrants‟ lives. The second image on the top-
right presents a migrant worker who has been severely injured at work, but who could 
not receive any adequate treatment due to not being able to pay the hospital fees. In 
both cases, migrants are described as illegal residents and their faces are not shown. 
They are also not given the opportunity to speak, but rather are shown aimlessly 
strolling away. Although they are human beings who suffer in society, the space and 
time in which they exist are unclear, as are their identities which are hidden. The way of 
representation at this point makes those migrant workers be imagined as faceless people 
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in the virtual time and space. In fact, the space represented in the second image is 
presumed to be a slum or backward suburban or rural area, rather than a location in a 
major Korean city. The difference of social class between urban and rural areas is 
highlighted at this point and is reproduced in the Korean/migrant divide. This divide 
suggests that the urban is the space of majority Koreans and they view the incident as 
happening in the territory of Others rather than Our territory, establishing a system of 
double exclusion.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Portrayals of Dehumanisation of Migrant Workers as Illegal Residents 
  
  
 
 
Another significant point is that the migrant workers in Figure 6.2 are represented as a 
dark and anonymous group. They, as voiceless and faceless beings, are principally 
shown as working in factories or watching television programmes from their 
accommodation in small and insular residential communities. In other words, they are 
given limited social roles within a restricted space. They are treated as an accessory of 
the machinery in the factory, even sometimes described as living together in an 
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unhygienic and dilapidated environment. Visual portrayals describing the migrant 
workers‟ accommodation reproduce the sense of extreme poverty as the camera uses 
high-angle and zoom-out techniques. Moreover, they appear only in groups, deprived of 
eye contact, faceless and somewhat out of focus. These visual grammars make them 
seem inferior lonely Others and strangers. The shots of the camera are out of focus and 
images are filtered with mosaics; the techniques of long-shots and close-ups of specific 
body parts of workers are used. This type of screening makes the news audience feel 
uncomfortable and emotionally negative about the migrant workers who appear in the 
scene. Chouliaraki (2006) argues that „the deprivation of a sufferer‟s voice, the 
representation of subjects in large, non-descript groups, long-shots of the devastation of 
an unknown landscape – such visual effects relegate sufferers to the realm of the Other, 
alienating them from the existential order of Western viewers‟ (2006: 87–89). This 
tendency of visual representation can be understood as a way of depriving them of their 
own identity, which causes the dehumanisation of migrant workers.  
 
 
6.3.3. The Non-national Criminals Held up to Mockery 
 
As was already shown by Western scholars, such as Hartmann and Husband (1974), 
Hall (1978) and van Dijk (1987), the mass media are apt to represent ethnic minority 
groups as being associated with crime, while under-representing crimes against them. 
Early Chinese settlers in Britain faced racial hostility from national newspapers with 
persistent references to the „yellow peril‟. Newspaper exposés of „Chinese vice‟ sought 
to link gambling, drug abuse and objections to sexual relations between Chinese men 
and White women (Law, 1981; Clegg, 1994). Criminal activities of non-nationals have 
become an important issue through media since 1990s when migrant workers started 
immigrating in large numbers.
32
 Criminals who have entered the country have become 
an important issue in the media. This fascination is overwhelmingly showing migrants 
in the media in a specific light, even if the growth of such stories over-represents a 
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 Seoul Daily, 7
th
 November 1990, „Foreign criminals increase rapidly this year‟; 
Dong-A Daily, 24
th
 September 1991, „Foreign criminals in extreme – many of them are Southeast 
Asians who entered by tourist visa‟; 
Hankook Daily, 31
st
 March 1992, „Foreign criminal methods are becoming increasingly brutal‟; 
Hankyoreh,21
st
 May 1992, „Foreign criminals increase rapidly – estimated 60 thousand illegal 
immigrants‟. 
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relatively small reality of migrant life. 
 
One of the most frequent ways of dehumanising non-nationals involved in crime is the 
representation of them as faceless and voiceless. Most of them are represented wearing 
a cap or are represented covering themselves with their jumper or coat, or alternatively 
are represented using a mosaic effect, making them hardly recognisable (Figure 6.3). 
News makers ostensibly insist on shielding a suspect as a device for his/her safety. 
However, when looking into its producing procedure the representation of anonymous 
individuals turns out to be apparently contradictory. As was mentioned in the previous 
chapter, it is practically impossible to film a suspect being arrested and taken to the 
police station for investigation unless reporters are positioned in every police station in 
Korea 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Therefore, almost all scenes of suspects with 
their head down or under investigation on the news are intentionally directed once the 
film crew arrives at the police station. A police officer in charge of the case, as he/she is 
required, may allow enough time and space for the reporters‟ filming of non-national 
offenders who are temporarily in prison. Next, the officer may be asked to skilfully act 
like they are investigating the lawbreaker, facing each other over a desk, at the same 
time as the investigated individual may be ordered to conceal his/her face (43 out of 69 
news reports). Cumulatively, the production procedure is taken as a whole result in a 
pseudo-portrayal of non-national criminal suspects. 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Portrayals of Non-nationals as Criminals 
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This tendency of visual representation is broadly similar to one which portrays the 
dehumanisation of migrant workers. Sometimes news makers attempt to obscure the 
non-nationals through techniques such as out-of-focus shots or extreme long-shots, but 
most of the time they try to clarify the existence of the suspect through a close-up shot. 
One of the most important visual functions especially found in this context is a visual 
frame which exploits a contrasting relationship between non-national criminals under 
investigation and the Korean police examining them. This visual can be interpreted as a 
reflection of the authority structure in reality. This dichotomous representation of 
authority and subordinate reflects that of a judge versus a criminal, a master versus a 
servant or a conqueror versus the defeated, and has been constantly reproduced through 
imagery and this can be a type of visual discourse which is usefully applied in media 
nowadays.  
 
Figure 6.4 shows another type of visual material which contains this dichotomous 
power relation. The pictures below connotatively describe power relations between 
authority and sinners. Noteworthy is the fact that, like the traditional dichotomous 
expression of the authority and sinners in religious painting, the image describes 
authority as the subject who imposingly lifts his or her head and stares straight towards 
the front, whereas sinners are described as the objects who avert their eyes or cover 
their faces, not being able to look straight at the authority. It is particularly interesting 
because this traditional visual expression has an influence on today‟s representation of 
television news. 
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Figure 6.4. Portrayals of the Power Relations between Us and Them
33
 
 
 
   
 
 
6.3.4. Feminisation of Others in the Context of Family-centrism 
 
Recently in Asia, where migrant and gender research is conducted, the character of 
gender immigrants has become more obvious and one of the extreme examples is the 
increase of inter-cultural marriages in Asia. H Kim argues that „Asian women choose 
marriage as a migration route in order to move to the developed countries in North-East 
Asia (South Korea, Japan and Taiwan)‟ (2006: 16). It is a fundamental fact in the 
migration mechanism that defines the feminisation of migration. This is not only 
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 1) Rogier van der Weyden (1446–1452). The Last Judgment polyptych. Available online from 
http://www.wga.hu/frames-e.html?/html/w/weyden/rogier/08beaune/00beaun1.html, Accessed 19
th
 
October 2010. 
2) Citizens and a soldier. 18
th
 May 1980. From The May 18 Democratic Uprising in Gwang-Ju, South 
Korea. Available online from http://www.518.org/main.html?TM18MF=A0303, Accessed 18
th
 October 
2010. 
3) Anja Niedringhaus. 12
th
 November 2004. Pulitzer Prize for Breaking News Photography 2005, First 
Place awarded to the Associated Press, Iraq team. Available online from 
http://www.pulitzer.org/archives/5499, Accessed 19
th
 October 2010. 
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because of a result of the quantitative aspects of the women‟s position and the increase 
in their numbers, but also because of a result of the increased globalisation of gender 
relationships. Although the total amount of discourse is still small, the feminisation of 
Other is something that is increasing rapidly through the discourse of multiculturalism 
in the Korean PSB news. However, when we consider the number of domestically 
residing non-nationals, we cannot explain why married migrant women, who only 
constitute ten per cent of the total, have become the focus of the multicultural discourse 
led by researchers, media, NGOs, and local and central government. The main point is 
that migrant workers as males are still treated as aliens in society, whereas married 
migrant women, despite demographically representing a smaller group, gain from 
government interest. This tendency displays a Korean trait of the multiculturalism 
discourse, which shows a close relationship with the gendered framing of national 
identity and multiculturalism. That is, the masculine is constructed as the custodian and 
the superior of the Other, while the feminine is connected to the subjugated and the 
inferior. Looking into the background of this phenomenon, the national policy drive 
towards multiculturalism seems to be to assimilate the new family compositions 
resulting from an increased number of married migrant women. The multicultural 
policy of the Korean government, for example, is limited to educating married migrant 
women about Korean culinary traditions, etiquette and culture, yet this is without 
accepting cultural diversity, but in fact emphasises homogenous Korean culture and 
focuses on assimilating migrant women into Korean society. This shows how it is a 
function of maintaining patriarchy to control rather than respect or humanise the 
migrant female population. The Korean bureaucrats and the elite majority lead the 
multicultural discourse constructed through these processes (S Lee and J Ahn, 2007).  
 
This is ideology learnt from „family-centrism‟, which is regarded as an absolute virtue 
in Korean society. Behind family-centrism, alienation and objectification of married 
migrant women are closely related to such many complex ideas, as demonstrated in 
examples such as the traditional patriarchal system of society, the Korean concept of 
pure blood and the myth of a single-race nation. Despite the fact that family-centrism is 
connected to the economy and relationship within the family in Korean society, paternal 
authority and power based traditions of family-centrism have coexisted with the 
continued dissolution and modification of it. Family relationships which have a primary 
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economical purpose are difficult to form and maintain for those who lack the 
economical resources. It first appeared in the 1990s as a marriage problem for farming 
industry bachelors, and then it spread to the men who work in small businesses in the 
city and serve in the service industry and who are comparatively worse off 
economically. The marriage of Korean men with migrant women means obviously a 
lower-class marriage within the dominant situation where class differences between 
couples are common, but this helps men to sustain a dominant position in the 
relationship. Considering these points, the increase of married migrant women can 
cloud the concept of pure blood and single-race nationalism but it can also consolidate 
the patriarchal tradition based on paternal power. Married migrant women are heavily 
relied upon in families that have assimilated and adapted into the husband‟s family 
system. It is not an exaggeration to say that married migrant women are called upon to 
maintain the patriarchal family in Korean society. This demand and expectation are 
strong enough to define their legal and social existence.  
 
How does KBS construct the feminisation of the Other? In terms of the representations 
of married migrant women, KBS employs three main frameworks: daughters-in-law, 
mothers of mixed-heritage children and housewives in rural areas. These patterns are 
the stereotypes of traditional femininity, which stresses the passive and self-sacrificing 
role of obedience to parents-in-law, dedication in bringing up children, assisting the 
husband and devotion to the household. The visual discourse of married migrant 
women only focuses on this traditional concept of femininity. The married migrant 
women who appear on KBS News 9 are mainly shown cooking in the kitchen wearing 
traditional outfits on national holidays, or being with children or looking after their 
immobile parents-in-law (specific examples will be discussed in the following section). 
This limited stereotypical discourse, which positions the women as objects of 
traditional femininity, reports favourably about their adaptation to Korean society. The 
married migrant women who accept this subjectification of the ideal feminine freely are 
often on the verges of society, such as in an urban slum or in rural communities. On the 
other hand, those who are not able to adapt themselves to fatalistic roles within their 
Korean marriages are branded as potential criminals or social deviants. Moreover, the 
news discourse limits the difficulties that they experience in Korea to mundane 
everyday instances, such as cooking Korean meals and learning Korean. This implies 
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that if they can cook Korean meals and speak Korean well, they will have no problems 
fitting into Korean society. This shows the limitation of the multicultural discourse in 
Korea that excludes the real cultural diversity and traditions of the married migrant 
women. The discursive tendency of feminisation is closely linked to another case of the 
dehumanisation of married migrant women. 
 
 
6.3.4.1. Daughters-in-law as Maidservants 
 
As we saw before, a high ratio of news reports related to foreigners in Korea is 
produced during the Korean traditional holiday season. For instance, after 2005 there 
were a number of reports relating to migrant women who had been married into rural 
Korean communities. In the build up to the main two holidays of Ch’usŏk, the Korean 
Thanksgiving, and Seol, the Korean New Year‟s Day, KBS News 9 showed married 
migrant women preparing traditional Korean holiday food or learning how to prepare 
for the holiday: 
 
The foreign daughters-in-law clearly had a busy day as they 
learned how to make holiday food and prepare ancestral 
ceremonial rites. Even though everything seemed strange and new, 
they enthusiastically learnt the unfamiliar culture („Even though 
everything seemed strange and new‟, 6th February 2008). 
 
The foreign daughters-in-law learned how to prepare the memorial 
service table and make traditional stuffed rice cakes („Foreign 
daughters-in-law memories‟, 12th September 2008). 
 
As can be seen above, during the holiday season most of the married migrant women 
shown in the Korean public media are represented as „foreign daughters-in-law‟. To 
understand this nature of reporting we must also understand the dominant social 
structures within Korean society. „Foreign daughters-in-law‟ appeared a total of 53 
times in the news reports and was the most frequently used term to describe them. The 
second most used term was „foreign women who married into Korean families‟ and this 
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appeared a total of 45 times. Both expressions were used based on the viewpoint of 
parents-in-law of married migrant women and it indicated that these women are 
subordinate.  
 
In the news, they are portrayed as people who prepare meals for the family, take care of 
their retired parents-in-law and give birth to and educate their children. These human 
characters are defined by the specific term „daughters-in-law‟. It is important to notice 
that in conventional Korean society, the daughter-in-law has the lowest position in the 
family relationships. The daughter-in-law should be sincere in regards to her duties 
which include solving every uneasiness within family life whilst repressing her own 
desires, and it is even the case that they need to look out not only for their household 
but also their parents-in-law and the children‟s lives if the husband is absent due to war 
or accident (I Lee, 2010). Therefore, the traditional concept of the daughter-in-law in 
Korea includes their destiny being to sacrifice their own lives for the family and to 
become passive, deserting their own identity.
34
 
 
It is noteworthy that the terminology used in the KBS report largely renders the social 
position of married migrant women as being „daughters-in-law‟, rather than 
independent human beings. This reflects the hierarchical structure of Korean society, 
which stresses that daughters-in-law must learn the domestic culture from parents-in-
law, who have the dominant right to educate and assess their daughter-in-law‟s 
performance. Parents-in-law, representing typical Korean culture, are constructed as 
taking the lead in maintaining cultural identity, whereas married migrant women, 
portrayed as foreign daughters-in-law, are represented as unintelligent and passive, and 
as having an inferior culture which needs to be adapted to the superior Korean culture 
to support the family. As such, married migrant women are doubly dehumanised as 
women controlled by patriarchal ideology and as non-nationals from a developing 
country by the nationalistic ideology.  
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 There is a famous Korean proverb which describes this passive daughter-in-law, that is: „If woman 
marry, she must live three years as mute, other three years as deaf, and another three years as blind.‟ It 
was a lesson from the time when woman were needed to be patient to the hardness of marriage through 
endurance and with a submissive attitude and it refers to the view of society towards daughters-in-law at 
the time. 
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Dehumanisation is also formed through restricting the linguistic usage of married 
migrant women. According to Bodemann and Ostow (1975, cited in Dittmar and von 
Stutterheim, 1985), foreigner talk expresses disdain, and continuously reaffirms the 
degradation of the foreigners. Widespread foreigner talk in the general discourse 
features founded by Ferguson and De Bose (1977); are 1) simplification, 2) short 
sentences, 3) wrong orders, 4) unclear meanings, 5) hypercorrect use of the language 
standard, and so on. Habermas (1971) also points out that linguistic and communicative 
inequality distorts and represses real patterns of socialisation. From this viewpoint of 
the linguistic ability of non-nationals, the migrant is usually in the subordinate position 
and the native in the superior. A total of 62 married migrant women interviewees 
appeared on KBS News 9 during the five years, and 60 women were interviewed in the 
Korean language. Among them there were very few people who could speak Korean 
fluently despite having lived in Korea for more than ten years. Most of them had 
difficulty speaking Korean after having lived in the country for one to five years. 
Despite this fact, the interviews were conducted in the Korean language and they gave 
subtitles in order to deliver the meaning clearly to the audience. Many were curious as 
to why it was necessary for the interviewer to speak Korean in a situation where clear 
communication cannot be achieved; the fact that they included subtitles, unlike when 
they interviewed Koreans, means that these married migrant women‟s Korean was still 
at a very basic level. The fact that they had difficulty speaking Korean and were called 
foreigners can be interpreted in various ways, the most logical being that this was 
because the majority of the news audience feel superior compared to foreigners who 
mimic the language which is part of Korean culture. This will be discussed later on; it is 
closely related to „the narcissism of minor difference‟ which is endemic in Korean 
society. Through these communicational disadvantages, married migrant women are 
forced to answer in a passive way, such as yes or no, to the reporters‟ closed questions. 
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Reporter: Are you happy? 
Yujin (from Vietnam): Yes, I am. 
(„More than half of them live in poverty‟, 14th July 2005) 
 
Reporter: Aren‟t you tired? 
Pung Kim Mai (from Vietnam): No, that‟s OK 
Reporter: Isn‟t it difficult to cook (tofu fry)? 
Pung Kim Mai: No, that‟s fine. 
(„I am happy although I am clumsy‟, 5th October 2006) 
 
There are many Korean daughters-in-law who are suffering from the inequality of 
married life in the home of the husband‟s parents. However, the difference between 
married migrant women and Korean married women appearing in the news is whether 
they have got their own voice in the news or not. This is a considerable margin between 
Us and Them. As Chouliaraki (2006: 88–89) argues, „speech – initially formulated in 
Spivak‟s critique of colonial discourse – does not refer strictly to talk, but, more 
generally, to the capacity of suffering others to call attention to their unfortunate 
condition and engage their addressees with this condition … Spivak asserts the fact that 
sufferers who are deprived of their “voice”, of the appellative power to make others 
aware of their misfortune, remain forever subalterns or “Others”.‟ Thus, voiceless 
married migrant women in the KBS news not only display their insufficient ability to 
speak the Korean language, but also reflect the power structure between Others and Us 
in Korean society. 
 
 
6.3.4.2. Localisation: The Wives in the Countryside 
 
Another process of dehumanisation is underway at this point, in the ruralisation of 
married migrant women. This is understood as „standardisation‟ of married migrant 
women as farmers‟ wives who live in rural areas. In regard to the KBS news discourse, 
married migrant women‟s partners or potential partners are restrictively defined as 
„rural bachelors‟ or „countryside and seaside men‟, and it observed that the increase of 
inter-cultural marriage has also led to a centralisation of the countryside or seaside. 
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These news reports suggest that in rural areas there is a much higher percentage of 
inter-cultural marriages and that there are significantly more married migrant women 
compared with the capital and other major cities. According to the data presented in 
2007 by the statistics office, actually 41.2 per cent of the men who are employed in 
primary industries get married to migrant women; a KBS news report has supplied us 
with the same numbers. However, if it is focused on the total amount of inter-cultural 
marriages, men working in primary industries make up only 11.7 per cent of all inter-
cultural marriages. In other words, among all the inter-cultural marriages in Korea, only 
one in ten is a countryside or seaside man in an inter-cultural marriage. The data 
presented by the Ministry of Government Affairs and Home Affairs (2008) is similar: 
70.3 per cent of married migrant women in Korea live in seven major metropolitan 
cities and one metropolitan province, with 56.9 per cent of them living in the capital 
city, Seoul. When considering this data, it is important to notice the bias of the reporters 
in suggesting that inter-cultural marriage is limited to men and women who live in rural 
areas, which obviously contradicts the real situation.  
 
It should be acknowledged that a similar form of power structure as between male-
female and majority-minority exists, and that is urban-rural. Local identity, similar to 
gender and ethnicity, is formed and accumulated over a long period of time and has an 
influence on contemporary political and social contexts. This can be explained by 
applying the concept of „Domestic Orientalism‟. Said (1979) pays particular attention 
to the colonial discourse. He analysed how the viewpoint from which the West looks at 
the East has been formed and defined it „Orientalism‟. Piterberg (1996) derived the 
concept of „Domestic Orientalism‟ from Said‟s research. He highlights that, in the 
process of representation in which European-Israeli Jews who hold the hegemonic 
initiative depict the „Oriental Jewry‟ who lives in the old territory affected by Islamic 
culture, the Oriental Jewry is defined as those who must be „modernised‟ in order to 
join the new imagined community, which is part of Western civilisation, and their 
culture is portrayed with a specific sense of values such as being intellectually frozen, 
primitive and degenerated, superstitious, lazy, poor and filthy, physically unfit and 
unhealthy, uneducated and uncivilized, and humiliated and inferior (Piterberg, 1996). 
This is an outstanding example of the way in which a hegemonic narrative is 
dynamically and continuously constructed on the basis of the displacement and 
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negation of powerless groups and of the construction of a new identity for these groups 
– in the name of pluralism of course – which is well integrated into the hegemonic 
narrative (Piterberg, 1996). In KBS news, the concrete discourse of this localisation of 
married migrant women is represented as the discourse of natural and positive, rather 
than negative.  
 
Most frequently migrant women in the public media in Korea belong to rural areas and 
some of them are even represented as „a local source of new energy‟. But it is easy to 
notice that these „heroic migrants‟ can only exist when they have internalised Korean 
values of being a woman (including communication problem solving, taking care of 
parents-in-law, supporting husband, children‟s education, well-kept household, etc.), 
which minimises their identity not only as a foreigner but also as a human being. The 
following news article contains this discourse: 
 
Because of foreign brides, rural areas have become cheerful where 
for once I cannot hear babies crying („They are also Koreans‟, 30th 
March 2006). 
 
Foreign daughters-in-law have become the new energy of rural 
places which once were hollow due to low fertility and aging 
(„Foreign daughters-in-law lead rural area‟, 23rd September 2007). 
 
 
These discourses represent married migrant women as Others, who are living in a 
different space from Us; even though they live within wider Korean society, the news 
discourses limit them to a specific space such as a rural area. Not only rhetoric 
discourse but also visual discourse contributes to the localisation of married migrant 
women in this specific perspective. In Figure 6.5 below, typical examples of the news 
programme‟s portrayals of localised married migrant women are shown. Here television 
attempts to express the image of „provincial‟ or „provincial-like‟, as much as it relates 
to Korean society. These attempts include describing married migrant women in a 
Korean traditional house or doing agricultural chores or duties, in the front yard of a 
disorganised house in a typical rural area, or a leafy area. In the context of Korean 
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localism, therefore, married migrant women are only accepted into Korean society as 
localised housewives, that is to say, as the second-class citizens of Korea. 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Portrayals of Locally Married Migrant Women 
   
 
 
6.3.4.3. Clumsy Inferiors 
 
Due to the patriarchal and centralised view of Korean culture, married migrant women 
are represented as Them, who are fundamentally different from Koreans in the related 
news stories. These representations merge together when married migrant women 
experience traditional Korean culture, when multicultural families prepare for the 
Korean holidays, and when children from multicultural families learn about Korean 
traditions at school. The common element in these news segments is that they all 
stressed the „difficulty‟ for married migrant women and children from multicultural 
families to learn Korean culture; therefore, it exposed their limitations as being part of 
their identity as Them as non-national, and it illustrated subliminally the message that 
Korean culture is not something anyone can easily grasp. Most reporters simply 
presented their own subjective opinions rather than objective facts during such news 
segments. As we will see in the news clippings below, many expressions, such as 
„foreign brides who want to be born again as Koreans‟, „they have sincere filial love‟, 
„truly learning women‟, are obviously the result of a reporter‟s impressions based on 
subjective opinion. The term „clumsy‟, which frequently appeared in these types of 
news report, is also a very subjective expression whose meaning can change depending 
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upon the standards of the interpreter. For some it may lead to believe in the existence of 
countless „clumsy‟ non-nationals who are not familiar with Korean culture. For 
example, what these married migrant women learn about wearing a Hanbok or making 
traditional Korean dishes, is equally unfamiliar for Korean women of the same age 
because many of the things that they are taught have almost disappeared from modern 
life: 
 
Although still clumsy the foreign brides want to be born again as 
Koreans („They are also Koreans‟, 30th March 2006). 
 
Pung kim mai who married and came to Korea two years ago from 
Vietnam fries Tofu clumsily („I am happy although I am clumsy‟, 
5
th
 October 2006). 
 
She is clumsy when pounding rice („Soothing longing...‟, 7th 
December 2008). 
 
These kinds of situation can be explained in terms of „the narcissism of minor 
differences‟ based on Freud‟s theory. Freud argues that the smaller the actual difference 
between groups, the larger it is likely to loom in their imaginations (Kolstø, 2007). 
Freud‟s tentative statements were in line with the insights of Simmel, Durkheim, Lévi-
Strauss, Dumont, Elias and Girard. Bourdieu (1984) writes in his classic La Distinction 
that social identity lies in differences, and differences are asserted against what is 
closest, which represents the greatest threat. Appadurai (2006) defines as predatory 
those identities whose social construction and mobilisation require the extinction of one 
another, proximate social categories, defined as threats to the very existence of the 
group, defined as Us. In other words, the reason Koreans can keep their composure and 
have the narcissism of „foreigners also enjoy our traditional culture‟ is created because 
there is the „difference‟ that they are not familiar with Korean culture like the Koreans 
on the premises. Therefore, their number increases and they hold enough social power 
to get into the step of enjoying „our culture‟ as „their culture‟, that is, when they have 
the sense of crisis of disappearing „minor difference‟, such pride will disappear. Blok 
(1998) argues that the loss of differences – especially cultural differences – represents a 
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threat and can lead to explosive situations. Social identity lies in differences, and 
differences are established, reinforced and defended against what is closest – and what 
is closest (in different meanings of the word) represents the greatest threat. Thus, in this 
symbolic economy, „the hatred of Others is the necessary complement to the 
narcissistic idealisation of the “national self”‟ (Morley, 2000: 221). At this point, the 
Korean tradition has a motivational urgency, which means that it is appropriated as a 
„means of power‟ (Hobsbawm, 1983) to legitimate Korean rule over non-nationals, 
especially daughters-in-law. 
 
This discourse is clearly constructed through pictures on the television screen. Figure 
6.6 shows visual portrayals displaying such subjectification of married migrant women, 
as they prepare Korean holiday food. Each of the news reports presents very similar 
images. The scene of married migrant women wearing traditional Korean clothes, 
following the instructions of their mothers-in-law is clearly indicative of the power 
structures within society. The mother-in-law could be constructed as the judge or 
educator, with the non-national woman as a novice and juvenile, being taught simple 
daily tasks. 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Portrayals of Married Migrant Women Making Korean Food during 
Holiday 
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6.3.5. Non-national Sports Celebrities: Monsters or Superhuman?  
 
Sport is the only field in Korea in which non-nationals can officially work and become 
famous in the media for their achievements. In Korea, there are four major pro-league 
sports (football, baseball, basketball and volleyball) which permit registration of non-
national players although it is very limited.
35
 Non-national players who work in the 
Korean sports leagues generally stay in Korea for anywhere from a few months up to 
five years depending on various situations, and very few of them naturalise as Korean 
citizens. KBS News 9 representation has the tendency toward categorising them into 
two parts: monsters or superhuman. 
 
Within this narrow framework of representation, the first saw „the Negro‟ only as a sub- 
or infrahuman figure, while its successor has sometimes been prepared to identify the 
same incredible subspecies as superhuman and even godlike in its physicality (Gilroy, 
2005). Michael Jordan, Mike Tyson, Halle Berry and the tennis star Williams sisters are 
some of the iconic presences that embody the latter possibility (Gilroy, 2005). As 
Hacker (1992) writes, „White America still prefers its Black people to be performers 
who divert them as athletes and musicians and comedians‟ (1992: 34). Campbell (1995) 
argues that the coverage of the Black performers was intended to „balance‟ the station‟s 
coverage of the inauguration of US president; because so few minority subjects were 
featured in other inauguration stories, coverage of the pre-inaugural ball gave stations a 
chance to show the ethnic diversity that many of the reporters in attendance described.  
 
One of the most universal pieces of rhetoric used in signifying non-national sport 
players in KBS news is the term „monster‟. The terminology of „monster‟ is mainly 
used towards non-human animals, rather than a humanised identity, specially stressing 
physical „abnormality‟. This discourse implies that the outstanding achievement of non-
national players is rooted in their biological physical condition – extreme height, long 
arms and legs, extraordinary elasticity and athletic ability. The biological conditions 
presented here are not regarded as a result of their effort, but natural ability due to birth, 
a kind of endemic racial trait. The media discourses mainly focus on physical traits as 
                                                         
35
 Since 2010, the Korean football and baseball leagues have allowed two non-national players to play in 
each team. The Korea basketball and volleyball leagues are restricted to only one non-national player in 
each team. 
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benefits which, in turn, cause deficiency in the mentality and identity of Others, 
limiting their ability in the physical field (Campbell, 1995). This can be regarded as a 
stereotype from Western society that has been learned, reproduced and modified in 
Korean society. Monster is mainly applied to Black or mixed-heritage non-White 
players. 
 
A monster appeared in the pro-volleyball league. A new foreign 
player named Leandro, the Samsung volleyball team player. His 
power comes from his extreme height which is 208 cm and from 
his long arms which are 94 cm long („Secret of high flying hit‟, 
26
th
 December 2006). 
 
Monster attacker Palaska, who dreams of winning for the first time 
has been defeated by the competing team („Monster attacker 
Palaska‟, 10th December 2007). 
 
Garcia, the monster power slugger who even broke the baseball bat 
(„I like Korean barbecue‟, 2nd June 2008). 
 
On the other hand, the visual portrayals of White non-national sports players are close 
to describing them as superhuman, as shown in Figure 6.7. There is a somewhat similar 
textual meaning of monster, yet the visual representations of them produce a 
completely different meaning. Their high height and bulky builds are maximised 
through low-angle shots. This camera angle enables the subject to look superior and be 
perceived as triumphant. Therefore, non-national celebrities appear here as superhuman, 
not just extraordinary humans, and they are likely to be interpreted in a positive light, 
unlike the monster analogies discussed earlier. 
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Figure 6.7. Portrayals of Non-national Sports Celebrities 
   
 
 
The double perspective around White non-nationals and non-White non-nationals can 
be also found in mixed-heritage Korean celebrities. As K Park (2008) points out, in 
Korean society it is very rare that mixed-heritage individuals enter the entertainment 
industry, and only in recent days has their story become an issue taken seriously. The 
number of mixed-heritage entertainment celebrities, typified by Insuni,
36
 is very small 
but is also limited to singers or sports players; therefore, it focuses on their biological 
abilities such as their natural-born voice, height or physical flexibility. In this process 
they are described as if they have a dominant voice and physical nerve because they 
inherited something from African blood, unlike Koreans and Whites. On the other hand, 
Whites started working as actors or models, but were an ignored class in society in the 
past; however, since 2000, discrimination based on looks has become endemic in 
Korean society and the trend for seeking the Western White appearance has become 
strong. In this process several White mixed-heritage people became celebrities for being 
actors or models in the Korean entertainment business. Despite having the same 
condition of being mixed-heritage, the perspective towards them largely depends on 
whether one of their parents is White or non-White in Korean society. This can be 
interpreted as a result of apparent racial discrimination structures, which ranks them 
according to physical appearance and skin colour. 
 
 
                                                         
36
 She is the most successful mixed-heritage (African-American father and Korean mother) Korean pop 
singer in Korean history so far. She held her concert at the Carnegie Hall, New York in 1999, which was 
the first time a Korean pop singer had ever performed there. Today, she is an icon of success through 
overcoming severe discrimination for all mixed-heritage people in Korea. 
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6.4. Pathologisation of Others 
6.4.1. Nosophobia: The Deadly Pathogenic Others 
 
A major part of pathologisation of ethnic minorities in the media is related to focusing 
on those who are carrying serious diseases. These can be portrayed as physical or 
psychological diseases. The former mainly focuses on „contagiousness‟, whereas the 
latter highlights a vague fear of the „uncontrolled being‟ of power and authority. First of 
all, physical pathologisation of ethnic minorities starts from the viewpoint of regarding 
them as potential carriers of fatal diseases. Particularly, there has been the discursive 
relationship between HIV/AIDS and Southeast Asia in the Korean news media. 
HIV/AIDS has been regarded as not only a physical disease, but also a moral and 
mental disease. According to Lean‟s research (2007) on the media discourse on 
HIV/AIDS, one of the means in which HIV/AIDS can be transmitted is through sexual 
intercourse. As such, the disease has been implicated with questions of morality. Many 
religious leaders and conservatives have voiced their opinions with regards to 
HIV/AIDS and morality, and they have concluded that the disease is linked with 
immoral behaviour. The representation of „immorality‟ is contextualised in terms of the 
link between HIV/AIDS and homosexuality or sexual abuse. Therefore, it is believed 
that the infected should be permanently expelled and segregated. Their existence is 
completely denied in Confucian society, which is shown as being morally and mentally 
superior. A person infected with HIV is a stranger and an Other to Korean society.  
 
Construction of discourses about HIV/AIDS has brought Southeast Asian migrants into 
a perceived close relationship with the disease. „Blind spot of AIDS management‟ 
which was aired on 1
st
 April 2005 featured a HIV-infected Thai female migrant worker 
who had worked in South Korea for four years. HIV/AIDS is still considered something 
more common amongst Southeast Asians due to the Korean mass media framing it such 
that most HIV/AIDS sufferers have become infected whilst visiting prostitutes in 
Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Philippines. In addition, there is a bias 
against foreigners from Southeast Asia, who are believed to be very promiscuous.
37
 
Thus, overall these news reports about the HIV infections amongst Southeast Asian 
                                                         
37
 Dong-A Daily, 12
th
 July 1993, „Developing countries in Southeast Asia, AIDS alert‟; 
 Kyung-Hyang Daily, 16
th
 November 1995, „Southeast Asian Game, AIDS alert‟. 
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migrant workers consolidate the bias of an increased risk of HIV/AIDS infection in 
Korea by these sexually promiscuous Southeast Asian migrant workers. 
 
There have been a series of cases where a number of 
migrant workers came into Korea and were infected with 
HIV while living in the country. A Thai woman who entered 
the country four years ago, and who illegally stayed and 
worked at factories around the Pyeong-taek and Kim-po 
areas, was diagnosed as HIV-positive last September. Last 
July, another Thai woman who came to the country as a 
guest worker died one month after being diagnosed („AIDS 
control blind spot‟, 1st April 2005). 
 
The above case is a good example of how the media connects HIV/AIDS to migrant 
workers and presents them as a threat. If we look at the expression used in the first 
sentence we see that it states „a series of cases of AIDS-infected migrant workers‟. As 
reported in the news, it is estimated that around 300 foreign residents in Korea were 
infected with HIV in 2005. In fact, it is difficult to estimate the actual statistics of 
infected individuals; therefore, it is arguable that the statistics produced in this report 
are guesswork. In spite of this fact, it is noteworthy that they report a specific group 
among foreigners – those of migrant workers – and expressions of frequency, such as „a 
series of infections‟, are used to lead to the stereotyping of this particular group. In 
detail, the news reported a case of two Thai women. From this, it is noticeable that 
news reports put disproportionate emphasis on certain countries in Southeast 
Asia. Furthermore, unlike other news discourses around migrant workers, which are 
male-dominated, in HIV/AIDS-related news it is interesting to note that the migrant 
workers are presented as women. This is closely linked to sexual morality in Korean 
society, as we can see that polygamy was socially accepted until the 1960s when 
modernisation started in earnest, and sexual morals were enforced upon women more 
than men, such as the forbidding of pre-marital sex and Confucian traditions banning 
the remarrying of a widow. Although it should be more cautious to approach these 
samples due to the small scale, the frequent appearance of female cases of HIV/AIDS 
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in news is related to sexual immorality in Korean society and can be interpreted as an 
expression of long-standing social conventions.  
 
On the other side, we can find another discourse which represents migrants as having a 
close correlation to mental illness. „Madness‟ has been one of the major perspectives 
that Western society has adopted towards other races and civilisations (D‟Souza, 1995). 
It has been used as a convenient measure in dichotomously classifying „normality‟ and 
„abnormality‟, „control‟ and „out of control‟, and „civilised‟ and „primitive‟. Even in 
modern medicine, however, mental illness is still difficult to clearly investigate and 
diagnose and can be also judged differently depending on the degree of medical 
development or cultural difference. This can especially be seen to be the case in news 
discourse, as it is seldom suggested that Korean husbands suffer from madness when 
committing violence against married migrant women who are badly injured and even 
killed, even though such incidences have occurred often in recent years. On the other 
hand, KBS news represents the mental illness of married migrant women, especially 
those from Southeast Asia, as a serious social threat. 
 
Many mentally ill Vietnamese women go to Korea (to marry). 
Their Korean husbands hardly know („If money received, 
everything is normal‟, 28th November 2006). 
 
Some Southeast Asian brides who have been caught had serious 
diseases including mental illness („Urgent inquiry for checking 
facility‟, 12th February 2008). 
 
This discourse towards a certain migrant group can function as justification for 
governmental limits on immigration, constructing cynical and discriminative attitudes 
towards them, and moreover justify in part the violence of Korean men towards them. 
Furthermore – and crucially – it can shift the responsibility of social malfunction on to 
Others. 
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6.4.2. The Numbers Game 
 
The counting of illegal migrant workers can also be understood as one of the practices 
of the pathological view. Rhetorically, this well-known numbers game of much 
immigration reporting in the media does not imply that these numbers are necessarily 
correct. Rather they signal subjectivity and hence credibility, whereas the numbers 
themselves imply the size of the threat (van Dijk, 2000). The represented portrayals of 
migrant workers are similar to the news discourses seen about the time of epidemics, 
such as Swine Flu in 2009–2010. The common components of this news discourse are 
as follows: 
 
 
i) It spreads rapidly and is expressed in numbers in order to 
transmit the spectacle. 
ii) It is shown as having a detrimental impact on society, 
especially the menacing threat to the right to life of Us. 
iii) Therefore, this threat should be expelled and segregated 
from Us. 
 
The constant numbering and monitoring of the increasing volume of migrant workers, 
especially illegal residents, in the news discourse is similar to the repetitive 
reproduction of the numbers of victims and the spread of infection to maximise the 
perception of the outbreak when looking at epidemic discourse. There was a dormant 
fear of the existing threat that tries to impinge on the territory of Us as shown in the 
discourse construction (Appadurai, 2006). 
 
In sum, the typical numbers game of immigration reporting has one main semantic 
objective: to associate immigration with problems and threats, if only by quantity (van 
Dijk, 2000). 
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Huge numbers of illegal foreign labours debase the level of wage 
for natives (25
th
 July 2006). 
 
Illegal residing migrant workers in domestic areas are over 
180,000 people (1
st
 February 2007). 
 
Illegally residing foreigners reach 230,000 people (12
th
 September 
2008). 
 
The first example refers to „huge numbers‟, an obvious hyperbole because not only was 
there an exact numerical statement about illegal migrant workers, but also the report 
was supported by an interview with only three angry Korean workers. As Clark (1998) 
sharply observes on the press representation of refugees, „the use of numbers and the 
language associated with it become very clear by the reporting in the media, and terms 
such as “exodus”, “flood” and “invasion” become the standard descriptors‟ (1998: 2). 
In the KBS news reports, the abuse of statistics is significantly found. This is seen most 
frequently in news related to migrant workers, which claims increasing numbers of 
migrant workers. Moreover, expressions such as „huge numbers‟ and „rapid increase‟ 
are often emphasised in reporting the phenomenon of increasing migrant workers. Most 
significantly, the negative term „illegal‟ is constantly used in describing migrant 
workers in this „numbers game‟, which, as a result, constructs a discourse reflective of 
the dramatic spread of an epidemic. The production of this media discourse promotes 
negative perceptions towards migrants, creating social anxiety (Gordon, 1996). 
 
 
6.4.3. The Lunatic Mob 
 
There are also news discourses that are produced by the psycho-pathological view, 
which identifies the migrant workers as having few educational skills but a wide range 
of learning difficulties. In the news reports, migrant workers are shown to be less 
skilled, less responsible, impossible to communicate with, and low skilled as members 
of the labour force. This rhetoric is in opposition to those values regarded as positive in 
the labour market, such as being skilled, responsible, communicative and quality, again 
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constructing difference and abnormality between the Others and Us. 
 
Pathologisation of migrant workers can be seen in the visual discourse as well. Visual 
analysis confirms the tendency to portray migrant workers who have participated in 
cultural activities during Korean holidays as a group type. They were mostly shown in 
chaotic and discursive images rather than personal images and their clothes looked 
quite informal and inadequate. As Schroeder (2002) insists, group portraits reflect and 
inscribe a strict social hierarchy within the ideology of the group portrait. Wearing 
informal clothes, some migrant workers talked loudly while they eating and playing 
games, got drunk and made a lot of noise. Even though they were celebrating Korean 
holidays, their behaviour confirms the fact that they have a lower status in this society. 
In the news portrayals, their way of playing traditional games was so clumsy and less 
professional that Koreans had to teach them how to play properly. In general, the 
images of migrant workers represented them as being happy and cheerful; however, 
most of them are represented as a group wearing their working uniforms and their 
images were represented as chaotic and lacking in personal identity. This tendency of 
representation may enable the behaviour of the Others to be perceived as an expression 
of group wildness. As Gilman (1985) argues, the wildness of „uncivilised‟ aliens was 
generalised as madness to the eyes of „civilised‟ Westerners. The chaotic group dancing 
of the migrant workers compared to the traditional Korean activities of the traditional 
holiday season can be said to be working through a similar discourse. While the group 
are attempting to learn „civilised‟ behaviour, they are also simultaneously showing their 
inherent wildness in the mediated discourse. 
 
Disease is considered a threat to the health of the nation state and in particular to the 
health of the traditional fatherland of Korea. Disease sees migrant workers constructed 
not only as problems, but as deadly problems. In becoming linked to the transmission 
of disease an analogy is created: migrant workers threaten the life of the host society – 
a society that is repeatedly presented as healthy and robust and the migrant workers are 
represented as the pest, the polluted enemy that potentially compromises the health and 
endangers the wellbeing of the healthy nation (Pickering, 2001).  
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Contrary to this, in the visual discourse We, dressed in Korean traditional attire display, 
are calm, devoted and disciplined in behaviour, which implies We are the worthy heirs 
of such a high and civilised Korean culture and civilisation (Figure 6.8). The camera 
techniques used to capture the two opposing groups also show divergence as the 
migrant groups are captured by extreme long-shots and high-angles from a distance to 
signify powerlessness and insignificance. These images show the migrant workers as 
daunted and distinct from the main culture of Us, who are shown by medium-shots and 
low-angles, to imply more respect and intimacy towards the object from the perspective 
of the viewers. From a visual aesthetics point of view, migrant workers are shown in 
mostly dark and black-coloured clothing, whereas Koreans are distinguished by varied 
and multi-coloured apparel. According to Gilman‟s argument (1985), racial pathologies 
are formed through the complete dichotomous distinction between „order‟ vs „disorder‟ 
and „control‟ vs „loss of control‟. Although the samples are not large in this study, the 
fact that they record an obvious contrast representing Us and Others is of great 
significance. 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Portrayals of ‘Their Tradition’ as ‘Disorder’ and ‘Our Tradition’ as 
‘Order’ 
   
 
 
6.4.4. The Natural-Born Cruelty 
 
The pathologisation of non-national criminals, especially Chinese and Korean-Chinese, 
is reflected in a variety of forms in the news discourse. The most prominent tendency is 
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the construction of a natural-born deviancy among the group. The news „Foreign 
criminals increase, become truculent‟ (8th December 2008) reported the situation that 
the number of Chinese who stay in Korea has quickly increased, exceeding 0.6 million 
and as a result of this criminal activities have increased as well. This news especially 
focused on the Korean-Chinese who constitute the largest group of people with Chinese 
nationality residing in Korea. During an interview in the middle of the news a Korean 
emphasised that: „Their fighting itself is far from the Korean way. During the fighting if 
one says “kill you”, it will actually happen.‟ This example projects a universalistic 
viewpoint of Korean society towards the Chinese and Korean-Chinese. The core of the 
discourse is that their crimes come from their cruelty and the cruelty is endowed in 
them from their embryological and cultural environment, which is fundamentally 
different from those of the Koreans.  
 
Highlighting the cruelty of non-national criminals through visual representation is also 
one of the important characteristics of television news media. In Figure 6.9 we can see 
images that appeared on news reports about serious cruelty in crimes committed by 
foreigners. The top-left image shows the confiscated weaponry used in a massive 
demonstration conducted by Chinese students. Despite most of the weapons possessed 
by the demonstrators being ordinary objects like umbrellas and bottles filled with sand, 
the camera only focused on a single big wire-cutter. Even if there was no reporting of 
how this object was used or was intended to be used, it can be perceived as a visual 
representation to dramatically illustrate the cruelty and gravity of the Chinese students‟ 
demonstration. The top-right image is also similar to the first, in which a Korean police 
officer who was dealing with Chinese illegal immigrants was portrayed while patrolling 
Korean waters. The image shows one of the suspected Chinese crew under 
investigation, alongside a multiple image showing weaponry, including a shovel and 
club. This implied visual grammar embraces non-verbal content of the cruelty and 
inhumanity of the Chinese crew under investigation. The lower-left image of a bleeding 
Korean police officer implicitly represents the seriousness of non-nationals‟ violence 
while also prompting suggestions of the critical situation being brought upon Koreans 
from outside, by zooming in on the police officer who is a symbol of government 
power. The lower-right CCTV image that was taken in an everyday convenience shop 
would increasingly reproduce the significance of non-national crime due to the realism 
180 
 
of CCTV imagery. This style of portrayal by news media outlets may encourage 
viewers to encounter the imagery in an emotional way rather than under logical 
consideration, due to the manner in which the outsider is framed as dangerous and 
threatening. 
 
 
Figure 6.9. Portrayals of Non-national Criminals’ Cruelty 
  
  
 
 
6.5. Victimisation of Others 
6.5.1. Miserable Others Who Should Be Sent Back to Their Families 
 
Another frame of the news produced during the Korean traditional holiday season is 
related to the victimisation of non-nationals. It can be seen that many news items are 
also produced in order to illustrate the miserable migrant workers who have miserable 
and gloomy holidays, whilst the other migrant workers enjoy the Korean holidays. In 
the news reports in this category, the reporter puts emphasis on the fact that Others‟ 
appearances differ from us, especially in regards to their skin colour. This can be clearly 
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seen in his commentary that many different skin colours of foreigners are gathered here, 
which has led to an anxious mood.  
 
Firstly, discourse around the family will be discussed. Although family-related 
discourse in the news of migrant workers tends to predominate during the holiday 
season, it is also frequently featured in other types of news as well. In the family-related 
discourse, family is presented as the absolute good and the most important thing in life. 
Therefore, this leads to the conclusion that the Korean resident migrant workers are 
also sojourners who need to return to their hometowns in order to spend time with their 
families. This tendency can be easily found in news segments that depict migrant 
workers as objectified service providers and miserable beings. Miserable 
representations are associated with one of the three dominant discourses, i.e. 
victimisation. Victimisation emphasises the moral superiority of Koreans as subjects 
that can help these people – who are suffering financially and physically – to return to 
and meet with their families because their suffering and struggles in Korea are the 
result of living in a culture they do not belong to. Within Korea many do not consider 
the idea of helping them to fit into the society as a solution for their problems. These 
discussions are directly supported through news. News repeatedly conveys indirectly 
the following message „what they want is to return to their families‟. Through these 
entreaties, migrant workers are recognised as aliens who need to leave the country 
someday instead of becoming members of Korean society. Direct discourses are 
reproduced by the interview with migrant workers. The following news interview is 
typical: 
 
A Sri Lankan migrant worker: My mum cried looking at the 
picture of my injured hand. She begged me to return home. I do 
not have any friends here (Korea) and I miss my mum („Migrant 
workers in the shade‟, 14th December 2005). 
 
A Sri Lankan migrant worker: My father and brother, who are still 
in my homeland, are sick. At the moment no one is earning any 
money in my household ... I miss my family so much („I feel 
homesick for my family‟, 16th February 2007). 
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News stories such as those above are based on migrant workers who expressed their 
longing for their family located in distant places. A particular reportage was interesting 
in that a Sri Lankan man was hospitalised and appeared on the screen wearing a patient 
gown. While the appearance of nine patients in the news represents the victimised 
migrant discourse, eight of them were Southeast Asians. All the migrant workers with 
whom the above interviews were conducted were staying in hospitals or at home after 
they had to quit work either after becoming sick or getting injured at their workplace. 
Figure 6.10 shows a visual representation of the tendency towards victimised Others. 
Most migrant workers who were hospitalised because of accidents or injuries in their 
workplaces held interviews whilst staying in bed. In these cases the visuals supported 
the idea that they were miserable and inactive migrants. One more important 
representative tendency was producing dramatic images through the use of extreme 
close-up. These types of images can cause audiences to see the represented objects 
more emotionally, and in a subjective way, rather than rationally and objectively (Zettle, 
2005). All of them were depicted as being „miserable‟ and „lethargic‟ beings that cannot 
do anything without the aid of Koreans and who cannot become fully independent away 
from their homeland. 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Portrayals of Migrant Workers Suffering from Injury or Illness 
   
 
 
This should be regarded as a function of the vital discourse of reproducing the 
183 
 
victimised migrant workers. Combining the victimisation of migrant workers and 
family ideology superficially maximises the sympathy of viewers towards migrant 
workers through an emotional representation of their lives. This is proved by the fact 
that a number of sponsors actually offered to help some of the migrant workers after the 
news had aired. Korean viewers humanised the migrant workers, whom they saw in 
tears when thinking of their families, making the viewers feel they are the same as 
Koreans with families in their homeland. Figure 6.11 shows the images of migrant 
workers who miss their families. It contains images such as a Southeast Asian migrant 
worker who shed a tear whilst calling his family in his hometown, an Uzbek migrant 
worker who delivered a message to his daughter in his hometown via a news interview, 
and a Korean-Chinese migrant worker‟s daughter crying because of the overwhelming 
emotions of a family reunion. Television news dramatised these events by showing 
close-ups of their crying faces. Sometimes sad background music was even added in 
order to illustrate the migrant workers‟ lives and how being separated from their 
families is a source of misery. According to Bogart (1980), who discusses news as a 
drama genre, as well as an ongoing fictional drama, a continuing news story, 
incomplete, is more likely to arouse our propensity for role-playing, our imagination 
and our emotions than a news report of a completed event; and not only do battles and 
wars have this character, but so also do significant events in our society, such as serial 
murders, kidnappings or touching stories about the socially vulnerable. These dramatic 
ways of portrayal depict the migrant workers, namely the representative objects, in a 
more dramatic way, and this results in the exaggerated empathy of the audience. 
 
Figure 6.11. Portrayals of Migrant Workers Who Miss Their Families and 
Homelands 
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Away from the tendency of emotional news reproduction, however, a different 
conclusion can be drawn from analysing this news discourse in more detail. This can be 
easily picked up during the interview of the chief of the Immigration Detention Centre. 
During his interview, he said that „they should live in their own country with their 
family, not here (Korea), because they are causing trouble with health, hygiene, housing 
and childcare.‟ This statement can also reflect the family-centralised discourse and a 
single-dimensional ethnical code centralised and associated with the conception of the 
state as a synonym for the Korean societal framework. These discourses are often 
mentioned as being the main causes of migrant worker discrimination in Korea (D Seol, 
2000; K Park, 2008); especially in a Korean society that is based around a family-
centred Confucian ideology, migrant workers who come to seek jobs, leaving their 
families behind, can be branded as cruel and money-seeking. They are also seen as 
temporary – only in Korea to earn money before returning to their family and homeland. 
Simultaneously, the visual discourse represents them as weak and powerless patients, 
dehumanising them as passive and spiritless beings.  
 
Taking a practical approach, there is an important factor missing in the news discourse, 
which is that many migrant workers appearing in the victimisation discourse get 
seriously injured due to excessive work in factories, with little or no safety procedures. 
Subsequently, they are unable to get adequate medical treatment due to the lack of 
medical insurance for migrant workers. What is more, exploitation in a workplace with 
low pay is common practice. Even though the Korean government and the employers, 
who are responsible for the institutional management of migrant workers, are actually 
responsible for the victimisation, this fact is hardly mentioned in the news. Instead, the 
suffering of the migrant workers is represented as an affair of personal circumstance. 
Thus, it appeals to viewers‟ sympathy and concern at an individual level while being 
de-contextualised. As such, it is possible to say that KBS serves a specific function 
within the ideological state apparatus (Althusser, 1971), speaking for the government 
rather than public interest.  
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6.5.2. Victims as Obstacles of Economic Profit 
 
The victimisation of married migrant women is divided between domestic violence in 
the multicultural family and the educational problems of their children. Although there 
have been several married migrant women who have died as result of domestic violence 
in the last decade, the Korean public media have focused less on this kind of problem in 
the multicultural family. In this case many news reports focus more on the anxiety 
about the negative image of Korea in the eyes of the victim‟s countries, such as 
Vietnam and Cambodia, in terms of trade economy rather than criticising racism, 
domestic violence or lax marriage management system in Korea. In particular, KBS 
news has mentioned the negative effects on the level of business, which illustrates the 
attitude that KBS news has towards human rights.  
 
Reporter: It often happens that Vietnamese women who marry a 
Korean man die after domestic violence. Because of this in 
Vietnam negative views about Koreans have become widespread.  
Korean Consul General in Vietnam (interview): When we do 
business with Vietnamese partners it is not like in the past ... In the 
past it was very friendly but I heard from many reports that it is 
very cold these days („Anti-Korean movement caused by domestic 
violence‟ 2nd September 2007). 
 
This discourse produced by the news is similar to a national crisis theory where the 
„Nation brand, Korea‟ decreased its position and therefore got economic damages as 
well due to domestic violence to these women. This can be interpreted as human rights 
having become a means by which we can keep Our benefits and position rather than 
approach Their human rights. It gives a strong impression that we need to develop a 
system to protect their human rights because we are scared of the business problems 
and the outside views. This discourse can be seen as a result of the typical principals of 
nationalism. That is, all social issues and problems are perceived and judged from a 
macro-discourse perspective through national interests. „Individual‟ human rights and 
even death can be largely neglected by the overriding discourse of „national‟ interests. 
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More seriously, this media discourse, produced in the system of nationalism, reduces 
social structural problems, such as domestic violence in multicultural families, to 
individual moral deformity, and consequently acts as a steering device away from the 
fundamental problem. 
 
 
6.5.3. Mum Unqualified for Domestic Education 
 
The media repeatedly bring up the fact that married migrant women and their children, 
especially those that have ceased living in the undeveloped areas, face various 
difficulties. In particular, problems with children‟s education in multicultural families 
have been regarded as one of the most serious side-effects caused by married migrant 
women within Korean society. In the news items this research focuses on, there were a 
total of 16 cases of KBS news reports that treated inter-cultural marriage problems, and 
nine of them were about the education of inter-cultural marriage families‟ children. In 
fact, education itself has been treated as one of the most crucial issues in Korean society. 
Because of the demand for high education in Korea, a phenomenon of avoiding 3D 
industry (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) has been caused due to the high college 
entrance rate and the following education inflation; thus, it brought about the situation 
which demanded migrant workers. Against this background, this issue of multicultural 
family children‟s educational problems has become a point of dispute that opposes 
inter-cultural marriage itself. 
 
Five year old Hye-young, who hardly recognises simple words 
such as bread and milk, has a Filipino mother. She has lost an 
essential stage in the process of learning the language due to her 
mother‟s lack of Korean („Urgent request for language education 
support‟, 1st December 2006). 
 
Owing to the mums‟ poor Korean, children‟s development of 
language is very slow („Foreign bride protection law‟, 3rd February 
2007). 
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As we can see in the above news scripts, Korean media consider education as not being 
a public affair, but rather a private area and the academic ability of children is up to 
each family, especially mothers. Although children are raised by both their mother and 
father, their position that the children‟s language development has been delayed 
because their mother is foreign reflects a conventional patriarchal idea, that is, the 
mother should take care of the children‟s education and the household while the father 
should feed his family. The reproduction of these types of idea through media can 
transform the issue to the level of individual morality; that is, regarding the inter-
cultural families‟ educational problems as a private matter, being mostly the non-
national mother‟s responsibility. They are sending out the message that in order to help 
married migrant women to learn to be Korean society members they should be 
supported with a personal interest. These news stories mostly argue that overcoming the 
ignorance and the indifference of society members is the key to solving these problems; 
however, no news item could be found which would suggest a demand for a public or 
political solution to this problem. This news broadcasting situation can be interpreted as 
having originated because the producers believed that the issue constituted an 
interesting theme or a curious story; therefore, they didn‟t put any positive spin on the 
subject in order to propose a solution or treat it earnestly. Also these types of news are 
limited to one time reportages and show the calendar news symptom, which is that it 
circulates annually by nature. 
 
The news discourse stresses that the economic deficiency of migrant mothers and 
multicultural families has a detrimental impact on children‟s education through 
expressions such as:  
 
The more serious problem is not that the mother is poor at our 
language, but that there is no economic affordability for the 
education of children („I want to learn the language‟, 14th October 
2007). 
 
This is the discourse that implies the reason for the educational problems of 
multicultural families‟ children is the non-national mother‟s clumsy Korean ability on 
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the one hand. On the other hand, the more significant problem is that they do not have 
any extra funds for children‟s education because they mostly belong to lower-income 
groups. Both discourses restrict the problem of children‟s education of multicultural 
families to the only issue of the private sector. In other words, this can be interpreted as 
reflecting the dominant discourse of the Korean ruling class, which does not want to put 
children‟s education within the public sector. On the other hand, some news reports 
have approached the benefit of being a multicultural society and have pointed out the 
fiction of a single-race nation in terms of functionalism or unionism in order to develop 
national wealth. Both views, which use the inter-cultural children as a useful resource 
of various languages for the development of Korea and see multiculturalism as a chance 
to develop Korea, erase the errors and obstructions of the past race-related discussions 
or interpret the benefits of a multicultural society from a strong functionalist point of 
view. 
 
A more significant way of representing the domestic educational problem is making the 
married migrant women‟s under-educated children appear mentally handicapped. This 
tendency of discourse is deeply linked with the pathologisation of them as well. The 
educational problems of multicultural families‟ children, which KBS news essentially 
represents, are most seriously represented when converted into mental illness. The 
discourse about the causative link between language learning difficulties and mental 
illness of mixed-heritage children is reproduced in articles from news reports. 
Furthermore, it is consolidated by the supportive comments of a psychiatrist. In the 
news, mixed-heritage children suffering difficulties in linguistic ability are described as 
mentally retarded children with mental disabilities and the only solution for the children 
is treatment, rather than quality education or governmental support for them. According 
to Gilman (1985), the concept of difference is needed to distinguish the healer from the 
patient as well as the „healthy‟ from the „sick‟. Order and control are the antithesis of 
pathology. Pathology is disorder and the loss of control, the giving over of the self to 
the forces that lie beyond the self. It is because these forces actually lie within and are 
projected outside the self that the different is so readily defined as the pathological. 
That is, they are portrayed as mentally retarded, in opposition to Korean children who 
are mentally healthy, and this is shown to be overcome through treatment and their 
behaviour is classified as a disorder. This constructs a pathological understanding of 
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migrant children and poverty: 
 
Multicultural family children exceed forty thousand. Among them, 
mental disorders have been increasing because they cannot learn 
the language at the proper stage („I want to learn language‟ 12th 
October 2007). 
 
To sum up, the media discourse of victimisation is produced through a sympathetic 
perspective towards migrants on the one hand. However, looking closely at it, the 
discourse implies that discrimination, exclusion, inequality and anti-humane acts 
towards the group are fundamentally self-inflicted and provoked. From this perspective, 
ethnic minorities experience double victimisation – being victimised by a series of 
systematic and discriminative attitudes in everyday life, and again being victimised by 
media discourse reporting these facts. 
 
 
6.6. Koreans as Binary Opposites: The Almighty Superiors and Lawful Judges 
 
Koreans in the news about non-nationals are represented in a completely different light 
compared to ethnic minorities. First of all, representation of Koreans mostly involved 
interviewees of high professional status with strong opinions about non-nationals. More 
specifically, most of the Koreans appearing in the news frame are high-class males who 
work in professional fields, such as police officials, representatives of NGOs, 
researchers, executives or scholars. This tendency of discursive representation can be 
understood as a process of reproducing traditional gender stereotypes in order to 
reinforce racial discrimination. That is, as Devitt argues (1999), women are often 
marginalised and portrayed limitedly in the „private sphere‟ – as housewives, mothers, 
victims, etc. – whereas men are represented in the „public sphere‟ – as social elites, 
political/economic leaders, representatives of the public sector, and so forth. This 
strictly limits gender roles between men and women. Compared to non-nationals, who 
were described as law violators, most of the Koreans were law enforcers or interpreters, 
who are portrayed as holding the moral high ground and virtue. In the interviews with 
Koreans, many of the techniques, such as medium-shots and standard angles, contribute 
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to the stress of the Koreans‟ authority over the foreigner. According to van Dijk (1988), 
generally in news articles, White males, as the mainstream of the society, speak about or 
for ethnic minorities, whereas ethnic minorities‟ opinions are not asked for. In the same 
manner, Korean males, as the majority of the society, are represented as speakers who 
have got their own professional opinion about or for ethnic minorities in Korean society. 
The majority of those interviewed wore formal suits and ties, and looked comfortable 
and settled. For the ultimate result, techniques of medium-shots and standard-angles 
were applied to the scenes of their interviews (Figure 6.12).  
 
 
Figure 6.12. Portrayals of Koreans in Ethnic Minority Related News Reports 
   
  
 
 
While these professional Koreans have more stable social status than migrant workers, 
the technique of visual grammar helps to reaffirm the inequality of status. It is noted 
that the professional Korean interviewees had their interviews in quiet and familiar 
settings, such as research rooms or an office. This presents a striking contrast to where 
migrant workers‟ interviews took place, i.e. in messy and noisy places such as festival 
sites, factories and homes which were mostly dark and untidy. The level of linguistic 
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expression of Korean interviewees meets the expected standard, revealing upper-class 
status. These linguistic expressions reinforce the authority of the dominant social group 
and they function within the discourse to conclude and judge the behaviour of migrant 
groups. They simplify the issues at hand related to migrant workers, using expressions 
such as „the main point of the matter is‟, „we should/must do‟ or „they are/want‟, which 
are intended to advise on the attitude of Us towards Others, defining them and their 
behaviour. The interviews of high-class professionals showed their authority and power 
as the interviews were carried out in a quiet and comfortable atmosphere and 
interviewees used sophisticated vocabulary, whereas migrant workers raised their 
voices during their interviews and often used grammatically wrong Korean. Their 
voices were mostly close to mechanical sounds because their voices were disguised in 
the broadcast and their images were not clear because of dark environments and the 
filtering by mosaics.  
 
Moreover, one of the big differences in visual grammars lies in the gaze at the camera. 
Most Korean interviewees directly faced the focusing point of the camera or looked at 
reporters who stood next to the camera, unlike migrant workers who often showed their 
backs or specific parts of their body. Their images often had mosaics or were just close-
ups of specific parts of their bodies, excluding the scenes of their interviews at the 
festival. There is a fundamental difference between images from which represented 
participants look directly at the viewer‟s eyes, and images in which this is not the case. 
When represented participants look at the viewer, vectors, formed by participants‟ eye 
lines, connect the participants with the viewer. The participant‟s gaze (and the gesture, 
if present), following Halliday (1985), demands something from the viewer, demands 
that the viewer enter into some kind of imaginary relationship with him/her. In each 
case, whether the participant gazes or not, the image wants something from the viewers 
– wants them to come closer or stay at a distance or to form a pseudo-social bond of a 
particular kind with the represented participant (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006: 118). 
The audience, therefore, feels a certain kind of association and identification with 
Korean interviewees while they were watching the interviewees‟ calm and confident 
attitude through eye contact. In contrast, the audience stay at a distance while watching 
the migrant workers, who were not introduced individually and did not gaze at the 
camera in such an unstable background.  
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6.7. Conclusion 
 
The key findings in this chapter can be summarised as follows. Firstly, as a result of 
analysing the news discourse, it can be seen that KBS News 9 has three significant 
representation tendencies when representing ethnic minorities in Korea – 
dehumanisation, victimisation and pathologisation. First of all, as the most common 
method of representation, dehumanisation of ethnic minorities was found in the news of 
all the critical categories – non-nationals as migrant workers, criminals and married 
migrants. Migrant workers were defined mainly as „illegal residents‟, „uneducated‟, 
„people who must be managed by authority‟ and portrayed with the negative image of a 
mosaic and with a dark background. In terms of non-nationals as criminals, ethnic 
minorities were represented as potential criminals and their humanity was ignored and 
reduced, although the vast majority of the migrant population is not involved with any 
form of crime. News reporting, which refers to potential terror attacks from Muslims, 
or simply defines undocumented foreigners as illegal entrants and individuals who have 
overstayed their visas, has a particularly controlling effect on the portrayal of the whole 
migrant group and their human rights. Lastly, in the other tendency of the 
dehumanisation of crime suspects, the suspected criminal acts of ethnic minorities are 
highlighted in KBS news, and often collective guilt is implied for their nation or 
ethnicity as a whole, rather than the individual culprit. Also, suspects are treated the 
same as those individuals convicted of crimes. In this way a stereotypical discourse 
about people from specific regions – such as migrants from Southeast Asia – is 
produced. Labels and names for particular ethnic groups carry particular and changing 
ideological baggage. Use of categories and terminology requires sensitivity to the 
people concerned. The Korean public news media operate in a confused position, often 
retaining spurious racial categories and using ethnicity with little understanding. 
Overall, race thinking pervades news coverage of migrant workers and ethnic relations 
and the thoroughly mistaken notion that races are real is continually reinforced. 
Dehumanisation of married migrant women is represented in a variety of ways. First of 
all, they are presented through a very narrow framework of feminine roles in the 
patriarchal Korean society, rather than as equal human beings. During this process, 
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married migrant women are mostly represented as daughters-in-law or farmers‟ wives 
who have to work hard, often with the caricature of being inarticulate and uneducated, 
due to their limited proficiency in the Korean language. 
 
In terms of the victimisation of non-nationals, there are two contrasting tendencies in 
representing ethnic minorities superficially as victims or perpetrators. It is interesting 
that the tendencies of these two discourses are closely related. First of all, migrant 
workers who get injured at work and have had long-term medical treatment in hospital 
can represent this well. In news discourse, they are reflected as „victims‟ who have 
suffered from poor working conditions and Korean companies that delay paying their 
salary and medical expenses, while at the same time, they are depicted as „perpetrators‟ 
who have left their family in their homeland, neglecting their responsibilities. This 
discourse, all in all, contains a monitoring function which strongly promotes migrants 
to promptly return to their home countries, rather than suffering from family separation 
in a far-flung country. This clearly does not include a critical eye on immoral Korean 
companies which leave dangerous working conditions and do not pay proper salaries 
for migrant workers. This dual perspective can also be seen in the case of married 
migrant women. In reporting the case of a murdered foreign wife from Vietnam, due to 
the domestic violence of the Korean husband, the report is more concerned with how 
the national brand could be damaged economically, rather than offering condolences 
over her death from a human rights perspective. Moreover, it is pointed out that there is 
a problem of language education and deficient learning capabilities of mixed-heritage 
children in multicultural families, and reports blame married migrant women. They are 
blamed for being uneducated and not fluent in Korean, even though education is a 
nationally driven public service and both parents are equally responsible. 
 
Lastly, the discourse of pathologisation of non-nationals can be mainly divided into 
physical and psychological perspectives. In terms of physical pathologisation, the 
representation of Southeast Asians as a group potentially at risk of HIV is often the case. 
People with HIV in Korean society are regarded as sexually promiscuous due to the 
strong sexual conservatism under the influence of Confucian culture. Therefore, giving 
pathological characteristics to ethnic minorities from specific regions can be the most 
significant stereotypical discourse. For example, the news discourse reporting the 
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dramatic increase in immigrant numbers is similar to that of the drastic spread of 
epidemics, like Swine Flu. This type of discourse encourages fear and wariness towards 
Others within society (Appadurai, 2006). With regards to psychological pathologisation, 
the most critical discourse is related to the „natural born something‟ of Others. For 
instance, a series of discourses report tendencies, such as „immigrants have brutal 
inclination by nature‟, „they are naturally aggressive‟ or „they naturally lack learning 
abilities‟. These discourses simply dichotomise ethnic minorities as „very cunning to 
deceive Koreans‟ or as being „impossible to normally live with Koreans due to mental 
illness, or lack of learning ability‟, with both cases making it difficult to accept them in 
the society of Us. 
 
Secondly, in opposition to the negatively stereotypical and distorted representation of 
ethnic minorities, Koreans in news programming appear as distinctively different from 
ethnic minorities from a binary opposition perspective. Koreans as Us, in opposition to 
Them, allows for the construction of a clear and concrete argument which is logically 
presented. Additionally, the concise dichotomous terminologies of Us and Them are 
used throughout the interviews. Moreover, Koreans are naturally charged with authority 
and the position of representing Korean society and government, being represented as 
moral and proud male law enforcers, parents-in-law or husbands in a patriarchal society, 
and intellectual educators in a developed society. This binary opposition division of Us 
and Them has already been seen in White-centric Western societies and it is interesting 
that the racial ranking and stereotype towards other ethnicities among non-Caucasians 
has been constructed, absorbed and reproduced intact. 
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Table 6.1. Binary Oppositions: Us and Them in the PSB News Reports on Ethnic 
Minorities  
 
Us Others 
Dehumanisation  
Individual Group 
Names given Anonymous 
Husband Wife 
Intellectual Emotional 
Standard language Poor language 
Legal Illegal 
Urban Countryside 
 
Victimisation 
 
Law enforcer Perpetrator 
Victim Assailant 
Good Cruel 
Carer Miserable 
Moral Immoral 
Solution Troublesome 
 
Pathologisation 
 
Order Disorder 
Doctor Patient 
Moral Immoral 
Sane Insane 
Clean Filthy 
 
In Sum 
 
Superiority Inferiority 
Bourgeoisie Working class 
Authority Subordinated 
Proud Shame 
Educator Educatee 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Discourse Making: Institutional Voices 
 
 
The gatekeeping process determines the way in which we define our 
lives and the world around us, and therefore gatekeeping ultimately 
affects the social reality of every person. 
(Shoemaker and Vos, 2009: 3) 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous textual analysis chapters, the methods by which KBS news as Korean 
PSB represents ethnic minorities were examined using quantitative and qualitative 
analysis methods. These two chapters uncovered that KBS news has specific tendencies 
in representing ethnic minorities and the media discourse reproduces power and 
functions as a reinforcement tool in the process of presenting Others who are excluded 
in power from Us who have political, social and cultural power. In this chapter there 
will be in-depth analysis, through interviewing KBS news makers, of how media, as a 
reproduction tool of power, produces specific discourse in the process of selection, 
production and editing in order to distinctively classify Us and Others.  
 
Hall (1973) contends that the journalistic tenet of objectivity is itself a myth which is 
magnified by the structure of news production. According to his argument, the news is 
not only a cultural product: „it is the product of a set of institutional definitions and 
meanings, which, in professional shorthand, is commonly referred to as news values‟ 
(Hall, 1973: 87). Those values, he says, dictate a „status quo‟ production of news that 
reflects the „informal ideology‟ of journalism, which is based on common sense 
understandings as to what constitutes the news in the journalistic discourse (Hall, 1973). 
In seeking to explain the misrepresentation of ethnic minorities in the British news 
media, Cottle (1999) warns of the „problem of inference‟, that is simply reading off 
racist motivation on the part of media producers from the identification of racially 
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demeaning news items. Overcoming this problem, for Cottle, requires analysis of the 
process of the news production, involving an investigation of determinate factors such 
as journalist and proprietor prejudice, news value and organisation of news production. 
 
News value, „one of the most opaque structures of meaning in modern society‟ (Hall, 
1981: 234), has long been noted as helping to select, order and prioritise the production 
of news representations (Galtung and Ruge, 1981). In the context of ethnic minority 
reporting, then, it is perhaps surprising that news often brings to do the forefront images 
of ethnic minorities in terms of conflict, drama, controversy, violence and deviance 
(Halloran 1974, 1977; Hartmann and Husband, 1974; Troyna, 1981; Cottle, 1991, cited 
in Cottle, 2000).  
 
The news that is featured through newspapers, televisions and the Internet is obviously 
chosen through a reproductive process and then is reported to the audiences. This news 
selection process is called gatekeeping and the people who are in charge of this process 
are called news makers. Gatekeeping is the process by which the billions of messages 
that are available in the world get cut down and transformed into the hundreds of 
messages that reach a given person on a given day (Shoemaker, 1997). Donohue, 
Tichenor and Olien (1972) have suggested that gatekeeping be defined as a broader 
process of information control that includes all aspects of message encoding: not just 
selection but also withholding, transmission, shaping, display, repetition and timing of 
information as it goes from the sender to the receiver. On a more microscopic level of 
analysis, gatekeeping can also be thought of as the process of reconstructing the 
essential framework of an event and turning it into news (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). 
News makers can be divided into „editors‟, whose responsibility is the selection and the 
broadcasting of the news contents, and „reporters‟, who supply and report the contents 
of the news. News contents broadcast on television are the result of the news makers‟ 
reasoning; this means that the news reflects the news makers‟ conscious or unconscious 
opinions. The direction and structure of news contents are shaped by the regulations 
and the production guidelines of the broadcast corporation. During this process, 
gatekeeping is practised, which means that the value of the news and its point of view 
are judged by specific standards, to decide whether or not the news should be 
broadcasted. Halloran, Elliott and Murdock (1970) state that gatekeeping begins as 
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soon as the reporters start covering a case and not afterwards in the office when the 
news has already been covered. This means that the reporter‟s point of view, perception 
and his or her specific agenda shape the character of the news. The resulting news is 
then filtered again in the editing process. Thus, news value is not an inherent 
characteristic of events and news items. It is rather determined by the news production 
and institutional practices (Eaman, 1987).  
 
Before the interviews, I also consulted the 2007 edition of KBS‟s production guidelines. 
I found only one paragraph
38
 that deals with news coverage relating to non-nationals 
and foreign countries in a way that is useful for this research. KBS has an informal 
culture and the majority of the guidelines and regulations are implicit. This explains 
why I found only one paragraph addressing this specific issue. The lack of explicit 
guidelines has granted producers and employees greater creative influence when 
making decisions about the contents of the news. This also means that the results of the 
interviews that I have conducted with news reporters and news makers become a key 
reference in trying to establish why they have opted to produce those specific news 
items.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to try to understand the choices that were made by news 
reporters when producing news that was related to ethnic minorities in the Korean 
society. This was done by interviewing ten reporters who are currently working inside 
KBS; the results were then used to reveal their ideas about cultural diversity, foreigners 
and ethnic minorities. All reporters that were chosen had covered news stories related 
to foreigners at least twice between 1
st
 January 2004 and 31
st
 December 2008; 
differences in workplace, gender, age, experience and position were taken into account. 
The interviews were conducted between 5
th
 December 2009 and 14
th
 January 2010.  
 
Nine out of the ten interviewees were university graduates and one held a Master‟s 
degree. Seven majored in communications, media or journalism and another three 
studied social sciences, such as sociology or economics. Like other broadcasters, KBS 
                                                         
38
 <Chapter 1 - 5. (5)> Foreigners: ... the human rights of foreigners are to be respected and 
discrimination should not be supported. We should be careful to not make the people and their children 
who have received Korean nationality through marriage objects of ridicule or curiosity. We have to put 
effort into encouraging mutual understanding and cultural adaptation (p. 25). 
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also has its own employment exam. The majority of successful candidates hold degrees 
from prestigious universities and high Test of English for International Communication 
(TOEIC) scores, as set by ETS (Educational Testing Service) in the United States.  
KBS selectively employ professional journalists specialising in certain fields, such as 
law and medicine. However, most journalists rotate between different desks for a 
certain period, including police reporting to social, political, economic desks, and 
therefore gain diverse experience. Therefore, the ten interviewees were not specialised 
journalists on issues of multiculturalism, migration or ethnic minorities, but most of 
them had experience in reporting related issues while working in the social affairs desk. 
 
 
Table 7.1. Interview Participants 
Name Gender Workplace Position at KBS Experience 
Interview 
date 
S. Choi F KBS Jinju Reporter 4 years 05/12/2009 
J. Ji M KBS 
Suncheon 
Reporter 4 years 07/12/2009 
B. Im M KBS 
Gwangju 
Senior Reporter & 
Documentary 
Director 
13 years 07/12/2009 
K. Kim F KBS Ulsan Reporter 7 years 08/12/2009 
J. Kim F KBS Seoul Reporter 7 years 10/12/2009 
S. Lee M KBS Seoul Chief & Editing 
Reporter 
16 years 11/12/2009 
H. Lee F KBS 
ChunCheon 
Reporter 7 years 12/12/2009 
J. Sun F KBS Seoul Senior Reporter & 
Current Affair 
Director 
14 years 14/12/2009 
W. Kong M KBS Busan Reporter 5 years 21/12/2009 
J. Yoon F KBS Seoul Reporter 9 years 14/01/2010 
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In this chapter, the interviews are analysed within five thematic levels following 
Shoemaker and Vos‟s (2009) classification: the individual level, the routines or 
practices of communication work level, the organisational level, the social institutional 
level, and the social system level. This is an essential research process in order to 
understand the news makers‟ personal attitudes and the news-making process inside 
KBS, as well as how the general consensus, emotions or ideologies of the Korean 
population or political/economic power affect news making. These different levels are 
discussed in detail below. 
 
 
7.2. The Individual Level of News Makers 
 
Although the declared purpose of the news is to reflect the general interests of a society, 
the news is not a mirror of reality because the reporters‟ personal points of view can 
distort the contents (Tuchman, 1978; van Dijk, 1988; Schudson, 2003). It is a 
representation of the world, and all representations are selective (Husband and 
Downing, 2005). This means that some human beings must do the selecting; certain 
people make decisions about what to present as news and how to present it (Schudson, 
2003). The Washington Post columnist David Broder writes that „the process of 
selecting what the reader reads involves not just objective facts but subjective 
judgements, personal values and prejudices‟ (Schudson, 2003: 33). Therefore, 
understanding the concept or value, stereotypes towards a certain group or issue at the 
individual level of KBS journalists has important significance as it is closely linked to 
the tendency and direction of the news content. 
 
 
7.2.1. Internalised Racial Hierarchy 
 
As discussed in the section above, ethnocentrism functions as a reference point to 
classify Us and Others in news production. As seen in the textual analysis chapters, 
interestingly not all non-nationals are represented as Others. This includes the racial 
hierarchy that is prevalent in wider Korean society and can be confirmed in the content 
of the interviews. KBS reporters adopted just as easily the discriminating perceptions 
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that are rampant in Korean society and easily make a distinction between White and 
non-White people. The majority of them insisted that news becomes more „vivid‟, 
„dynamic‟, „high-quality‟ and „elegant‟ when interviewing White people.  
 
For example, if some interviews are needed to describe cold weather, 
interviews with Whites tend to make the report more vivid. So I have 
sometimes interviewed Whites because their different viewpoints often 
make my news reports dynamic. (J. Kim) 
 
 
I guess that I prefer interviews with Whites to others. I think I choose 
Whites as interviewees who look intelligent. Well, due to their gentleness 
or kindness? I believe other Koreans also consider them as I do. In my 
case, I would prefer to interview a gentle White person in his 50s because I 
may think he can raise the quality of my report with a sort of elegant 
feeling. (Sun) 
 
It is also discovered that the KBS reporters pose different questions when interviewing 
White and non-White interviewees. This is part of their practice of choosing to cover 
different news items depending on whether the people involved are Whites or non-
Whites. They choose non-Korean interviewees according to skin colour depending on 
what type of opinion they would like to receive. If they want to cover a casual and light 
topic, such as traditional Korean culture, or they want to show society in a positive light 
they choose to get the opinion of a White person. If they want to hear how difficult and 
hard life in Korea is or they want to tackle more serious and controversial topics like 
discrimination, on the other hand, they will choose to interview someone non-White. 
The questions posed will be directed to obtain the answers that the reporters wanted to 
have beforehand and this method is an integral part of setting the mood of the news that 
will be aired.  
 
First and foremost, I have a premise that White people may come from 
developed countries. Based on the prejudice or premise, I usually ask their 
opinions, for example, about cultural phenomena. Interview subjects are 
also obviously different. When I interview non-White migrant workers 
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who are in difficulties in Korea, I ask them to talk about their difficulties 
or opinions about the structural problems in Korean society. (Yoon) 
 
These are just some examples of stereotypes of White people. This attitude reflects 
upon the news and is also a general tendency of representation in Korean PSB. The 
reporters interviewed had an obvious tendency to favour White people.  
 
 
7.2.2. Can You Speak English? Otherwise Just Speak Korean 
 
KBS journalists‟ tendency towards favouring Caucasians is reflected in the news 
preference, and this news text can be used as a tool to highlight the reproduction of 
other racial preferences. The racial preference of KBS journalists has an impact on 
linguistic limitations and access due to internalised racial stereotypes. That is, due to 
the limitations in the linguistic skills of the reporters, foreigners were interviewed in 
either Korean or English because they assumed that White people naturally speak 
English. On the other hand, they do have prejudices against Arabs, Indians or any other 
non-Whites who are regarded as not being able to speak English; this is why they prefer 
interviewing White people.  
 
There were thousands of foreign customers who entered Korea to 
supervise the shipbuilding process of Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. They 
held end of year parties annually. If I had to interview participants in the 
party, I preferred Whites from the English-speaking world because I 
thought they were more appropriate for the atmosphere. Of course, there 
were also a lot of Arabs and Indians but I hesitated to select them as 
interviewees in comparison with White people. (K. Kim) 
 
The reporters‟ biased view towards White and non-White people influenced the choice 
of language in which they conducted the interviews. In the case of White people, the 
interviewees were mostly regarded as tourists or professionals and the interviews were 
usually conducted in English on the assumption that the person being interviewed could 
not speak Korean. When interviews were being conducted with non-White people, on 
the other hand, especially migrant workers or married migrant women who had 
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emigrated from Southeast Asia, the interviewers conducted the interviews in Korean. 
Their interviewees often did not speak the language all that well in order to give the 
audience an impression of „friendliness‟ and „closeness‟. This was done on the 
assumption that „they‟ (non-Whites) had to assimilate into Korean society and therefore 
must learn Korean.  
 
 
First, they (Asian migrant workers and married migrant women) are 
considered as those who should deservedly adapt themselves to Korea … 
When a reporter faces a White person, he/she may assume that the 
interviewee can speak English. But in the case of non-White people, the 
assumption can be different. (Choi) 
 
Even if foreign migrant brides speak in poor Korean, the scene can move 
viewers: „Ah! They are desperately making efforts to become Korean.‟ 
(Sun) 
 
When we interview Southeast Asian people, they want to learn Korean 
with enthusiasm and we also want to teach them with good will. So, for 
them, the interview is a sort of opportunity by which they can learn 
Korean or Korean culture. They may try to speak Korean, and we think the 
interview atmosphere will be better with their words in Korean. But White 
people are supposed to be unable to speak Korean, naturally, so we do not 
ask them in Korean. (Kong) 
 
Summarising the interview content, most White people are not regarded as migrants and, 
as they can barely speak Korean because they have not lived in Korea for a long time, 
most people assume that they can only speak English. On the other hand, non-White 
people, treated as migrant workers or married migrant women, try to learn Korean 
because they will stay in Korea for a long time, and many believe that they should do 
so. However, one important fact is being forgotten here. According to the government 
announcement made in December 2008, the amount of non-nationals in Korea whose 
purpose is to live in Korea instead of travelling shows that Americans are the second 
biggest group (117,986), after Chinese, which adds up to approximately 170,000 when 
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including migrants from the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Australia, Germany and 
Russia, generally known as White centralised countries (KNSO, 2009). Most of them 
work as English tutors in educational institutes in Korea following the English 
education syndrome which originated in the 1990s. In short, the Korean perception of 
Whites being tourists rather than migrants is no longer based on reality. Thus, the 
interview approach of KBS reporters can be seen more as being based on personal 
stereotype about race rather than anything else. 
 
An important issue, however, is the negative stereotype about ethnic minorities that the 
news media have created. In the past few years, migrant workers from Southeast Asia 
have been ridiculed because of their pronunciation of the Korean language, which has 
become the butt of many jokes as well as a target for ridicule and sometimes a 
downright hostile attitude towards them. Recently stories that are meant to generate 
empathy towards ethnic minorities have become part of the South Korean news. These 
stories are often presented in such a way that they become nothing more than 
caricatures specifically designed to generate sympathy often because of the 
pronunciation of the migrants. This practice may result in the fact that ethnic minorities 
are separated and ghettoised from the general society of Korea. Both the public as well 
as the political parties regard them as nothing more than a „special‟ object which results 
in a lack of representation of their opinions in both the news and political decisions. 
The feeling of their Otherness will become even stronger in the long term. Public 
service broadcasters are sensitive towards the opinions of people and the current 
political climate because they are a social communication medium. There is a need for 
people to become more critical towards these kinds of topic. The focus of these 
interviews needs to be expanded and the reporters and KBS‟s willingness to cover news 
stories of a different and higher calibre needs to grow. This way the quality of the news 
will increase and create a culture that is more accepting of differences. 
 
 
7.2.3. The Compassionate Professional 
 
One of the major themes of news coverage that features ethnic minorities that KBS 
reporters have covered was „ethnic minorities under poor conditions‟. This kind of 
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news is limited to one-time reports when an incident happened, and is less in-depth than 
the actual or planned news coverage. Moreover, the simplified account of the incident 
might easily lead to a misinterpretation of the facts as well. The reporters that had 
covered such news items easily remembered them and wanted to help the 
underprivileged foreigners whose grave conditions they had exposed. And they often 
said that they were ashamed on behalf of the whole South Korean community, who 
they felt had abandoned these migrants. Evidence shows that the reporters‟ emotions, 
which were often founded on very few actual facts, had the tendency to influence the 
news broadcasts. The same situation can be easily presented in either a negative or 
positive light depending upon the reporter‟s intentions.  
 
A Filipino woman divorced from her husband, and her child entered an 
elementary school. But due to the child‟s black face, the child has been 
maliciously alienated from fellow classmates. Since the mother was the 
only provider of the family, the home was poor. So, from the bottom of my 
heart, I wanted to help them escape their extreme poverty. (J. Kim) 
 
It was the year 2007. At that time, the story of the Yeo-su Immigration 
Detention Centre was prominent. This was an office that arrested illegal 
migrants before being deported from Korea. One day, a fire broke out 
there killing about ten and injuring many more. It was a tragic accident. A 
real tragedy ... I think it was a great shame on Korea. (Im) 
 
Television news coverage links the report to strong visual images and sound effects, 
which have the ability to make a far more lasting and stronger impact than the same 
contents in a newspaper would (Campbell, 1995). This is the reason why the reporters‟ 
personal opinions can sometimes construct a whole new social reality (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). Therefore, the sympathy of KBS reporters towards ethnic minorities 
can be shown directly or indirectly through the news, and in this way their bias towards 
ethnic minorities can be reproduced.  
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7.3. The Routines of Communication Work 
 
The role of the news media in the system of racial discrimination is not limited to news 
reports or editorials, but already begins with routines of news making (Tuchman, 1978; 
van Dijk, 1988). Routines in the process of news production are defined as „patterned, 
routinised, repeated practices and forms that media workers use to do their job‟ 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 105). These routines are developed as a way to minimise 
the organisational risk of being involved in a libel suit and to protect individual 
communication workers from criticism by their peers at an organisational level 
(Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). Moreover, these critically influence decisions for major 
news items and the formula for such news reports among news makers and gatekeepers 
at an individual level (Hirsch, 1977). Therefore, understanding routines in the process 
of news production is crucial in connecting individual level and organisational level 
functions, as well as analysing a definitive form of news representation (Shoemaker and 
Vos, 2009).  
 
 
7.3.1. Formula for Making Ethnic Minority News 
 
Every KBS reporter that I interviewed has covered at least two news reports relating to 
ethnic minorities and had interviewed non-nationals in the past, including Whites. They 
recalled the news items that they had covered as being limited to mainly two subjects: 
the first being about ethnic minorities participating in traditional Korean holidays and 
the second being about ethnic minorities suffering from poor conditions. The first case 
consisted of nearly identical news items that were repeated during holidays such as 
Ch’usŏk (Korean Thanksgiving Day) or Seol (Lunar New Year‟s Day). These news 
items are generally called „The Calendar News‟ by Korean reporters.  
 
Most news reports feature holiday experiences of married migrant women 
during traditional holidays. (K. Kim) 
 
I have dealt several times with foreign daughters-in-law during traditional 
holidays. (Kong) 
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As known from the textual analysis chapters, ethnic minorities who appeared in those 
news items were mainly migrant workers who had joined in celebrating the Korean 
holidays or married migrant women (usually described as a „foreign daughter-in-law‟ in 
the KBS news reports) who were preparing holiday meals for their family. Ethnic 
minorities are featured only within this context in the news and are otherwise absent. 
They are being objectified in this way and the news often presents their view of Korean 
culture as „positive‟, „they are also enjoying the holidays‟ and „they are adapting to 
Korean culture‟. This is because KBS reporters understand that such news stories fit 
right into the holiday atmosphere. 
 
In the Korean society, there are common thoughts that foreigners may 
experience difficulties in adapting themselves to Korean culture during 
traditional holidays such as Ch’usŏk or Seol. Reporters tend to focus on 
the positive aspect that foreigners really enjoy Korean culture. For 
example, in reports, it is often shown that foreign daughters-in-law go to 
markets and prepare food. (Choi) 
 
There are only two cases of when we highlight migrant workers. First, we 
make them simple participants in traditional holidays to emphasise that 
they also enjoy holidays like us. Such an aspect is used in news reports 
related to migrant workers. In the report, they say „we also love Ch’usŏk‟, 
or we say „migrant workers also enjoy the holiday‟. I have those 
experiences. (J. Kim) 
 
In this case, why is it that this kind of news is being reproduced every year? Most 
reporters explained that it is a kind of „routine‟. Every year it is repeated over again 
because of this reason. Routines play no small role in that accomplishment. News 
organisations and news makers are faced with an overwhelming stream of events and 
information that must be culled and crafted into news.  
 
I think it is just a routine. It is customary to show various groups. (Yoon) 
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The fact that they referred to it as a routine means that this kind of news broadcasting is 
deeply rooted within KBS‟s culture and news-making process. This is because routines 
economise effort in the mass news-making process (Shoemaker, 1997). As the Glasgow 
Media Group (1978) argues, however, routine news practices lead to bad news. 
According to Golding (1981), routines simplify the task of news judgement – events 
that are more easily accessible, „manageable technically‟ or „ready prepared for easy 
coverage‟ than others will routinely be told as news stories (1981: 75). Tuchman (1997: 
188) notes that typifications are used to „decrease the variability of events as the raw 
material processed by newsmen and news organisations‟. Or journalists, in a similar 
way, use „frames‟ as an efficient way to „process large amounts of information quickly 
and routinely‟ (Gitlin, 1980: 7). Television news, in particular, has more dependency on 
planned issues due to the limitations of the production technology, mainly its mobility. 
 
For instance, in Ch’usŏk, reporters tend to show scenes of a traditional 
Korean village, traditional Korean-style houses and people of Ansan 
(migrant workers). That is a sort of fixed frame that reporters hold. Those 
scenes are reported to emphasise that Ch’usŏk is a national holiday which 
all Koreans, even foreigners, enjoy. (J. Kim) 
 
It would have been difficult to repeat this type of news every year if the audience‟s 
reaction was negative towards it or if it suffered from criticism for being unbeneficial to 
society. According to the journalists, the responses have mostly been positive towards 
such news items and the reporters themselves think that such news is funny. This 
illustrates that KBS reporters have internalised the dominant discourse around 
multicultural society and the reporters have agreed that the use of this term is limited 
and is generally only used during these specific occasions. The reporters‟ way of 
thinking naturally does not differ that much from the general consensus. The news that 
the reporters have the tendency to describe as „funny‟ includes allusions to aliens who 
are unfamiliar with Korean culture, married migrant women who can barely cook 
Korean food and migrant workers who have barely mastered traditional Korean games 
such as Jegi-Chagi
39
 and Tuho.
40
 
                                                         
39
 Jegi-Chagi: The purpose of this game is to try to keep a shuttlecock in the air as long as possible by 
kicking it up in the air with one‟s feet. 
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Since viewers find it funny that foreigners with blue eyes or black faces 
also enjoy our traditional holidays, such items are often chosen as news 
items. And such news reports have relatively higher audience rates. 
Therefore, annually, reporters suggest those items, and then the editorial 
staffs permit them. This is the regular process. (S. Lee) 
 
It is not funny for viewers to watch only Korean people on television 
during traditional holidays. The people want to see foreigners enjoying the 
holidays together. Then, even if we intended to interview only two 
Koreans, we can interview foreign children playing the traditional „Tuho 
game‟ in order to get a sentence from them that it is interesting, to make 
the report colourful. (Kong) 
 
These routine customs seem critically focused on ethnic minorities who remain in 
Korea and it seems that this is so because the news makers are of the opinion that 
Koreans should be interested in them. They are usually shown making and eating 
Korean dishes and playing traditional Korean games during Korean holidays. It appears 
that this type of news is interesting for Koreans. Reportages about Them who are 
enjoying „Our festival‟ are often there for the purpose of self-satisfaction for Korean 
news audiences and will reinforce the Otherness of ethnic minorities, even though these 
kinds of news give ethnic minorities the opportunity to be featured in the limelight. In 
other words, news which shows foreigners enjoying Korean culture during the holiday 
season is a sort of seasonal item for the amusement of Korean audiences; I would 
define it as being mainly „holiday entertainment‟. 
 
It is a kind of routine only for our satisfaction, not for them. It appears to 
be based on our self-satisfaction that we pursue diversity. (K. Kim) 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
40
 Tuho: This game is similar to darts and is played by competing teams. The main difference between 
Tuho and darts is that the target is laid down upon the ground instead of set upright. 
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7.3.2. Limited Application of the Term Multiculturalism 
 
What do the terms „multiculturalism‟ and „cultural diversity‟ mean to KBS reporters 
individually? How is it understood within the Korean public media productions and 
how is it used routinely in the news? Through conducting the interviews, it was 
discovered that, when describing non-nationals who had immigrated or were living in 
Korea, the terms „multicultural society‟ or „multicultural family‟, which are frequently 
used in the discourses in Korea, actually carry a very limited meaning. A new term 
should be considered since the Western counterpart does not specifically refer to a 
certain ethnic group, whereas the South Korean use of the term does. 
 
I made two observations concerning the usage of the term „multicultural‟. Firstly, the 
reporters considered the term „multicultural‟ to be designated to foreigners of non-
Korean origin, particularly non-White non-nationals and their cultures. Secondly, they 
perceived it as a „different‟ or „other culture‟ situated within the Korean culture; the 
term carried a „positive‟ and „objective‟ meaning to them. This point of view was to be 
expected because it could also be seen within the news items that the reporters had 
created.  
 
I think that the word „multicultural‟ is based on the premise of different 
nationalities or cultures of various foreigners. Other cultures, different 
from Korean culture … (Yoon) 
 
With a growing number of married migrant women, many foreigners who 
are not White people or Westerners have entered Korea. In this situation, I 
think the words multicultural and multicultural society are used as 
objective as well as positive terms by the news media. (H. Lee) 
 
As seen in the interview content, the terminology of „multiculturalism‟ is perceived by 
KBS journalists to be highly limited and reflects the results of the news textual analysis 
in the previous chapter. This showed that terminologies such as „multicultural‟ and 
„cultural diversity‟ are restrictively used in reference to Southeast Asian married 
migrant women and their families. It is also observed that the usage of the term 
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„multicultural family‟ was still generally limited to a family living in the countryside of 
which at least one member had married a female migrant from Southeast Asia such as 
Vietnam and Cambodia. Although its usage should have extended to include a family 
that includes at least one male migrant worker who had recently married a Korean 
woman, the term „multicultural family‟ is still very limited in use. 
 
Since Korean men in rural farming regions find it difficult to marry 
Korean women, they try to marry foreign women. Then, they form 
families with their children in local communities. This is the common 
understanding of multicultural family in Korean society. (Sun) 
 
In this sense, the term „multicultural family‟ is not a term focusing on „cultural diversity‟ 
but on specific space, a „rural area‟, and the „Korean male resident of a rural area 
married to a foreign women‟, as „lower class‟ and outside Korean mainstream society. 
 
Few reporters recognise the uniqueness of this phenomenon in society, which is very 
different from the multicultural society formulation process that has happened in 
Western societies. In this case, the term „multicultural‟ in Korean society is understood 
by KBS journalists as a concept which is used to lessen the serious discrimination 
towards migrants of specific nationalities – migrant workers or married migrant women 
from Southeast Asia. 
 
The term multicultural society was introduced as migrant workers and 
brides from Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam entered Korea. So, 
the term appears to have a concept different from that in Western societies 
such as Europe. In Korea, the word was introduced due to Koreans‟ severe 
discrimination against those foreigners, aiming at relieving the 
discrimination. (Kong) 
 
However, as known from the textual analysis, a very important fact that cannot be 
overlooked is that the term „multicultural‟ is being used not to explain a phenomenon in 
Korean society objectively, but to be a means of dividing the society in two: Us and 
Them, and is not an indication of events currently happening in South Korea. That is, 
the terminology of „multicultural‟ or „cultural diversity‟ is used to define Others who 
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flow into Korean society and simplify a series of social phenomena occurring while 
they are living in society from the news makers‟ perspective. In this sense, as Wasburn 
(2002) argues, ethnocentrism, as one of the news-making decisions, uses arbitrary 
definitions of Others or other cultures as the abnormal, assuming that Our culture is 
most important, most valued and most powerful. As Hall (1997a) has phrased it, this 
means that the majority of society is aware that there are Others with „differences‟ 
present in the society and uses this knowledge as a means of strengthening a self-image.  
 
 
7.3.3. Standardisation of News Representation of Ethnic Minorities 
 
I looked at KBS reporters as being viewers of news relating to a multicultural society or 
ethnic minorities that had been made by KBS and not as producers. Overall it is argued 
that two polar opinions within the group existed: a negative attitude which limited the 
production of this type of news content and a positive attitude, especially compared to 
the general consensus in the past. Concerning the reporters that harboured negative 
opinions, it must be noted that the news that they presented about migrants was limited 
in both amount and scope. These limited frames have a negative effect upon the 
objectivity of the news because they allow the group to be easily represented in a 
certain way to suit an agenda and create a cultural bias toward them in this way. The 
specific approaches towards ethnic minorities that the reporters were recognised to have 
the most could be summarised as „sympathetic views‟, „warm hearted for them‟, 
„conflict between us and them‟. The two most featured types of news stories were those 
that were focused on the poor conditions of migrant wives and were presented with 
much sympathy and stories that focused on the social conflicts with migrant workers. I 
exposed the fact that news items that presented a sympathetic point of view were apt to 
have no follow-up items, due to this they were never discussed when a similar incident 
or event happened again. It was also pointed out that this type of story sends out the 
message „it is each individual‟s duty to help those people with their problems but not 
the societies as a whole‟, rather than trying to instigate a discussion in order to try to 
provide an institutional-level strategy to solve the problem. 
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Generally, there appears to be two major themes in news about ethnic 
minorities or the multicultural society: conflict and sympathy ... Conflict 
becomes news when ethnic minorities suffer severe racial discrimination 
or labour exploitation while sympathy becomes news when foreigners are 
chased by the Immigration Office or are in miserable conditions due to 
lack of social security. However, such news reports do not suggest 
solutions of providing more benefits or systematically changing things. 
The media only strategically and formally says that migrants are so poor 
that Koreans should support them personally, instead of arguing that we 
should institutionally change related public policies. That is all of the news 
reports about ethnic minorities. (Yoon) 
 
Most television programmes and news reports are warm-hearted towards 
them. For example, the KBS TV programme Love in Asia41 showed such 
warm stories of poor people so that we help them. And another famous TV 
programme Asia! Asia!42 is a case in point. Our news reports also have 
mainly focused on problems of migrant workers or mixed bloods suffering 
discrimination in school. So far, those subjects have been the main view 
point on them, I think. (S. Lee) 
 
On the other hand, opinions have come forward that the scope of the news relating to 
migrants has become broader and there is a stronger emphasis on positive news. With 
the increase of the percentage of ethnic minorities in society, reporters have become 
more observant of them and Korean society has become more accepting of foreigners, 
and because of this the general view of the future has become more positive as well. 
Some interviewees thought that KBS has started broadcasting more quality news about 
discrimination and about foreigners‟ real lives and their human rights during the last 
two or three years.  
                                                         
41
 A documentary-style television programme which began on 5
th
 November 2005 on KBS. It is aired 
once a week and has a 55-minute running time for one episode. The majority of them are based on the 
stories of multicultural families who stay in Korea, because of free speech they can talk about the 
difficulties that they have experienced during their stay in Korea. Also they often give married migrant 
women the chance to travel back to their motherland with their Korean family. 
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 A social campaign programme which was aired on MBC from 15
th
 February 2003 until 5
th
 November 
2007. It aired during a section of a programme called „The Exclamation Mark‟ and mainly featured 
interviews with migrant workers staying in Korea; they often invited their family from their motherland 
for a week in Korea. 
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I think there would be no notable gap between Korean society‟s level and 
Korean media‟s level. Ethnic minority groups are starting to speak with 
their own voices, as citizens rather than just poor people. There are a lot of 
ethnic minorities now. Korean society has begun to accept them as its 
regular members. This is why the upcoming stage is expected. (Kong) 
 
News subjects have varied in terms of their areas or contents … Recently 
there has been relatively various and quality reports upon them, dealing 
with their human rights or discrimination against them. (H. Lee) 
 
It will take time to reconcile the desirable direction and the current 
situation. Anyway, reports appear to be headed in a positive direction 
where Koreans and migrants share their ideas and understand each other. 
Things are changing gradually. (K. Kim) 
 
As can be found in the interview content, however, the positive direction that KBS 
journalists feel is somewhat relative compared to the past, and mainly comes from an 
individual perspective, therefore it is hard to say if it is an actual fact. Due to the 
positive direction of representation, what they say has been discussed in limited frames, 
as discussed in the next section. 
 
 
Limited frames in representing Others 
As has been previously mentioned, reporters have noticed themselves the limited 
amount of time and effort that they spend and the limited amount of coverage that news 
items produced concerning ethnic minorities receive on KBS. If they are aware of this 
situation then why do they continue to limit their reports in size and depth? The reasons 
for this are threefold. Firstly, the limited coverage may be the result of a lack of data. 
South Korea‟s first real migrant wave took place only around 2000. The fact that news 
stories containing nearly identical subjects and contents are being repeated might be 
because of the lack of news items and the fact that they are forced to cover social 
phenomena that they have never experienced before.  
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It is only recently that the concept of multicultural society has been 
introduced. For example, in comparison with France, where many Arabs 
live, Korea is just at an early stage so that there are no various sources. If I 
try to show a successful foreign migrant, it is hard to find an appropriate 
case. There are insufficient sources. (J. Kim) 
 
Secondly, the cause might be the working routines and priorities. KBS‟s reporters are 
used to focusing on daily events and incidents of a fleeting nature and have developed a 
shrunken timeframe because of this. Often they have to cover the incident the very 
same day that it occurs. These working conditions do not allow the reporters the time 
that is necessary for a long-term, in-depth investigation. The breakneck speed at which 
they have to work contains the danger of superficial and possibly distorted coverage.  
 
If an accident or event takes place, reporters start to concentrate on that. 
So, since they have to take care of current accidents or events, they have 
no real room for designing other reports, actually. (Ji) 
 
Reporters are people who have no choice but to find new items every day. 
But it is difficult for them to always produce new, fresh ideas. In the 
process, customarily, officials at the head office sometimes give items 
related to the issues to reporters, being reminded of their previous items 
that are not new but familiar because they had been dealt with before. (Im) 
 
Finally, there is sometimes the opinion that this is because KBS reporters lack a 
personal interest in these cases. KBS reporters often belong to the upper class of 
Korean society in terms of influence and often they might not have real interest in the 
more vulnerable individuals in society, such as migrant workers, migrant wives and 
mixed-heritage people. The distance of their realities to those of migrants sometimes 
makes empathy less likely and stereotypes are common repertoires they draw from. 
 
It is not a matter of structure but of the personal limit of each reporter 
because they are also members of Korean society. They cannot be free 
from the viewpoint most Koreans have. KBS news reporters already have 
socially vested rights. Therefore, it is easy for them to ignore minorities in 
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society and belittle their problems. Those reporters tend to be recognised 
and receive wages higher than the average wage. So, if they do not 
intentionally pay attention to multicultural issues and they have no 
personal experience or interest, it is easy for them to become far from the 
issues. No interest, no sight. (Yoon) 
 
The social circumstances that translate into a demand for this particular type of news 
encourage its production. In those cases when KBS produced news with a different 
point of view they were pressured to return back to the previous situation in order to 
appease the public which in general has a negative opinion about migrants. This is the 
reason why the news stories concerning foreigners that are produced are generally in 
line with the public opinion.  
 
 
7.4. The Organisational Level of News Production  
 
It is essential in studying the news-making process to focus on the organisational level 
(Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). This is because, „although individuals and routines 
generally determine what gets past the gate and how it is presented, the organisations 
hire the gatekeepers and make the rules‟ (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009: 62). Chomsky‟s 
(2006) research of mid-20
th
 century memos between the publisher and editor of The 
New York Times shows that the organisation explicitly intervened with news content on 
a routine basis. Donohew (1967) also found a high correlation between the publisher‟s 
attitude and newspaper content and concluded that „publisher attitude appeared to hold 
up as the greatest single “force” operating within the news channel‟ (1967: 67). 
Regarding the organisational level, this research will try to determine the attitude that 
KBS as PSB maintains in the representations of non-nationals and ethnic minorities. 
This research is also going to explore the influence of the upper management and the 
government upon the news content about ethnic minorities. Their influence can be 
either explicit or implicit or even hidden from the rest of the employees. The influence 
of the desk and guidelines within the group will be examined as well.  
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7.4.1. The High Value of the White Interviewee  
 
The majority of the KBS reporters that I interviewed stated that news relating to 
foreigners – this specifically means news items covering White people to the KBS 
reporters in this chapter – has a high value because of its uniqueness. High news value 
can be interpreted in more than one way. First of all, it can be interpreted as being of 
high value because White non-nationals have a „special‟ status in South Korea. As I 
stated earlier, news about ethnic minorities does exist in Korea but they are presented in 
it as being „not ordinary‟, Other, and about „someone who is different from Koreans‟.  
 
I think White non-nationals apparently have higher news values than 
Koreans to some extent. I believe most reporters may think so. If a 
reporter is willing to interview Whites and is capable of it, he appears to be 
evaluated highly. (Ji) 
 
Secondly, they can be used as a means of putting South Korea in the spotlight. In this 
case, interviews with non-nationals are used in such a way as to reinforce the ideas that 
are being presented in the main article, which deals with South Korea rather than 
focusing on the non-nationals themselves as human individuals with a multi-level 
existence. In this case they just figure as a „funny‟, „novelty‟ or „special‟ elements. This 
issue will be explored in more detail later. 
 
If I interviewed foreigners in the street, for example, the interview can 
give editorial staff the image that the reporter made efforts for the report. It 
was effective especially when the interview was unusual or made Korea 
look better. (S. Lee) 
 
It is thought that the amount of improvement in the value of the news is judged by 
looking at the audience‟s reaction. How desk and chief executives view news items 
relating to foreigners has a tremendous impact upon the reporters‟ decisions. It is 
evident that the show desk‟s decisions and atmosphere within the group play a central 
role when the value of the news is judged and not the reporter‟s personal interest in 
ethnic minorities. During the course of the interview it became evident that recently this 
specific type of news has become an important part of the station‟s main strategy. The 
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reason for this is that KBS has become aware of the fact that social and political interest 
in such news items is increasing and that the public has developed an interest in them, 
which is something that did not exist in the past. This is clearly illustrated by the fact 
that foreigners are being introduced by their previous foreign name when featured in 
the news even though they have already been naturalised and have adopted a Korean 
name.  
 
I once interviewed a person who was naturalised as a Korean citizen. So, 
he has a Korean name so that I wrote his name in Korean. But, from the 
view point of the desk, it was impossible for Korean readers to know 
whether or not he is a pure Korean or a naturalised Korean citizen. 
Therefore, my boss ordered me to write his foreign name. (Choi) 
 
Around the time I reported the news story, there was a growing concern 
that Korean society should sympathise with migrant women who married 
Korean men because their children will play leading roles in Korea due to 
its suffering from a low birth rate. Based on this sympathy, most news 
items related to the issue were reported on News 9. Items about foreign 
brides usually came out in News 9, indeed. The chief executives appeared 
to understand the importance of those items as new issues. (Sun) 
 
 
7.4.2. The Guidelines for News on Ethnic Minorities 
 
As I have already mentioned previously, within the KBS group there exists a specific 
approach towards reporting on foreigners and especially ethnic minorities which is 
embedded within KBS‟s system and culture. In connection with this issue, I wish to 
investigate deeper the emotional motivations that are hidden in the institutional 
dimension. This is done by first asking the reporters about whether or not KBS has any 
specific guidelines or formal regulations about news reports dealing with multicultural 
issues or ethnic minorities. Ten reporters in total replied that they were uncertain about 
whether or not such guidelines existed. This lack of knowledge regarding this is to be 
expected given their lack of any instructions or education about such rules. Overall they 
thought that such regulations didn‟t exist. It can be concluded that the point of view 
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KBS presents when broadcasting news about ethnic minorities depends mostly upon the 
reporters‟ personal opinions.  
 
No official guidelines for news reports exist reportedly. No special 
directions … (J. Kim) 
 
I do not know where it is. I guess it is quite possible that there are words of 
non-discrimination against foreigners in the code of ethics or the code of 
news report. However, I cannot remember. I have no recognition of it. I 
believe detailed guidelines depend on each reporter‟s view point. (Kong) 
 
The Korean Broadcasting Act, which should be upheld by all broadcasting stations, 
includes features in a similar passage (Act No. 8568. 27
th
 July 2007). The passage deals 
with non-nationals and minority groups specifically, which is mentioned in one 
sentence: 
 
<Chapter I – Article 6. (Impartiality and Public Interest Nature of 
Broadcasting)>: 
… 
(2) A broadcast shall not be discriminatory in programming on account of 
gender, age, occupation, religion, belief, class, region, race, etc.: Provided 
that this shall not apply in case where a broadcasting business operator 
engaged in a specialised programming with respect to a missionary work 
of religion within the limit of a relevant broadcast field. 
… 
(5) A broadcast shall strive to faithfully reflect the interests of the groups 
or classes that are relatively small in number or at a disadvantage in 
realisation of the pursuit of their interests. 
 
This regulation, however, is only understood from an ideal perspective; in reality there 
have not been any actual discussions on how to apply this in a practical way. As a result, 
KBS journalists are not aware of the existence of such a regulation at all. Even if they 
acknowledge it, it is very difficult to maintain consistent reporting attitudes in a 
situation with an absence of concrete and practical schemes. 
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7.4.3. Limitation to Reporting Issues about Ethnic Minorities 
 
The problems caused by the increase in interest in such issues and the absence of a 
policy can be rephrased as the problem of KBS reporters struggling with an internal 
conflict. They are feeling torn apart between two different perceptions, which are listed 
below.  
  
Only one time: Curiosity broadcasts  
The majority of KBS reporters pointed out that news concerning a multicultural society 
or ethnic minorities is still being aired as one-time content and this is a critical point. 
This tendency is the result of the fact that KBS does not have professional reporters that 
are stationed in other countries and it does not employ any foreigners or people that are 
members of ethnic minorities. The majority of their time and effort is spent on daily 
updates on the state of politics, economy and culture. In this situation, news relating to 
ethnic minorities is limited to the holiday seasons when there is less political news to 
report and more incidents involving them tend to occur. It is the custom in Korea to 
degrade ethnic minorities for personal amusement and give people the impression that 
they occupy a special position since they usually appear during special events.  
 
Every reporter is in the same situation. They are interested in foreigners 
only when they are faced with special events. Reporters just explain 
foreigners‟ lives during Korean traditional festival season, showing that 
they make Korean rice cakes, pan-fried Jeons (Korean style pizza), and so 
on. And if an incident breaks out, it just comes out in reports. Those 
reports end up in single shots, regrettably. (Ji) 
 
 
KBS does not recognise migrants as members of society 
The majority of the employees in KBS did not perceive ethnic minorities residing in 
South-Korea as a significant social issue. Less attention is spent on migrants at the 
headquarters of KBS in Seoul because they have less chance of contact with ethnic 
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minorities than the local departments do. This may be seen as a form of discrimination 
and their existence is a serious problem; eliminating them from the media is a form of 
ignoring the issue. KBS reporters think in the same way about foreigners as most 
Koreans do and this influences the news content. 
 
 
The deep-rooted discrimination against other Asian people not only exists 
in KBS but also prevails in Korea. The prejudice seems to influence news 
values to some extent. (K. Kim) 
 
I believe if we recognise ethnic minorities as official members in Korean 
society, we should report them sympathetically and stipulate how we 
report on the multicultural society, migrant workers or Korean citizens by 
naturalisation. So far, however, there has not been such an atmosphere 
when they are sincerely accepted as official members in Korean society. 
(Yoon) 
 
In the end the two elements mentioned before are an example of circular reasoning. 
KBS reporters are not immune to the prejudice and indifference towards ethnic 
minorities that Koreans in general have. This in turn leads them to produce news items 
that only cover incidents that have just transpired. People that watch the news in turn 
internalise the image of foreigners that is presented thus reinforcing it and making sure 
that it continues existing within Korean society. 
 
 
7.5. The Social Institution Level 
 
Although it is true that news making is processed through communication organisations 
and its news makers, from a social structural perspective, communication organisations 
belong to a social system alongside other social institutions. Therefore, social 
institutions in a social structure directly or indirectly influence each other (Shoemaker 
and Vos, 2009). Shoemaker and Vos (2009) maintain that social institutions that 
influence the news-making process include „markets‟, „audiences‟, „advertisers‟, 
„financial markets‟, „government‟, „interest groups‟ and „other media‟ among others. 
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Here „governmental politics‟ and „audiences‟ will be analysed, as these were selected as 
the most critical factors among KBS journalists. 
 
 
7.5.1. Governmental Politics in the Representation of Ethnic Minorities 
 
Although markets are often seen as the most appropriate means of regulating the mass 
media, the government nevertheless influences gatekeeping in the news-making process 
(Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). Political power, media intervention and numerous 
historical events produce consequences which have been revealed in a number of media 
and communication studies and remain one of the most revealing research topics today. 
Despite the numerous references to this topic, the most simple and salient political 
rhetoric shows how political power attempts to control the mass media by managing the 
flow of information as „control of information is central to power‟ (River, 1965: 129). It 
is discussed in the previous theoretical review chapter that Korean PSB has conformed 
and adapted to changes and flows of power, and is therefore not free from 
governmental power. What importance do issues relating to multicultural society or 
ethnic minorities carry within the social institutional dimension of KBS? It is true that 
if the issue is prone to being influenced by the government or the chief of the group 
then policy and politics will be capable of easily swaying it. This kind of influence is 
reflected more in the informal culture of the company than in the formal processes and 
documents. Thus, the personal experiences and emotions of the reporter carry more 
weight than the data when it comes down to the final shape and content of the news. 
This was acknowledged by the majority of the interviewees; they acknowledged that 
they had been influenced by the governmental changes. The remainder of the 
interviewees downplayed the impact of any political pressures. 
 
Under the power of government 
There were not many reporters who responded to the questions about the influence of 
the government on ethnic minorities or multiculturalism related news. Many reporters 
answered that, whilst these types of news items are influenced, the influence is minor 
and indirect. The main reason the reporters have been granted so much influence is 
because the general consensus seems to be that issues concerning migrant workers, 
223 
 
migrant wives and racially mixed people are not politically sensitive issues at the 
moment. Currently both the progressive and conservative parties are under the 
impression that the number of ethnic minorities in Korea is still so small that their 
presence is of little importance. They do recognise that migrants live miserably and 
need some help. The fact is that news items covering issues concerning them are treated 
as soft news and are often devoid of political issues, which is in tune with the political 
climate in South Korea. Occasionally this particular brand of news has been known to 
be used to pacify politically sensitive agendas. 
 
Those causes can have a little influence over such reports. For example, I 
made a report about the issue last year but it has not been aired since the 
foundation of the Lee administration. There was influence. (Choi) 
 
There is a possible influence even if it is just little. It seems to be a little 
influence. It is possible. (J. Kim) 
 
Government policy, however, can steer the news intentionally or unintentionally in a 
certain direction. Government and government instances depend upon the information 
supplied to them by news reporters – even if the information is limited in scope and 
amount – for their decision making. Their dependence in turn reinforces and enlarges 
unjustly the influence of the news presented. Assuming that KBS‟s reporters have 
similar customs to reporters in Korea in general, when the government presents reports 
they will immediately submit it for publication without first checking the facts stated. 
This is due to their lack of time and because there is severe competition within this 
sector. In the case of migrants in Korea, the theme of and the point of view presented in 
the article can be altered by reporting the data that the government has released. This 
cannot be done if in-depth analysis is to be done by the media company itself. The 
influence of the government upon the content of the news was acknowledged by several 
of the reporters interviewed.  
 
When under the Roh administration (a progressive party), the government 
tried to emphasise the matters of human rights or weak minorities so that a 
social consensus also appeared. A sort of influence on news or 
broadcasting comes out according to the government. The current 
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administration focuses on regulation, reform and advancement, by which 
news reports are affected. (S. Lee) 
 
The dynamics are changed according to the government, I believe. The 
government now is conservative and right wing. The right wing considers 
nationality important. Those news reports may be under severe pressure 
from the rightwing government with no benefits. In this sense, given that 
KBS is also an organisation vulnerable to political influence, its news 
reports will be affected indirectly. (Yoon) 
 
 
Not even a politically essential issue 
On the other hand, some of the reporters interviewed stated that neither the government 
nor management possesses the power to change the representation of ethnic minorities 
in the news. However, this does not mean that KBS is immune to outside influences or 
that it has a strict policy regarding this type of issue. The majority of the reporters 
interviewed argued that the shaping of the final form in which the news is presented is 
not influenced by changes in politics because news regarding a multicultural society or 
ethnic minorities is not one of the big social issues at the moment. Neither is it a 
sensitive issue for the progressive or conservative parties. Meanwhile, it must be noted 
that KBS reporters not stationed in Seoul had been influenced less by the political 
climate than their colleagues working in Seoul. I discovered two reasons as to why 
KBS reporters not working in Seoul feel less political pressure: (i) they rarely meet 
representatives of political parties or the managers in person, whilst their colleagues in 
Seoul often do have to deal with them in person; and (ii) the news items that are most 
sensitive towards political and economical pressures and any kind of outside influence 
are produced in the headquarters stationed in Seoul. The reason for this is because all 
the major institutions are located in Seoul. Local departments usually deal with lighter 
topics and news stories relating to local events. 
 
Never … The issues are not politically crucial in Korea so only a few 
people try to talk about the matters. So the issues would not be affected by 
those governmental factors. (Kong) 
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There would not be considerable repercussions in this field in comparison 
with others. Taken as a whole, the viewpoint on social minorities would 
not be affected significantly because the themes are not politically 
sensitive. (H. Lee) 
 
Although the issues related to ethnic minorities can be considered as being less of a 
politically sensitive and critical issue in Korean society, as examined in previous 
content analysis, news related to ethnic minorities and especially migrant workers and 
non-national criminals has clearly shown differences in how news is reported. 
Therefore, news items about ethnic minorities are not free from direct political pressure, 
and also there is the possibility of unknowingly internalising self-censorship among 
journalists at an individual or desk level. 
 
 
7.5.2. Focusing on the Audience 
 
As audiences are sold to advertisers, their size and composition is very significant for 
media organisations (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). In the case of KBS, to be exact the 
case of KBS One, although advertising does not present a challenge, producers are still 
extremely keen to sustain their large audience. This is based on the very competitive 
realities of the Korean media market. In this context, even PSB producers and 
programme makers are under pressure in terms of the audience ratings. KBS news is 
ultimately meant to target the domestic audience. The broadcasts that are aired about 
ethnic minorities and multicultural issues are the result of the work of reporters and 
editors that had the audience‟s reaction and interest in mind.  
 
Negative responses – news reports about migrant workers 
Viewers have the tendency to voice their dissatisfaction directly about news reports 
concerning ethnic minorities. They voice their opinions by sending emails, by leaving a 
comment on the KBS official website or by calling in. There is a high level of audience 
involvement. The majority of the people that have voiced complaints are often stuck in 
the same situation as social minorities and belong to the lower income class or are blue 
collar workers as the interviewed reporters presume. Their reactions are often the result 
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of their fear that migrants will eventually take jobs away from Koreans. They also 
believe that the media has a secret agenda whose intent is to aid migrant workers in 
doing so. In general, it is found that there is a feeling of Us, the licence-fee payers, the 
public, the pure-blood sharers and the upper classes, versus the Others, those who do 
not pay the licence fees, from indigent countries, the plunderers and those who are not 
part of society. 
 
I think some people may say „Why does KBS side with foreigners even 
though it receives licence fees from Koreans? Do you know how much 
they are troublesome and bothersome in Korea?‟ In fact, I have received 
emails saying so. (H. Lee) 
 
When news reports about migrant workers are aired, some articles are 
posted on the official website. Instead of positive viewers, negative 
viewers actively post things, you know. They hold negative view points 
against migrant workers, arguing that those migrants only make trouble in 
Korea. (K. Kim) 
 
If a report showing the situation of migrant workers is reported, quick-
tempered people make phone calls to KBS. They emphasise the number of 
unemployed people, saying that they have taken all the jobs of Koreans 
and asks why KBS sides with them despite its status as a public service 
broadcaster. They demand that KBS should not give such news reports. 
(Yoon) 
 
Sympathetic responses – news reports about multicultural families 
On the other hand, there is a more positive attitude towards news about married migrant 
women, multicultural families and children of mixed heritage. This change has taken 
place only recently and possibly took place as a response to various conflicts that are 
present in Korean society. The most important of these is the social gap caused by low 
birth rates as well as the gap caused by the fact that the majority of younger people are 
moving out of the countryside and the marital difficulties caused by the problems of the 
males living in the countryside. Although it cannot be denied that some of the news 
being produced is prone to pitying them, reporters have noticed an increase in news 
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stories over the past few years that have abandoned this point of view in favour of a 
different one. The new approach consists of providing moving stories with a high 
production value. The image that they are trying to paint is of people who are 
struggling to help their families and to assimilate as best as they can. This is because in 
recent years people‟s perception of ethnic minorities has started to change. This does 
not mean that the quality of news has improved; neither does this mean that the news 
has become more impartial. This topic has been discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.  
 
 
I think the attitudes from audiences were quite positive. Personally, I once 
received a good evaluation (award). I think so. (Im) 
 
Given that the executives have constantly allowed me to report things 
related to multi-ethnic matters and that they strategically put those reports 
in the right position, they appear to be interested in the issue and think the 
audiences are also interested in it. (Sun) 
 
 
 
7.6. The Social System Level 
 
Lastly, the effects of social system as a structure in the newsmaking process will be 
discussed. Aday et al. (2005) found that the Iraq War as a fact was represented entirely 
differently between two media groups – Al Jazeera and CNN – which were based in 
totally different societies, the Middle East and America (cited in Shoemaker and Vos, 
2009). Evidently, this shows that television news can be constructed and restricted by 
social structures and systems, ideologies and cultures, and the findings reflect this. In 
other words, as Head (1985) argues, it is thought that „a country‟s broadcasting system 
mirrors national character, expressing a particular political philosophy and cultural 
identity‟ (1985: 2). Therefore, studying social structures, ideologies and cultures at the 
last stage is essential in the process of understanding the very core of a subject.  
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7.6.1. The Dualism between Nationalism and White-centrism 
 
Lastly, I asked interviewees which ideology influences these specific tendencies of 
news the most in terms of production. Roughly half the respondents answered that no 
such ideology exists but the other half replied without any hesitation: „nationalism‟ or 
„ethnic supremacy‟. It would be more correct to use the term „the myth of pure blood‟ 
here rather than „ethnic supremacy‟. Ethnic ideology not only results in a specific way 
of news presentation but it also affects the audience who watch it. The term 
nationalistic ideology refers here specifically towards a hatred and discrimination of 
countries and races that are different from Us. The idea of „the pure-blood myth‟ is 
closely related with the Korean foundation myth, which is an important contributor 
towards nationalistic pride despite the lack of basis for it. This often results in the belief 
that the nation must be composed of only one ethnic group. This leads to discrimination 
directed towards other ethnic groups, especially towards non-White people. It should 
come as no surprise that Koreans are opposed towards marriage with people of other 
ethnic groups and their resulting offspring.  
 
Well, it is the pure-blood ideology. Most Koreans think that foreigners 
who live in Korea should adapt themselves to Korean culture, instead of us 
adapting to them. This is a problem … For example, in the case of the 
news reports on foreign daughters-in-law, the reports focus not on their 
motherlands‟ cultures, but instead on how they have adapted themselves to 
Korean culture. (Choi) 
 
A sense of superiority to non-White races … Of course, we Koreans are 
also non-White people but we feel superiority to most other non-Whites. 
It‟s true, there is economical or social prejudice based on migrant people‟s 
state, but Koreans seem to look at them as wretched people. (J. Kim) 
 
Korean people have strongly held nationalism for a long time. (Kong) 
 
However, the nationalism that appears here is somewhat different from the ethno-
centrism which fosters exclusive attitudes towards other ethnic groups, and only places 
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emphasis on the Korean race. That is because there co-exists White-centrism as an 
object of admiration of Koreans towards Caucasians, as experienced in the process of 
Korean modernisation. As shown in the earlier chapters, Koreans in general are 
positively inclined towards White people and look down upon non-White people. The 
reporters themselves have recognised the existence of their own stereotypical views 
about different races and this duality also exists within Korean society. However, they 
refuse to change their opinions or to accept the idea that news making might be in need 
of overcoming this point of view.  
 
 
Among Koreans, there are obviously dual viewpoints of being generous to 
White people and looking down on non-White people. I am sure it exists. 
(Im) 
 
As you can see in the TV programme Chitchat of Beautiful Ladies,43 
White women are much more focused on than Black or Asian ones, who 
are just participating for the beauty of form. The same is true of ordinary 
Koreans who think White people are superior. I have heard that it is same 
in foreign language institutes. If an English teacher is a Black person, 
students‟ parents complain about the teacher, I have heard. There is 
obviously prejudice against non-White people while White people win 
Koreans‟ confidence. (Sun) 
 
This dual attitude of Koreans towards White and non-White people, as explained in 
Chapter Three, can be a compound result of the internalisation of the racial hierarchy of 
White – Yellow – Black, which was acquired from Japanese and Western missionaries 
during the modernisation process, and admiration towards White Americans during the 
Korean War in the aftermath of independence from Japanese colonisation. KBS 
journalists perceive this White-centrism as a prevalent ideology in society and they are 
also not free from this ideology as we look into the interview results. Therefore, it can 
be said that White-centric points of view at the social system level, once again, 
influence the individual level. In other words, the five-stage interview analysis adopted 
                                                         
43
 This programme focuses on how foreign women in particular view Korean culture and Korean men. 
The guest panel comprises sixteen women from various countries who have lived in and experienced 
Korea. Their stories of Korea and Koreans are unveiled through witty questions and discussions. 
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– individual, routines, organisation, social institution and social system – is rotationally 
connected and has close interconnections. 
 
 
7.7. Conclusion  
 
The aim of this chapter was the examination of the professional practice and opinions 
of media practitioners reporting on foreigners, including ethnic minorities. I managed to 
pinpoint what these elements are by interviewing editors and reporters as news makers 
and gatekeepers. As a result of five different levels of involvement came forward the 
individual, routines, organisational, social institution and social system levels. I was 
able to draw five main conclusions in the analysis of the interviews. These are listed 
below.  
   
The first conclusion that I drew was that most KBS reporters had a vaguely positive 
perception of „multiculturalism‟. The first time that this term began being used 
positively was when the term was used to describe a family consisting of a Korean male 
who had married a woman of foreign origin (frequently from one of the Southeast 
Asian countries). Such a family is referred to as a „multicultural family‟. When the 
media first started using this term, they often emphasised that such families were living 
in poverty and that they possessed a lower level of education. The majority of reporters 
believed that a „multicultural society‟ was being formed due to an increasing number of 
such families. Such topics were considered to be a source of entertainment because 
their culture differs from „ours‟. Some reporters explained that the last part was 
beneficial for society. In terms of positive perspective, it is generally evaluated that 
most KBS reporters have humanistic and empathetic attitudes towards migrant workers 
and ethnic minorities. On the other hand, however, it must be noted that migrant 
workers, who constitute more than half of all migrants in South Korea, are generally 
not viewed as being members of the „multicultural society‟. These are two sides of the 
same coin represented in the hegemonic discourses associated with „multicultural 
society‟ in South Korea. This illustrates that the meaning of the term „multicultural‟ has 
a rather constricted use. If we look back at the discussions about multicultural families 
and inter-cultural marriage that have taken place between the media and the 
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government since 2005 they show that, whereas migrant workers have been 
consistently excluded from all discussion, inter-cultural marriages have been accepted 
as a part of Korean society. Even though this discussion concerns a complex and 
diverse set of opinions that are intertwined in complex ways, it can be deduced that it is 
at odds with the male-centred Korean society.  
 
Secondly, KBS reporters noted that news reports relating to ethnic minorities are 
usually produced routinely, using a set of rules that have become part of KBS culture. 
This is especially true for news stories that focus on migrants who are participating in 
the celebrations for national holidays and news items about the poor living conditions 
of ethnic minorities. These types of story are reproduced every year at the same times. 
It was also found that there are differences in the content of news reports about White 
and non-White people. When they are featured in the news, they are often objectified in 
order to bring forward a different subject (cultural issues vs. difficulty of living in 
South Korea). Interviews are conducted in different languages (Korean versus English), 
and different types of question (open versus closed) are posed in order to receive 
different kinds of answer. These customs are an unfortunate integral part of KBS 
because they pose restraints upon the reporters. Consequently, the resulting news items 
have remained virtually unchanged over the years; the same can be said of the ethnic 
views of Korean society. 
 
Thirdly, within the KBS group no specific guidelines exist concerning broadcasts that 
feature ethnic minorities, nor are there any demands from the editors for them. It can be 
certain that such news does possess a high news value because KBS could have made 
the choice to air different news items instead of choosing ones that focus on this subject. 
Ethnic minorities are still subject to ridicule by Korean society. News items about them 
are still being used for strategic purposes; they are often far from impartial. There is 
also the question of whether or not the content of news about ethnic minorities is 
influenced or altered by the political power or administrators. Six out of ten reporters 
that were interviewed insisted that those in high positions had no interest in ethnic 
minorities and had therefore no policy to influence the contents of news concerning 
them. They claimed that they used their influence to limit the amount and length of 
news items concerning these topics. The reporters who claimed there was no control 
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from their superiors in the way they cover these stories believed the way the coverage 
was shaped reflected public opinion.  
 
The fourth observation was that reporters generally wanted to improve the content of 
news items being aired about ethnic minorities. That is to say, they wanted to place 
them in a more positive light (but still within hierarchical discourses and nationalist 
hegemony). The first thing they wanted to do was to cease making broadcasts that made 
fun of foreigners. Secondly, they felt that it was necessary to challenge KBS‟s refusal 
to acknowledge ethnic minorities as being part of society. They agree in principle that 
ethnic minorities in Korea should be given more attention and treated with more dignity. 
It was through these proposed changes that they wanted to change Korea‟s 
discriminatory view towards these groups of people. As a public broadcaster, KBS 
enjoys many benefits, such as access to a network system and being relatively 
independent from viewer ratings or monetary concerns. They also have an ethnic 
obligation as a public broadcaster to support diversity. All of this combined can aid 
them in their coverage of a multi-ethnic and multicultural society, only if they use these 
advantages effectively.  
  
Lastly, KBS reporters recognise that the audience‟s reactions can be divided in two, 
based upon their view of news about ethnic minorities. News about migrant workers 
usually gets negative responses, whereas news about wives who have emigrated in 
order to join their husbands in Korea can usually count upon positive reactions. The 
cause of these widely different emotions is the difference in the topics covered and the 
different approaches used for the different groups. A major influence upon those 
reactions is an overwhelming feeling of nationalism, especially due to the fear of losing 
one‟s job to migrant workers. Whereas the feeling towards migrant workers is rather 
uniform throughout all layers of society, no real uniform view exists towards married 
migrant women. The audience is aware of their poor living conditions and their need to 
support their parents-in-law and family. They have a higher number of children at a 
time when the birth rate is at an all-time low, but they are not accepted as members of 
society, the Us, because Koreans strongly believe in the superiority of their fellow 
countrymen. 
 
233 
 
Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
This is not a fairy tale, nor is it at an end. 
(Appadurai, 2006: 136) 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This study has explored the representation of ethnic minorities in Korean PSB news and 
the role of the public media in (re)constructing nationalism, ethno-centrism and racially 
stratified social order. While there is no doubt that KBS is central to the evolution of 
PSB, my claim is that issues of cultural diversity and social inclusion go to the heart of 
contemporary public media practices around the world, especially in developed 
countries. More specifically, this thesis has examined television news discourse towards 
ethnic minorities to understand the relationship between media power and ethnic 
minorities. This is an important focus as most people understand their world through 
discourses that media representated (van Dijk, 1988). Within this focus, PSB presents 
core elements of the study as it represents a medium that has a clear commitment to 
represent all elements of a society, in a fair and an impartial manner. In the age of 
globalisation and multi-channel television, in a situation where most societies are 
becoming multi-ethnic and multicultural, PSB‟s social role and responsibility to 
represent diversity is greater than ever. Therefore, my empirical study has examined 
how Korean PSB represents non-nationals in a society that has rapidly transformed into 
a multi-ethnic one. 
 
Using quantitative and qualitative textual analysis and semi-structured interviews, I 
tried to uncover the complex apparatus of minorities‟ representation, the ideological 
framework of these representations and the relevance of the decision-making process 
when these representations are produced. Interviews with ten KBS journalists revealed 
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the persistence of racial and nationalist stereotypes among individual producers which 
inform the process of production and the representations themselves. Institutional 
practices and socio-political hegemonic ideologies clearly have an impact on the way 
minorities are represented (or not represented) in the media. 
 
In the following sections I will summarise my findings, discuss the implications of this 
study and make recommendations for further research and policy.  
 
 
8.2. Key Findings 
 
This study has three key findings. Firstly, PSB news coverage of ethnic minorities and 
migrants is marginal as such stories are judged as marginal in their news value by their 
producers. Secondly, the discourse and iconography in news stories on migrants and 
minorities reaffirms these groups‟ Otherness vis-à-vis the mainstream society. What 
textual analysis shows is that when relevant stories are covered they are framed very 
narrowly within a set of themes mostly associated with crime, pity and the affirmation 
of the national culture‟s superiority. Ethnic minorities and migrants‟ representations are 
most often limited, distorted and highly stereotypical. Lastly, the representations are the 
outcome of news makers‟ personal viewpoints, which more often than not reaffirm 
hegemonic nationalist ideologies and racialised stratification of „newsworthy‟ subjects.  
 
 
8.2.1. Multi-ethnic, Mono-cultural Society 
 
One of the critical questions of this research project is how cultural diversity and 
impartiality, which PSB seeks to achieve, should be applied in a multi-ethnic society. 
This is important because PSB is now in the situation of coping with the conflicts 
between the two pervading values of cultural pluralism and national identity as Korean 
society changes rapidly as a result of globalisation. As can be seen in Chapter Two, the 
concept of the public is contextual and dependent on the apparatus of hegemonic power. 
In Korea, nationalism has long presented a core ideological frame in the construction of 
national identities. Thus, the production and reproduction of new minorities‟ and recent 
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migrants‟ symbolic and economic marginalisation fits within a longstanding discourse 
of national superiority. However, PSB, as a formal system of representation of the 
nation, is facing a contradictory reality. On the one hand, the reproduction of minorities‟ 
Otherness builds and reinforces the dominant and celebrated nationalist ideology. On 
the other hand, the mandate of the national broadcaster for fairness and impartiality 
poses challenges to the broadcaster when it merely reproduces minorities‟ symbolic 
marginalisation.  
 
As this research has shown, Korean PSB newscasts undoubtedly (re)produce 
nationalism as a ruling ideology and as a familiar theme in the broadcaster‟s role in 
reinforcing national identity. Although there is far less direct interference from the 
government due to political democratisation in the 1990s, the production of national 
and governmental ideologies is still not only reproduced in the routinisation of the ways 
news items are chosen and produced but is also reflected in the internalised nationalistic 
attitudes and racial stereotypes of the reporting journalists. In this process, Others, such 
as ethnic minorities, are identified as less important in terms of news value and, even if 
they appear in the news, their viewpoints and opinions are excluded and framed 
through the words of Korean nationals. Depriving ethnic minorities‟ of the right to have 
a prominent voice in the stories that concern them only furthers their position as 
strangers and Others in the national imagination. The tendency of news to position 
migrants as inferior Others within the national context (e.g. when they „eagerly‟ appear 
as desiring to take part in Korean traditional celebrations) narrows even further the 
visibility of minorities‟ agency. Such representations not only silence minorities but 
also reinforce ideologies of Korean national superiority. Others are mobilised as a tool 
for reconfirming and reinforcing the national identity and are subject to limited and 
incidental roles in the process.  
 
One more poignant aspect is that the discourse produced by Korean PSB does not 
overtly emphasise national identity but it causes an optical illusion of reflecting cultural 
diversity by actively producing „pseudo-diversity‟. One of the most important cultural 
phenomena in Korea, which can be illustrated by examining news relating to ethnic 
minorities, is the news items produced during the holiday seasons. In these items, 
which the Korean media regularly reproduce, concepts of diversity and 
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multiculturalism are stripped of the complexity associated with recognition and 
participation of minorities in the public sphere. Largely through the apolitical use of 
these concepts in the media these concepts are now widely used in Korea. However, 
what these concepts refer to is merely differences in „skin colour‟ and difference in 
origin. Yet, it is in the case of the celebratory use of such concepts that we most visibly 
see the lack of recognition. Migrants, still voiceless and without agency, are only 
invited guests that confirm the significance of the national celebrations. Korean 
society‟s multiculturalism partly includes married migrant women but totally excludes 
migrant workers. It exists in rural areas, but not in the metropolis. It is open-minded 
towards White Westerners, but less so towards non-White ethnic minorities. It affirms 
globalisation as a market process, but denies it as an exchange system of human 
resources. Most conclusively, it includes delivering education about „our culture‟ to 
them, but disapproves of „their culture‟ being delivered to us. From this perspective, 
Korea is a society rather based on „assimilationism‟ forcing others to adapt into our 
culture, not on „cultural diversity‟ as a basis of a multicultural society. In these 
occasions migrants become momentarily accepted in the Korean society, only of course 
as a result of their desire to assimilate and celebrate the national culture‟s superiority. 
Such representations illustrate the media strategy of „pseudo-diversity‟ that is produced 
on only specific terms and conditions as a nationalistic process of narcissism. These 
narrow definitions of multiculturalism and diversity only inspire cultural chauvinism 
and a (re)production of narrow and limited views on the culture of ethnic minorities 
from developing countries as inferior and uninteresting. 
 
In the long term, Korean society is predicted to become a „multi-ethnic, mono-cultural 
society‟. That is, it is significant that there will be an increase in number of the migrant 
population and mixed-heritage people resulting from multicultural marriages, but the 
exclusion of other cultures, especially among non-Whites and people from less 
developed countries, is not expected to easily change. The final discussion in this study 
is to show the vital role PSB plays in mediating cultural diversity and how Korea can 
be aided in transforming into a multi-ethnic society through specific solutions. 
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8.2.2. Selective Globalisation: Visible Globalisation, Invisible Others 
 
When it comes to discourse and the ideologies it reproduces, this study has 
demonstrated the selective, nationalist and classist framework in which concepts such 
as diversity and globalisation are interpreted in Korea. This discourse can be defined as 
„visible globalisation, invisible Others‟. In other words, although the discourse of 
globalisation is now prevalent in Korean media and society, internal debates around 
equality, participation and inclusion of differences in a society that has changed as a 
result of globalisation remain marginal. Although some discourse of empathy to ethnic 
minorities as sufferers might relate to a humanitarian ethos, circulated through global 
communications, in terms of terminology, the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in 
the Korean media has been restrictively used to refer to market liberalisation, the 
promotion on the world market of Korean companies and products, and support for the 
Korean culture within the country and beyond. For instance, White male actors in 
Italian suits and White female actresses with French designer bags modelling in Prague 
while driving expensive German cars are often visible in Korean commercials. 
Moreover, White top models who choose Korean products are used in television 
advertising as evidence of the Korean culture‟s and Korean capitalism‟s value. These 
representations are only some of the examples that reflect the most widely accepted and 
celebrated understanding of globalisation in Korean society. On the other hand, migrant 
workers from Asia or Africa who toil at work in small factories with poor conditions, 
migrant women married to Korean men or mixed-heritage people from multicultural 
families are rarely seen in the media. While their lives are closely tied to globalisation, 
they are silenced and „irrelevant‟ to the representations of globalisation. 
 
This representational tendency has been explained in detail. First of all, representation 
of non-nationals as criminals is identified as the most threatening, posing a direct risk 
factor. They are usually located in urban spaces. This emphasises that non-national 
criminals are a practical risk factor and an absolute „social evil‟ located near our living 
space, influencing the discourse of fear to a serious level. On the other hand, the news 
discourse of migrant workers and married migrant women is represented in a rural 
context although approximately 90 per cent of them actually live in urban or suburban 
areas. That is, the influx of Others in Korean society is restrictively represented in the 
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countryside as an excluded space and as an Other space within the national imagination 
that promotes urban over-development. This limited discourse functions as a „double 
exclusion‟ device which excludes Others as discriminated non-nationals and once again 
excludes them as rural people. 
 
Finally, as a result of analysing the news discourse, it can be seen that Korean PSB has 
three primary tendencies when representing ethnic minorities in Korea – 
dehumanisation, victimisation and pathologisation. In terms of dehumanisation of 
ethnic minorities, they are represented as „illegal residents‟, „uneducated‟ and „people 
who must be managed by Korean authority‟. The term victimisation contrastingly 
represents ethnic minorities as „perpetrators‟ or „poor victims‟. Lastly, the discourse of 
pathologisation of ethnic minorities can be divided into physical and psychological 
perspectives. All these tendencies of news discourse are in direct contrast to media 
discourses when it comes to representations of Koreans. 
 
 
8.3. Korean PSB: Towards a Multicultural Public Sphere 
 
As I conclude this thesis, I feel the need to reflect on the challenges presented to 
Korean PSB and the possibilities for it to play a positive role in a multicultural society. 
KBS occupies a special position in Korean society as a public service broadcaster. 
KBS‟s position as a corporation influenced by governmental authority can be a 
disadvantage to the organisation because, as most reporters pointed out, it makes it 
difficult for them to present a point of view that diverges greatly from the norm of 
national ideology. This is particularly limiting in South Korea because the public are 
rather conservative and they give priority to national interests, as often demonstrated in 
the result of social surveys, academic research and elections. Many of the reporters that 
I interviewed emphasised that the society as a whole is not willing to take a different 
approach to the current one when it comes to news coverage. On the other side, their 
position lends KBS three distinct advantages in this situation. These advantages can be 
summarised by their key terms of „network system‟, „relative freedom from 
commercialism‟ and „moral duties concerning the issue of diversity‟. The interviewed 
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reporters stated that these advantages can serve as a way of measuring KBS‟s potential 
to produce news of a higher quality than their competitors.  
 
The first advantage, „network system‟ refers to the infrastructural aspect. One of the 
biggest benefits of KBS is that it has a single network that connects all the major cities 
in Korea. At the moment, KBS has eighteen local stations,
44
 all of which are connected 
to KBS Seoul. The other major terrestrial broadcaster in Korea, MBC (Munhwa 
Broadcasting Corporation), has nineteen stations located throughout the whole country 
but each station is run by a different company and answers to different management 
and has different affiliates. That is, unlike KBS, MBC is not a unified whole. The other 
broadcast stations use regional correspondents to cover incidents that have happened in 
their allotted regions. The local offices often struggle with limited facilities and limits 
in human resources. KBS possesses the largest network system in Korea. No other 
station has an equally well-designed infrastructure.  
 
If it is seen that multicultural families including married migrant women are usually 
shown by media discourse to live in rural areas, the fact that news segments that 
involve them are produced locally is a big advantage because local reporters would be 
more familiar with the local circumstances and culture. The downside, however, is that 
the news that is produced locally and broadcast in that same region is seen only by the 
local inhabitants. This is harmful for the perception of ethnic minorities because it 
creates the illusion that any problems associated with ethnic minorities are concentrated 
in certain places, most of them being ghettos.
45
 Although approximately 90 per cent of 
multicultural families live in urban/suburban areas, it creates the impression of the 
existence of large ghettos in the countryside of Korea. It is important that the 
broadcaster airs these locally produced news segments throughout the whole country to 
give a sense of balance. This way multi-ethnic and multicultural phenomena can 
become more than just a local problem and become a national issue.  
                                                         
44
 There are nine main local stations: KBS Busan, KBS Changwon, KBS Daegu, KBS Gwangju, KBS 
Jeonju, KBS Daejeon, KBS Cheongju, KBS Chuncheon and KBS Jeju. And there are nine sub-local 
stations: KBS Ulsan, KBS Jinju, KBS Andong, KBS Pohang, KBS Mokpo, KBS Suncheon, KBS 
Chungju, KBS Gangneung and KBS Wonju. 
45
 The term „ghetto‟ was originally used in Venice to describe the area where Jews were compelled to 
live. A ghetto is now described as an overcrowded urban area often associated with a specific ethnic or 
racial population, especially because of social, legal or economic pressure. 
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The second advantage is that KBS is subject to less pressure about attracting large 
amounts of viewers than commercial broadcasting companies. KBS suffers less from 
economic pressure because it is stably supported by television licence fees.
46
 This can 
be a crucial advantage when dealing with television contents concerning multi-ethnicity 
and multiculturalism. As I stated previously, multi-ethnic related issues have low news 
value in Korean society and these subjects are not supposed to be attractive to public. 
Therefore, Korean PSB affords to spend more time and effort on presenting ethnic 
minorities impartially than commercial broadcasting stations would.  
 
The final advantage is that KBS as a public service broadcaster has an ethical 
obligation not to exclude the socially vulnerable from their news coverage because their 
broadcasts should serve the wellbeing of the society. Naturally this hasn‟t been 
expressed explicitly in the form of a regulation or in guidelines but it clearly influences 
the content of their reportages about social minorities. Reporters and KBS as a whole 
are aware of the existence of this moral obligation. This is one of the main reasons that 
KBS, unlike most commercial media, does have an interest in social minorities 
including ethnic minorities. This is also why they have produced news segments about 
them in order to aid their general strategy. This moral obligation provides the necessary 
motivation to set up the necessary institutes to aid the socially disadvantaged. And 
without any doubt, this is a significant step to the right direction for a multiethnic 
society. 
 
The advantages of a multi-ethnic society which journalists claim, however, remain at an 
abstract and ideal level, rather than being applicable and anticipated from visible results. 
Therefore, there is some distance to go before the concrete future prospect of KBS in 
fairly representing a multi-ethnic society. Accordingly, I maintain that there should be 
concrete and detailed guidelines for the public media, especially PSB productions, in 
order to directly and visibly improve cultural diversity in Korean society. Although it is 
reasonable to consider the distinctiveness of individual nations, I will take the European 
                                                         
46
 As at February 2010, no commercials were aired on KBS 1, some of the programmes on KBS 2 did 
feature commercials. KBS also generates income from their daughter companies: KBS N sports, KBS 
drama, KBS joy and KBS prime. The current licence fees are very low (around £15 per year) and have 
been frozen for the last thirty years. They are exceptionally small considering the magnitude of South 
Korea‟s GDP and national income. 
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case as a useful starting point for discussing PSB in a multicultural society. 
 
 
8.4. The British Case: Right on the Mark 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, South Korea itself has particular social traits associated 
with its history, culture and politics. These socio-cultural particularities are revealed 
throughout this study. Although Western social scientific research tends to have a 
Eurocentric bias and cannot be directly applied to the Korean socio-cultural reality, 
there are some key arguments and practices that inform our understanding of the 
Korean particularity within the universal context of multi-ethnicity and of the PSB. 
Within this perspective, it is argued that this study finally contemplates the British case 
of PSB in the multicultural society. During the early times of PSB in the UK, national 
interest was at the core of its concerns. The linking of culture with nationalism – the 
idea of a national culture – was given new expression in broadcasting through those 
kinds of programme that had the effect of, in the words of Reith, who was the first 
Director-General of the BBC, „making the nation as one man‟ (Scannell, 2000: 48). 
However, it was a notable change that the British Government enhanced the public 
sphere role of broadcasting at the beginning of the 1980s, particularly by authorising 
Channel 4 to give special attention to the interests of minority groups (Scannell, 2000). 
Today, PSB in the UK is committed to representing all audiences impartially, including 
ethnic minority groups (BBC, 2007). This is not just because PSB has a responsibility 
to meet the needs of all licence payers, but because PSB is one of the key institutions 
through which a picture is formed of the kind of society Britain is; whether it is 
inclusive or exclusive; whether it recognises and celebrates the value of cultural and 
ethnic diversity or falls back on old stereotypes and prejudices; whether it strives to 
increase mutual understanding and equality of opportunity or is content to allow 
hostility and disadvantage to persist.  
 
Ethnic diversity and multiculturalism are highly salient and contested issues in the 
contemporary British public media (Georgiou and Joo, 2009). Cottle (1998) describes 
the responsibility of PSB towards Britain‟s ethnic minorities as primarily being one of 
enhancing their representation through „multicultural programming‟. For many years, 
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the BBC and Channel 4 in particular, the representative public service broadcasters in 
the UK, have been publicly committed to serving their ethnic minority audiences 
properly, both „through targeted programmes and services and through fair 
representation in mainstream radio and television output‟ (Ofcom, 2005; BBC, 1995: 
163). This is because section 264(4)(i) of the Communications Act (2003) requires that 
public service broadcasters „reflect the lives and concerns of different communities and 
cultural interests and traditions within the UK‟. The communications regulator Ofcom 
has recently been conducting a review of public service broadcasting and has sought to 
define it more closely. One of the four purposes of public service broadcasting has been 
identified as follows:  
 
To support a tolerant and inclusive society, through programmes which 
reflect the lives of different people and communities within the UK, 
encourage a better understanding of different cultures and, on occasion, 
bring the nation together for shared experiences (Ofcom, 2005). 
 
This regulation for PSB is reflected in the detailed and practical schemes of each 
broadcasting organisation. One of the good examples of this is the „BBC Race Equality 
Scheme‟. It forms a part of the BBC‟s overall commitment to equality and diversity. 
The scheme outlines the framework the BBC uses to systematically assess or reassess 
its public functions and policies in respect of race equality. It also shows how the BBC 
will now develop, implement, monitor and review its work towards achieving equality 
for people who belong to different ethnic and/or cultural groups, in relation to the 
BBC‟s relevant public functions. The scheme is a tool to help promote racial equality at 
the centre of the BBC‟s work and specifically across relevant areas such as TV 
licensing, digital switchover and the BBC Trust‟s operations (BBC, 2007).  
 
There are some critiques about cultural diversity in the UK‟s PSB as a matter of course. 
A report of Ofcom, for instance, shows the total volume of multicultural programmes 
on the five public service broadcasting channels, including the BBC, in 2002 was 2.0 
hours a week on average, a figure that has gradually reduced – by 42 per cent since 
1998 (Georgiou and Joo, 2009). Additionally, Ofcom estimates the total spend on such 
programmes to be £5.2 million in 2002, compared with £6.8 million five years earlier. 
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In spite of this, the institutional definition of multicultural issues and the minimum 
amount of effort to put it in action in British PSB can be a good initial role model for 
Korean PSB during the period of transition into a multi-ethnic society. Therefore, a 
practical alternative is to study countries which have already experienced a multi-ethnic 
society prior to Korea, and analyse how they have represented cultural diversity in PSB 
and finally edit, supplement and apply the cases to the Korean situation. 
 
 
8.5. Suggestions for Further Research 
 
In completing this discussion I make a number of suggestions for further research. 
During the last four years of conducting this research, the terminology „multicultural‟ 
has come to be more and more widespread throughout Korean society and academia 
like a torrential downpour. Perhaps some recent studies form part of this torrent 
themselves. As revealed earlier, however, the multicultural agenda that has been 
discussed in Korean society and academia has significant limitations in its 
understanding of cultural difference and the challenges diversity presents to democratic 
societies. Therefore, I sincerely hope that this study will be not treated as one of the 
many other studies that are part of a growing trend, and I would hope to contribute to 
discussions around the distorted and misused term „multiculturalism‟ which is prevalent 
in Korea. Taking this study as a starting point, I hope that a number of researchers, 
including myself, will shed new light on multi-ethnicity and cultural diversity as a new 
cultural phenomenon and establish the paradigm of a new discussion. In particular, 
research about media policy for cultural diversity in the Korean context, ethnographic 
studies of ethnic minority media as examples of resistance to nationalistic discourses, 
and studies of the diverse audiences within Korean society are well overdue. In spite of 
this being the last step of a four-year research project, it is hopefully also a point of 
reflection. It will hopefully contribute to current and relevant academic and policy 
debates on the future of PSB and its public democratic commitment. 
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APPENDIX I: Tables from Chapter Five 
 
 
Table 5.4. The Total Number of Non-nationals who Appeared on KBS News 9 (2004–2008) 
 
 
Non-Whites Whites 
Total 
Asians 
Blacks Others Whites East Asians South & 
Southeast 
Asians 
Other 
Asians 
N 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
A 
L 
I 
T 
Y 
50 Chinese, 
44 Korean 
Chinese,  
14 
Mongolians, 
12 Japanese,  
5 Hong 
Kongers,  
2 Taiwanese,  
1 Korean 
Kazakhstani 
35 
Vietnamese, 
26 
Bangladeshis, 
19 Filipinos,  
16 Sri 
Lankans, 
14 Thai,  
12 
Cambodians, 
7 Indonesians,  
6 Pakistanis,  
4 Burmese,  
4 Nepalis,  
3 Indians,  
2 Malaysians,  
10 Other 
Southeast 
Asians 
8 
Uzbekistanis, 
3 Iranians,   
1 Middle-
eastern 
15 Americans,  
7 Brazilians,  
2 Dominicans,  
1 Tunisian,  
1 Colombian,  
1 Tanzanian,  
1 Senegali,  
1 Cuban 
53 Mixed-
heritage 
Koreans,  
1 Peruvian,  
1 Turkish 
 55 Americans,  
8 Australians,  
8 Canadians,  
8 Russians,  
7 Germans,  
3 Frenchs,  
4 Portuguese,  
4 Dutch,  
2 Ukrainians,  
2 Uzbekistanis, 
1 Bulgarian,  
1 English,  
1 Greek,  
1 Swedish,  
1 Italian,  
1 Kyrgyzstani,  
1 Azerbaijani,  
1 Polish,  
1 Hungarian,  
1 Belgian,  
1 Serbian,  
1 Croatian,  
1 Armenian,  
1 Spanish,  
2 Brazilians,  
1 Mexican,  
10 Unknown 
511 
Total 
(%) 
128 
(25.0%) 
158 
(30.9%) 
12 
(2.3%) 
30 
(5.9%) 
55 
(10.8%) 
128 
(25.0%) 
511 
(100.0) 
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Table 5.5. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Migrant Workers) 
 Non-Whites Whites Total 
Asians Blacks Other Whites 
East Southaast Other 
N 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
A 
L 
I 
T 
Y 
18 Chinese-
Koreans,  
6 
Mongolians, 
4 Chinese 
23 Bangladeshi, 
14 Sri-Lankans, 
9 Filipinos,  
7  Indonesians,  
7 Thais,  
4 Pakistanis,  
4 Nepalis,  
3 Burmese,  
3 Indians,  
3 Vietnamese,  
2 Cambodians,  
9 Unknown 
1 Iranian,  
1 Kazakhstan-
Korean,  
1 Uzbekistani 
1 American  
2 Russians, 
1 American 
123 
Total 
(%) 
28 (22.8) 88 (71.5) 3 (2.4) 1 (0.8)  3 (2.4) 
123 
(100.0) 
 
 
Table 5.6. Non-nationals as Migrant Workers  
Gender N(%) 
Visual 
frames 
N(%) 
Representati
on as 
individuals 
or groups 
N(%) 
Types of 
work 
N(%) 
Females 
26 
(21.1) 
Mosaic 18 (14.6) Individuals 54 (43.9) 
Manual 
Labourer 
108 (87.8) 
Males 
83 
(67.5) 
Lowering 
head 
2 (1.6) Groups 69 (56.1) Prostitute 2 (1.6) 
Males & 
Females 
14 
(11.4) 
Extreme 
close-up 
18 (14.6)   Job seeker 2 (1.6) 
  Long-shot 4 (3.2)   Soldier 2 (1.6) 
  Crowd-shot 22 (17.9)   Unclear 2 (1.6) 
  Back view 7 (5.7)   Victims 7 (5.7) 
  
Medium-
shot 
52 (42.3)     
Total 
123 
(100.0) 
Total 
123 
(100.0) 
Total 
123 
(100.0) 
Total 
123 
(100.0) 
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Table 5.7. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Migrant Workers 
Gender N(%) Visual frames N(%) 
Representati
on as 
individuals 
or groups 
N(%) Roles N(%) 
Females 8 (15.6) Back-view 3 (5.9) Individuals 50 (98.0) CEO 2 (3.9) 
Males 42 (82.4) 
Extreme 
Close-up 
1 (2.0) Groups 1 (2.0) 
Religious 
leader 
6 (11.8) 
Males & 
Females 
1 (2.0) Medium-shot 46 (90.1)   Criminal 1 (2.0) 
  
Covering 
heads 
1 (2.0)   Citizen 4 (7.8) 
      
Government 
authority 
16 
(31.4) 
      Professional47 4 (7.8) 
      NGO member 
13 
(25.5) 
      Policeman 3 (5.9) 
      
Colleagues of 
migrant 
workers 
2 (3.9) 
Total 
51 
(100.0) 
Total 
51 
(100.0) 
Total 
51 
(100.0) 
Total 
51 
(100.0) 
 
 
Table 5.8. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Criminals) 
 
Non-Whites Whites 
Total Asians 
Blacks Other Whites 
East Southeast Other 
Nationality 
30 Chinese, 
16 Korean-
Chinese, 
4 
Mongolians, 
1 Hong 
Konger 
1 Bangladeshi, 
1 Malaysian, 
1 Unknown 
1 
Uzbekistani, 
1 Middle 
Eastern 
1 Tunisian, 
1 Colombian, 
1 American 
1 Peruvian 
3 Canadians, 
4 Americans, 
2 Australians, 
1 Bulgarian, 
1 Russian, 
3 Unknown 
74 
Total (%) 51 (68.9) 3 (4.1) 2 (2.7) 3 (4.1) 1 (1.3) 14 (18.9) 
74 
(100.0) 
 
 
                                                         
47
 1 professor, 1 doctor and 2 lawyers. 
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Table 5.9. Non-national as Criminals  
Gender N(%) Visual frames N(%) 
Representation as 
individuals or groups 
N(%) 
Females 
9 
(12.1%) 
Mosaic 
11 
(14.8%) 
Individuals 
28 
(37.8%) 
Males 
46 
(62.2%) 
Lowering/covering head 
18 
(24.3%) 
Groups 
46 
(62.2%) 
Females & Males 
15 
(20.3%) 
Extreme close-up 
9 
(12.2%) 
  
Unknown 4 (5.4%) Long-shot 2 (2.7%)   
  CCTV 
9 
(12.2%) 
  
  Crowd-shot 
14 
(18.9%) 
  
  Back view 
9 
(12.2%) 
  
  Medium-shot 2 (2.7%)   
Total 
74 
(100.0%) 
Total 
74 
(100.0%) 
Total 
74 
(100.0%) 
 
 
Table 5.10. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Criminals  
Gender N(%) 
Visual 
frames 
N(%) 
Representati
on as 
individuals 
or groups 
N(%) Roles N(%) 
Females 3 (4.3%) Mosaic 5 (7.2%) Individuals 
69 
(100.0%) 
Crime victim 9 (13.0%) 
Males 
66 
(95.7%) 
Back view 2 (2.8%) Groups – Accomplice 5 (7.2%) 
Unknown  
Extreme 
close-up 
6 (8.6%)   
Police or 
prosecutor 
22 
(32.0%) 
  CCTV 1 (1.4%)   Civilian 5 (7.2%) 
  Bust-shot 
55 
(80.0%) 
  
Government 
authority 
9 (13.0%) 
      Professional48 
19 
(27.6%) 
Total 
69 
(100.0%) 
 
69 
(100.0%) 
 
69 
(100.0%) 
 
69 
(100.0%) 
                                                         
48
 4 religious leaders, 3 professors, 3 NGO officers, 3 teachers, 1 researcher, 1 businessman, 1 banker, 1 
doctor and 1 member of parliament. 
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Table 5.11. Types of Crimes and the Dispersion by Ethnicities and Nationalities 
Categories 
of crimes 
The dispersion by ethnicity & nationality Total 
Illegal migration or 
entries / forgery of 
documents 
16 Asians (8 Chinese, 3 Korean-Chinese, 1 Bangladesh, 1 Malaysian, 1 
Hong Konger, 1 Mongolian, 1 Unknown) 
6 Whites (1 Canadian, 1 Bulgarian, 2 Americans, 2 Australians) 
22 
Violence 
11 Asians (9 Chinese, 2 Korean-Chinese) 
2 Whites (2 Americans) 
13 
Drugs 
4 Asians (3 Korean-Chinese, 1 Korean-American) 
4 Whites (1 Russian, 3 Unknown) 
2 Blacks (1 Anonymous, 1 Tunisian) 
10 
Disguised marriages 6 Asians (4 Chinese, 1 Korean-Chinese, 1 Mongolian) 6 
Murders 5 Asians (3 Chinese, 2 Korean-Chinese) 5 
Frauds 5 Asians (4 Chinese, 1 Korean-Chinese) 5 
Counterfeiting/illegal 
remittances 
4 Asians (2 Korean-Chinese, 1 Chinese, 1 Mongolian) 
1 White (1 Canadian) 
5 
Abusing children 1 White (1 Canadian) 3 
Pickpockets 
1 Black (1 Colombian) 
1 Other (1 Peruvian) 
2 
Robbery 1 Asian (1 Korean-Chinese) 1 
Smuggling 1 Asian (1 Korean-Chinese) 1 
Illegal gambling 1 Asian (1 Chinese) 1 
Terrorism 2 Asians (1 Bangladesh, 1 Middle-Eastern) 2 
Total 56 Asians / 14 Whites / 3 Blacks / 1 Other 74 
 
 
Table 5.12. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Multicultural Family 
Members) 
 
Non-Whites Whites 
Total Asians 
Blacks Other Whites 
East Southeast Other 
Nationality 
5 Chinese,   
3 Korean-
Chinese,  
4 
Japanese,  
1 
Mongolian 
17 Filipinos,  
15 
Vietnamese,  
6 
Cambodians,  
4 Thais,  
1 Nepalese,  
1 Sri 
Lankan,  
2 Unknown 
13 Mixed-
heritage 
Koreans 
 1 Uzbekistani 
3 Russians,  
1 American 
77 
Total (%) 13 (16.9) 46 (59.7) 13 (16.9)  1 (1.3) 4 (5.2) 77 (100.0) 
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Table 5.13. Non-nationals in the Frame of Non-nationals as Multicultural Family 
Members 
Gender N(%) 
Visual 
frames 
N(%) 
Representation 
as individuals or 
groups 
N(%) Roles N(%) 
Females 
62 
(80.5%) 
Medium-
shot 
51 
(66.2%) 
Individuals 
64 
(83.1%) 
Foreign 
brides 
29 
(37.7%) 
Males 
5 
(6.5%) 
Mosaic 
15 
(19.5%) 
Groups 
.13 
(16.9%) 
Foreign 
daughters-in-
law 
23 
(29.9%) 
Children 
10 
(13.0%) 
Extreme 
Close-up 
3 
(3.9%) 
  
Divorced 
women 
10 
(13.0%) 
  
Back 
view 
3 
(3.9%) 
  
Mixed-
heritage 
children 
9 
(11.7%) 
  Daily life 
5 
(6.5%) 
  
Mixed-
heritage 
adults 
4 
(5.2%) 
      
Non-national 
men married 
to Korean 
women 
1 
(1.3%) 
      
Parents of 
foreign brides 
1 
(1.3%) 
Total 
77 
(100.0) 
 
77 
(100.0) 
 
77 
(100.0) 
 
77 
(100.0) 
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Table 5.14. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Multicultural Family Members 
Gender N(%) 
Visual 
frames 
N(%) 
Representation 
as individuals or 
groups 
N(%) Roles N(%) 
Females 
31 
(44.3%) 
Medium-
shot 
62 
(88.6%) 
Individuals 
68 
(97.1%) 
NGO member 
15 
(21.4%) 
Males 
37 
(52.8%) 
Mosaic 
4 
(5.7%) 
Groups 
2 
(2.9%) 
Government 
official 
13 
(18.6%) 
Children 
2 
(2.9%) 
Back-
view 
1 
(1.4%) 
  
Korean men 
married to  
non-national 
women 
11 
(15.7%) 
  Daily life 
3 
(4.3%) 
  
Parents-in-law 
of foreign 
brides 
8 
(11.4%) 
      Professionals49 
10 
(14.3%) 
      Businessmen 
5 
(7.1%) 
      Foreign brides 
3 
(4.3%) 
      Citizens 
3 
(4.3%) 
      Friends 
2 
(2.9%) 
Total 
70 
(100.0) 
 
70 
(100.0) 
 
70 
(100.0) 
 
70 
(100.0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
49
 6 professors, 2 doctors, 1 teacher and 1 Member of Parliament.  
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Table 5.15. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Visitors) 
 
Non-Whites Whites 
Total Asians 
Blacks Other Whites 
East Southeast Other 
Nationality 
7 Chinese,  
6 Japanese,  
4 Hong 
Kongers,  
1 Taiwanese, 
1 Mongolian 
3 Thais,  
3 Filipinos, 
2 
Bangladeshi, 
1 Malaysian, 
1 Pakistani 
 1 Tanzanian  
21 Americans,  
5 Australians,  
5 Germans, 
3 Canadians, 
3 Frenchs, 
2 Uzbekistanis, 
1 Belgian, 
1 Ukrainian, 
1 Hungarian, 
1 Polish, 
1 Greek 
1 Portuguese, 
1 Italian 
1 Swedish 
1 Dutch 
1 Briton 
13 Unknown 
92 
Total (%) 19 (20.6) 10 (10.9)  1 (1.2)  62 (67.4) 92 (100.0) 
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Table 5.16. Non-nationals in the Frame of Non-nationals as Visitors  
Gender N(%) 
Visual 
frames 
N(%) 
Representation 
as Individuals or 
groups 
N(%) Roles N(%) 
Females 
38 
(41.3) 
Medium- 
shot 
91 
(98.9) 
Individuals 
83 
(90.2) 
Tourists 
35 
(38.0) 
Males 
54 
(58.7) 
Extreme 
close-up 
1 
(1.1) 
Groups 
9 
(9.8) 
International 
students 
17 
(18.5) 
      Professionals50 
17 
(18.5) 
      
Religious 
figures 
6 
(6.5) 
      
Migrant 
workers 
3 
(3.3) 
      
Employees of 
foreign 
companies 
3 
(3.3) 
      Foreign brides 
2 
(2.2) 
      US Army 
1 
(1.1) 
      
Foreign 
ambassadors 
1 
(1.1) 
      
Families of US 
soldiers 
1 
(1.1) 
      Unknown 
6 
(6.5) 
Total 
92 
(100.0) 
 
92 
(100.0) 
 
92 
(100.0) 
 
92 
(100.0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
50
 7 CEOs, 4 professors, 4 teachers, 1 interpreter and 1 journalist. 
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Table 5.17. Koreans in the frame of non-nationals as visitors  
Gender N(%) 
Visual 
frames 
N(%) 
Representation 
as Individuals or 
groups 
N(%) Roles N(%) 
Females 
19 
(35.2) 
Medium-
shot 
45 
(83.3) 
Individuals 
52 
(96.3) 
Citizens 
19 
(35.2) 
Males 
35 
(64.8) 
Extreme 
close-up 
7 
(13.0) 
Groups 
2 
(3.7) 
Professionals51 
16 
(29.6) 
  Daily life 
2 
(3.7) 
  
Government 
officials 
9 
(16.7) 
      Street vendors 
5 
(9.2) 
      
Religious 
figures 
3 
(5.5) 
      NGO figures 
1 
(1.8) 
      CEOs 
1 
(1.8) 
Total 
54 
(100.0) 
 
54 
(100.0) 
 
54 
(100.0) 
 
54 
(100.0) 
 
 
Table 5.18. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Celebrities) 
 Non-Whites Whites 
Total Asians 
Blacks Other Whites 
East Southeast Other 
Nationality 1 Chinese   
8 Americans, 
7 Brazilians, 
2 Dominicans, 
1 Cuban 
24 Mixed-
heritage 
Koreans, 
1 Turkish 
21 Americans, 
1 Canadian, 
1 Serbian,  
1 Russian,  
1 Croatian, 
1 Ukrainian, 
1 Armenian, 
1 German, 
1 Spanish,  
1 Brazilian,  
2 Mexican, 
1 Dutch, 
1 Portuguese 
78 
Total (%) 1 (1.3)   18 (23.1) 25 (32.0) 34 (43.6) 78 (100.0) 
 
                                                         
51
 7 professors, 2 teachers, 1 pharmacist, 2 researchers, 3 chefs and 1 travel guide. 
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Table 5.19. Non-nationals in the Frame of Non-nationals as Celebrities 
Gender N(%) 
Visual 
frames 
N(%) 
Representation 
as individuals or 
groups 
N(%) Roles N(%) 
Males 
67 
(85.9%) 
Medium-
shot 
70 
(89.7%) 
Individuals 
78 
(100.0%) 
Sport players 
62 
(79.5%) 
Females 
11 
(14.1%) 
Part of 
the frame 
2 
(2.6%) 
Groups  
Sport 
managers 
10 
(12.8%) 
  Up-shot 
5 
(6.4%) 
  Governors 
2 
(2.6%) 
  Close- up 
1 
(1.3%) 
  Educators 
2 
(2.6%) 
      Chancellor 
1 
(1.3%) 
      Referee 
1 
(1.3%) 
Total 
78 
(100.0) 
 
78 
(100.0) 
 
78 
(100.0) 
 
78 
(100.0) 
 
 
Table 5.20. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Celebrities 
Gender N(%) 
Visual 
frames 
N(%) 
Representation 
as individuals or 
groups 
N(%) Roles N(%) 
Males 
45 
(83.3%) 
Medium-
shot 
54 
(100.0%) 
Individuals 
54 
(100.0%) 
Sports 
managers 
28 
(51.8%) 
Females 
8 
(14.8%) 
  Groups  Citizens 
7 
(13.0%) 
Children 
1 
(1.9%) 
    Professionals52 
7 
(13.0%) 
      Sports players 
6 
(11.1%) 
      
Korean 
mothers 
5 
(9.2%) 
      Politicians 
1 
(1.9%) 
Total 
54 
(100.0) 
 
54 
(100.0) 
 
54 
(100.0) 
 
54 
(100.0) 
 
 
 
                                                         
52
 3 professors, 2 journalists and 2 sports governors. 
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Table 5.21. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Koreans as Compassionate People) 
 
Non-Whites Whites 
Total Asians 
Blacks Other Whites 
East Southeast Other 
Nationality 
3 Korean-
Chinese, 
3 
Mongolians, 
1 Chinese 
2 Indonesians, 
2 Sri Lankans, 
2 Indians, 
2 Thais, 
1 Bangladeshi, 
1 Filipino 
3 
Uzbekistanis 
   20 
Total (%) 7 (35%) 10 (50%) 3 (15%)    
20 
(100%) 
 
 
Table 5.22. Non-nationals in the Frame of Koreans as Compassionate People 
Gender N(%) 
Visual 
frames 
N(%) 
Representation 
as individuals or 
groups 
N(%) Roles N(%) 
Males 
13 
(65.0%) 
Medium-
shot 
11 
(55.0%) 
Individuals 
11 
(55.0%) 
Migrants 
workers 
17 
(85.0%) 
Females 
5 
(25.0%) 
Close-up 
4 
(20.0%) 
Groups 
9 
(45.0%) 
Students 
2 
(10.0%) 
Children 
2 
(10.0%) 
Back-
view 
1 
(5.0%) 
  
Government 
officials 
1 
(5.0%) 
  
Receiving 
treatment 
4 
(20.0%) 
    
Total 
20 
(100.0) 
 
20 
(100.0) 
 
20 
(100.0) 
 
20 
(100.0) 
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Table 5.23. Koreans in the Frame of Koreans as Compassionate People 
Gender N(%) 
Visual 
frames 
N(%) 
Representation 
as individuals or 
groups 
N(%) Roles N(%) 
Males 
15 
(75.0%) 
Medium-
shot 
10 
(50.0%) 
Individuals 
19 
(95.0%) 
Doctors 
9 
(45.0%) 
Females 
5 
(25.0%) 
Providing 
medical care 
6 
(30.0%) 
Groups 
1 
(5.0%) 
Religious 
figures 
4 
(20.0%) 
  
Having 
conversation 
with non-
national 
3 
(15.0%) 
  
Government 
authorities 
2 
(10.0%) 
  Low-angle 
1 
(5.0%) 
  Citizens 
2 
(10.0%) 
      Educators 
1 
(5.0%) 
      Colleagues 
1 
(5.0%) 
      Producers 
1 
(5.0%) 
Total 
20 
(100.0) 
 
20 
(100.0) 
 
20 
(100.0) 
 
20 
(100.0) 
 
